Henry v. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 23 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 39039–2011.,39039–2011.
• Citation: 295 P.3d 528,154 Idaho 143
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph HENRY, Claimant–Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Defendants–Respondents.

154 Idaho 143

295 P.3d 528

Joseph HENRY, Claimant–Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Defendants–Respondents.

No. 39039–2011.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2012 Term.

Jan. 23, 2013.

Rehearing Denied March 5, 2013.

Richard S. Owen, Nampa, argued for appellant.

Bridget A. Vaughan, Special Deputy Attorney General, Boise, argued for respondents.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission finding that the claimant had failed to prove that the heart attack he suffered while at work was an industrial accident because his cardiologist could not determine whether the plaque rupture that caused the heart attack was triggered by events occurring before or after the claimant arrived at work. We hold that the Commission's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and affirm its order denying compensation.

I.Factual Background.

On November 15, 2009, Joseph Henry (Mr. Henry) suffered a heart attack shortly after arriving at his place of employment with the Idaho Department of Correction where he worked as a prison guard. He was transported by ambulance to the hospital and was diagnosed by a cardiologist as having an "acute posterolateral myocardial infarction due to a blockage of the right circumflex obtuse marginal artery." The cardiologist performed emergency surgery to place a stent in the occluded artery. Ten days later, Mr. Henry suffered another cardiac event while undergoing a cardiac stress test, and the following day he underwent triple bypass surgery.

In April 2010, Mr. Henry filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission in which he contended that his heart attack on November 15, 2009, constituted an industrial accident. He also contended that the triple bypass surgery was related to the heart attack and that his heart attack exacerbated his preexisting anxiety disorder, rendering him totally and permanently disabled.

The parties had an evidentiary hearing before a referee, and on June 24, 2011, the referee issued proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that Mr. Henry had failed to prove that his employment caused or contributed to his heart attack. The Commission adopted the referee's proposed findings and conclusions and issued an order that Mr. Henry had failed to prove he suffered an industrial accident. Mr. Henry then timely appealed.

II.Did the Industrial Commission Apply the Wrong Burden of Proof as to Causation?

The issue in this case was the cause of Mr. Henry's heart attack. It is undisputed that he had preexisting medical conditions and activities that increased the likelihood that he would suffer a heart attack. His preexisting condition certainly would not preclude him from being awarded benefits under the worker's compensation law. "Compensation is recoverable where an employee's work ... causes an accident which aggravates or accelerates a previous disease condition of the employee, and an employee must establish his employment caused or contributed to his injury—here the myocardial infarction." Horner v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985).

Mr. Henry argues that the Commission misapplied the law by requiring him to prove that his industrial accident was the sole cause of his heart attack and that his preexisting conditions were not a cause. As will be shown when discussing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Commission's conclusion, Mr. Henry's assertion is incorrect. The Commission did not require that Mr. Henry prove that his heart attack was caused solely or even primarily by his employment. Rather, it found that he "failed to establish to a reasonable medical probability that his heart attack was triggered by his activities at work on November 15, 2009."

III.Are the Commission's Findings of Fact Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence?

"When this Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, it exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings." Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002). Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. Because the Commission is the finder of fact, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. This Court does not weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Id. Whether the Commission correctly applied the law to the facts is an issue of law over which we exercise free review. Combes v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 430, 432, 942 P.2d 554, 556 (1997).

It is undisputed that prior to his heart attack, Mr. Henry had preexisting medical conditions that increased his risk of a heart attack. At the time of the heart attack, Mr. Henry was 54 years of age. He had suffered from chronic anxiety for about 14 years, and in 2004 he had been instructed to resume taking medication for hypertension that he had been prescribed in 2003. In 2001 he was diagnosed with sleep apnea and was subsequently prescribed a C–Pap device. In 2004 he was diagnosed with hypercholesterolemia with a total cholesterol level of 298; he was prescribed medication for that condition in 2006; and he had a cholesterol level of 328 on March 21, 2008. At the time of his heart attack, he had been smoking cigarettes for about 38 years and was smoking one and one-half packs a day.

On the day of his heart attack, Mr. Henry had preexisting atherosclerosis, with three different coronary arteries having some degree of stenosis due to the buildup of plaque. His right coronary artery was occluded, but it was being supported by collaterals from the obtuse marginal branch system. The occlusion of the right coronary artery was not then causing any symptoms. Mr. Henry's heart attack occurred when the obtuse marginal branch of the circumflex coronary artery became occluded. He was transferred to the hospital, where he underwent a cardiac catheterization procedure and an angioplasty stent procedure. He spent two days in the hospital and fully recovered from that heart attack. A stress test conducted ten days after the heart attack revealed the right coronary artery occlusion, for which he underwent triple bypass surgery.

Mr. Henry's preexisting condition is not a bar to receiving benefits. "An employer takes an employee as it finds him or her; a preexisting infirmity does not eliminate the opportunity for a worker's compensation claim provided the employment aggravated or accelerated the injury for which compensation is sought." Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 33, 43 P.3d 788, 792 (2002). "Aggravation of a preexisting condition may constitute an injury if it is precipitated by an accident." Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 138 Idaho 309, 312, 63 P.3d 435, 438 (2003). An "accident" is defined as "an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury." I.C. § 72–102(18)(b). "The claimant must prove to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the injury for which benefits are claimed is causally related to an accident occurring in the course of employment." Stevens–McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 332, 179 P.3d 288, 295 (2008).

In this case, Mr. Henry's cardiologist was the only medical expert who testified regarding the causation of the heart attack. He explained that the heart attack was caused when preexisting atherosclerotic plaque in Mr. Henry's artery ruptured, which was the inciting event of a coronary thrombosis. The issue with respect to causation was whether the plaque rupture was causally related to Mr. Henry's employment.

The cardiologist testified that mental stress, anxiety, exercise, and cold weather can cause blood pressure to go up, which puts hemodynamic stress on the artery, and that "the hemodynamic stress and probably other factors that are hormonal related release of certain hormones during stress and anxiety can cause an atherosclerotic plaque to rupture." Prior to the hearing, Mr. Henry's attorney sent a letter to the cardiologist asking whether certain specified conditions that existed with respect to Mr. Henry's employment could have caused his heart attack. The conditions included mental stress, anxiety, physical exertion, and being in cold weather. The attorney described them in the letter as follows:

Mr. Henry arrived for work on the morning of November 15, 2009, very early, about 6:30 a.m. Mr. Henry tells me that it was below freezing, dark and windy out at the state prison south of Boise.

Mr. Henry was late to work and got out of his car and walked quickly to the first building which Mr. Henry tells me is approximately 75 yo [sic] 100 yards away from the parking lot. By the time Mr. Henry got to the first administration building he did not feel very good, kind of had a general feeling of malaise, but had no specific symptoms.

Mr. Henry went in to the administration building where it was nice and warm and went through a check through process required by his employer. He then went back outside and walked as fast as he could another 450 yards to a second building. Mr. Henry tells me that he was late to work, worried about his job, and walked as fast as he could this last 450 yards in the cold weather.

By the time Mr. Henry got to the front door of the second building, he was sweating profusely and his co-workers immediately asked if he was alright. Mr. Henry indicates that he was taken to a break room and sat down. Over the next half hour, he continued to sweat profusely, his heart was racing, and these symptoms continually and gradually got worse. By 7:00 a.m., Mr.

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