Henry v. Betit

• Decision Date: 04 February 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. No. A-37-70.
• Citation: 323 F. Supp. 418
• Parties: Abraham HENRY and Sally Henry, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children Virginia, Abraham Earl, Mary Martha, Benjamin David, Abraham, Jr., Joe Carroll and Margaret Carroll, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children Bonnie, Margaret, Lawrence, Debora, Roderick, Brenda, Patsy, Issac John, Jr. and Sarah John, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children Marlene Jean, Alberta, Peter, Julie, Selina, Louise, Elliott Johnson, Jr. and Virginia Johnson, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children John Jacob, Keefer, Keren, Mary, Elliott, Jerene, Alvin and Lawrence, all on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. J. W. BETIT, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Health and Welfare, and Stanley P. Harris, Director, Division of Public Welfare, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Alaska

323 F. Supp. 418

Abraham HENRY and Sally Henry, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children Virginia, Abraham Earl, Mary Martha, Benjamin David, Abraham, Jr., Joe Carroll and Margaret Carroll, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children Bonnie, Margaret, Lawrence, Debora, Roderick, Brenda, Patsy, Issac John, Jr. and Sarah John, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children Marlene Jean, Alberta, Peter, Julie, Selina, Louise, Elliott Johnson, Jr. and Virginia Johnson, on their own behalf and as parents and next friend of their infant children John Jacob, Keefer, Keren, Mary, Elliott, Jerene, Alvin and Lawrence, all on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. J. W. BETIT, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Health and Welfare, and Stanley P. Harris, Director, Division of Public Welfare, Defendants.

Civ. No. A-37-70.

United States District Court, D. Alaska.

February 4, 1971.

G. E. Stein of Alaska Legal Services Corp., Anchorage, Alaska, for plaintiffs.

Charles K. Cranston, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Alaska, Anchorage, Alaska, for defendants.

Before HAMLEY, Circuit Judge, and PLUMMER and VON DER HEYDT, District Judges.

OPINION

PLUMMER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs allege that they are the heads of households in which dependent children reside and that their respective net annual incomes, if determined in accordance with Alaska Welfare Manual § 4643.2, are not greater than the allowable maximum for determining assistance under Alaska's Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act, A.S. §§ 47.25.310-47.25.420 (Supp.1970) amending A.S. 47.25.310-47.25.420 (1962) hereinafter referred to as Alaska's AFDC program.

For purposes of that Act, "dependent child" is a term of art defined as "a needy child under 18 years of age who is deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent," who lives with his father, mother or certain other specified relatives. A.S. § 47.25.410 (Supp.1970).

Plaintiffs contend that their families are ineligible to receive benefits under the Alaska AFDC program solely because the need of their children is caused by the involuntary unemployment,¹ as opposed to the death, absence or incapacity, of the father. Plaintiffs argue that this classification is inconsistent with the avowed purposes of the federal and state AFDC programs in that it provides incentive for unemployed fathers to desert their families in order to obtain the assistance needed to feed and clothe their children. This classification, they assert, places an invidious burden upon the integrity of their family relationships and deprives them of equal protection of the laws.

The case came before the court on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. At the conclusion of oral argument, defendants submitted a cross-motion requesting similar relief.

JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction to hear this case under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1970)² and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3), (4) (1962).³ The expanding scope of these statutes was explored recently in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969). Attempting to reconcile the Supreme Court's acceptance of jurisdiction under these statutes in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 821, 19 L.Ed.2d 869 (1968), which invalidated Alabama's AFDC "man in the house" regulations, with the more conservative interpretation of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 espoused by Mr. Justice Stone in Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496, 518, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939),⁴ Judge Friendly hypothesized that the Alabama statute "not merely caused economic loss to Mrs. Smith's children, but also infringed their liberty to grow up with financial aid for their subsistence * * *." 421 F.2d at 564. While this interpretation of King v. Smith has not been consistently adhered to, McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969), the Supreme Court continues to hear suits alleging wrongful deprivation of welfare benefits under 28 U.S. C.A. § 1343 (1962). Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L. Ed.2d 442 (1970); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed.2d 491 (1970). We conclude that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1962) confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear claims arising under the Social Security Act. McClellan v. Shapiro, 315 F.Supp. 484 (D.Conn.1970).

This court is not deprived of jurisdiction by the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of suits by individuals against the state. It is well established that a suit against a state official who is attempting to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional statute is not a suit against the state. Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 72 S.Ct. 321, 96 L.Ed. 335 (1952); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). While there is no single rule for determining when a state is the real party in interest, if the suit demands a judgment which can only be satisfied by an appropriation from the public treasury it will be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Harrison Construction Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n. 272 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1959). The state argues that a judgment against them in this case would necessarily compel the Legislature to appropriate additional funds for welfare. Plaintiffs, however, have merely asked the court to order responsible state officials to disperse whatever public funds are presently available for welfare in an even-handed fashion. Such a judgment would not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Compare Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F.Supp. 450, 459 (D.Md.1968), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) and Dews v. Henry, 297 F.Supp. 587, 592 (D.Ariz. 1969) with Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12, 18 (D.Me.1970). We conclude that the remedy prayed for in this case raises no Eleventh Amendment issues.

THE MERITS

AFDC was established as a federal grant-in-aid program by Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, Title IV, 49 Stat. 627. The program, as initially enacted, authorized payments on behalf of children who have been "deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent * * *." 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a) (1969). Alaska, as well as every other state, participates in this basic program on a matching fund basis. In order to qualify for federal funds the State must submit a plan "for the aid and services to needy families with children" to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for the Secretary's approval. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602 (1969). Pursuant to these provisions, Alaska received approximately $1,383,300 in 1969 from the federal government.

In 1967 permanent legislation was enacted which made additional grants available to states wishing to provide assistance to children whose need is due to the unemployment of the father. 42 U.S.C.A. § 607 (1969) hereinafter, AFDC-UP. Although § 607 purports to amend the definition of needy child contained in § 606(a), AFDC-UP is optional and not applicable unless described in the plan submitted by the state to the Secretary. 42 U.S.C.A. § 607(b) (1969). Although only about one-half the states currently participate in the AFDC-UP program, plaintiffs contend that the State of Alaska may not refuse to participate in AFDC-UP without violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of families whose need is distinguishable from that of AFDC families only in its origins.

At the outset, plaintiffs contend that the burden imposed by Alaska's AFDC program upon their right to maintain a family association requires that this court apply a strict, or "active", standard of review to the state's action.

The standard test for denial of the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law is stated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1910):

"1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." 220 U.S. at 78-79, 31 S.Ct. at 340.

In cases where a state has made a "suspect classification" or allegedly infringed "fundamental rights" the standard of review is more strict. The court in these cases must closely scrutinize the state action to determine if it is justified by a compelling (as opposed to a merely rational) state interest, and will require that any legislation be tailored so as to impose the least intrusion upon the preferred rights.

The category of "suspect classifications" has been limited to discriminations whose proscription may be clearly inferred from the language and legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as those based on race, alienage and lineage. Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1087-88 (1969). To date the Supreme Court has recognized only a few rights not found in the Constitution which are so fundamental that their infringement requires similar protection.⁵

Plaintiffs argue that the right to maintain the integrity of one's family has been recognized as fundamental.⁶ The...