Henry v. City of Mt. Dora

• Decision Date: 10 November 2014
• Docket Number: Case No: 5:13-cv-528-Oc-30PRL
• Parties: MARIE L. HENRY, as guardian, parent, next of kin, and for and on behalf of M.E. HENRY-ROBINSON, a minor, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MT. DORA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

MARIE L. HENRY, as guardian, parent, next of kin,and for and on behalf of M.E. HENRY-ROBINSON, a minor, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MT. DORA, et al., Defendants.

Case No: 5:13-cv-528-Oc-30PRL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

November 10, 2014

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants Brett Livingston and Ivelisse Severance's Renewed Motion to Dismiss Counts II through V and Count VII of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 26), and Plaintiff's response in opposition thereto (Doc. 27). The Court, having reviewed the applicable pleadings, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, concludes that the motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

On October 31, 2009, the Mt. Dora Police Department received an emergency call complaining that several juveniles were throwing rocks at a building in the downtown area. Officer Brett Livingston and Officer Ivelisse Severance (collectively, the "Officers")responded to the area, and Officer Livingston observed a group of juveniles, including minor M.E., walking downtown.¹ Officer Livingston stopped M.E. and the other juveniles to question them about the alleged incident. M.E. responded that she did not participate in the incident and had no knowledge of it. Officer Livingston then asked M.E. for her name and address, which Plaintiff contends was for the purpose of collecting information for a database. M.E. refused to provide this information to Officer Livingston. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Livingston then grabbed M.E., threw her to the ground, and arrested her for resisting an officer without violence in violation of § 843.02, Florida Statutes (2009). M.E.'s top was pulled down during the arrest exposing her breasts, and when M.E. asked Officer Severance to fix it, she refused.²

Thereafter, on May 21, 2010, the state court issued an order of adjudication and disposition in M.E.'s juvenile delinquency case withholding adjudication of delinquency on the charge of obstructing an officer without violence. (Doc. 34, Ex. B).³ The state court found that M.E. committed the offense of resisting an officer without violence andsentenced her to one-year probation, which required that M.E. complete and comply with various conditions. (Id.).

II. Procedural History

On October 25, 2013, Plaintiff Marie L. Henry initiated this action on behalf of her minor daughter, M.E., arising from M.E.'s arrest on October 31, 2009. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges various claims against the City of Mt. Dora (the "City") and the Officers in their individual and official capacities, including claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) deprivation of civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against the City (Count I); and (2) deprivation of civil rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments against the Officers (Counts II & III). Plaintiff also raises state law claims for (1) false arrest and false imprisonment against the Officers and the City (Counts IV-VI); (2) assault and battery against Officer Livingston and the City (Counts VII & VIII); and (3) negligent training and supervision against the City (Count IX). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, where applicable, costs, and attorney's fees.

The City filed an answer to the complaint on December 10, 2013, (Doc. 8) and filed an amended answer on December 17, 2013 (Doc. 11). The Officers filed a motion to dismiss Counts II through V and Count VII of Plaintiff's complaint on December 27, 2013. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff then filed a motion seeking to strike the motion to dismiss because the motion attached confidential records from M.E.'s juvenile proceedings that were not properly redacted. (Doc. 19). The Court granted the motion to strike, permitting the Officers an opportunity to renew their motion to dismiss and to either attach appropriately redacted confidential records or to file the records under seal. (Doc. 24). The Officersfiled their renewed motion to dismiss on April 28, 2014, and filed M.E.'s confidential records under seal. (Docs. 26, 34).

Currently before the Court is the Officers' renewed motion to dismiss. (Doc. 26). By their motion, the Officers contend that (1) Counts II through V should be dismissed to the extent that those counts allege claims for false arrest because the claims are barred by the principles established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (2) Counts IV and V for false arrest/false imprisonment under state law should be dismissed because Plaintiff's claims for false arrest are barred under Florida law; ⁴ (3) Counts II and III should be dismissed to the extent those counts allege claims for false arrest under § 1983 because the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity; (4) Counts II through V should be dismissed to the extent those counts allege claims against the Officers in their official capacities because those claims are duplicative of the claims alleged against the City; and (5) Count VII should be dismissed to the extent it alleges a claim for assault because it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and evaluate all inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable tothe plaintiff. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts, however, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether Plaintiff's claims for false arrest are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims for false arrest under § 1983 and Florida law (Counts II-V) are barred by the Heck doctrine as espoused in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477.⁵ In Heck, an Indiana state prisoner who was serving a fifteen-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter filed a § 1983 action against county prosecutors and a state police investigator alleging that his manslaughter conviction violated his constitutional rights. Id. The district court dismissed the prisoner's action because the issues it raised "implicated the legality of his confinement," and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 479. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the prisoner's § 1983 claims and held that his claims were barred because

to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, then the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 486-87. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated "[w]e think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution." Id. at 486. Heck's holding can be distilled into three main inquiries: (1) whether there is an underlying conviction or sentence; (2) whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence; and (3) whether the underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated or otherwise favorably terminated.

1. Underlying Conviction or Sentence

Plaintiff asserts that the Officers' contention that Heck applies to Plaintiff's claims for false arrest fails on the first inquiry because the order of adjudication withholding adjudication of delinquency does not constitute a "conviction" for purposes of Heck. The Court disagrees.

Plaintiff is correct in asserting that pursuant to applicable Florida law, an adjudication of delinquency, or in M.E.'s case a withholding of adjudication ofdelinquency,⁶ is not considered a "conviction" and is also not considered a finding of "guilt" as those concepts are understood in the criminal law context. See § 985.35(6), Fla. Stat. ("[A]n adjudication of delinquency by a court with respect to any child who has committed a delinquent act or violation of law shall not be deemed a conviction; nor shall the child be deemed to have been found guilty or to be a criminal by reason of that adjudication."). Rather, if a state court in Florida finds that a juvenile committed a delinquent act or violation of the law, the court is empowered to either withhold adjudication of delinquency or enter an adjudication of delinquency. § 985.35(4)-(5). Both options, however, indicate that the state court found that the juvenile committed a delinquent act or violation of the law. See Menuto, ...