Henry v. Fandrich

• Decision Date: 16 March 2018
• Docket Number: 262,OP 17–01798
• Citation: 70 N.Y.S.3d 139 (Mem)
• Parties: In the Matter of Charles E. HENRY, Jr., Petitioner-Plaintiff, v. Hon. Mark H. FANDRICH, Jon E. Budelmann, Esq., Cayuga County District Attorney's Office and County of Cayuga, Respondents–Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

159 A.D.3d 1409

70 N.Y.S.3d 139 (Mem)

In the Matter of Charles E. HENRY, Jr., Petitioner-Plaintiff,

v.Hon. Mark H. FANDRICH, Jon E. Budelmann, Esq., Cayuga County District Attorney's Office and County of Cayuga, Respondents–Defendants.

262

OP 17–01798

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: March 16, 2018

JARROD W. SMITH, P.L.L.C., JORDAN (JARROD W. SMITH OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER–PLAINTIFF.

JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (FREDERICK R. WESTPHAL OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS–DEFENDANTS JON E. BUDELMANN, ESQ., CAYUGA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND COUNTY OF CAYUGA.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, DEJOSEPH, AND CURRAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDERMemorandum:

Petitioner–plaintiff (petitioner) commenced this original hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking, inter alia, a declaration that he is eligible for judicial diversion and that respondent-defendant judge (respondent judge) should have referred his case to the Cayuga County Treatment Court Judge for a hearing. Respondent judge found that petitioner was statutorily eligible for diversion pursuant to CPL 216.00, but he denied petitioner's application to transfer his case to judicial diversion. We conclude that petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief. "[T]he remedy of mandamus is available to compel a governmental entity or officer to perform a ministerial duty, but does not lie to compel an act which involves an exercise of judgment or discretion" ( Matter of Brusco v. Braun , 84 N.Y.2d 674, 679, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724 [1994] ). Inasmuch as the determination whether to allow a defendant to participate in judicial diversion is a discretionary one to be made by the court (see CPL 216.05[4] ; People v. Driscoll , 147 A.D.3d 1157, 1159, 48 N.Y.S.3d 522 [3d Dept. 2017], lv. denied 29 N.Y.3d 1078, 86 N.E.3d 255, 64 N.Y.S.3d 168, 86 N.E.3d 255 [2017] ; Matter of Doorley v. DeMarco , 106 A.D.3d 27, 34, 962 N.Y.S.2d 546 [4th Dept. 2013] ), petitioner has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought (see Matter of Carty v. Hall , 92 A.D.3d 1191, 1192, 939 N.Y.S.2d 609 [3d Dept. 2012] ; Matter of Duffy v. Jaeger , 78 A.D.3d 830, 830, 910 N.Y.S.2d 654 [2d Dept. 2010], lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 705, 2011 WL 2566538 [2011] ; see generally Matter of Francois v. Dolan , 95 N.Y.2d 33, 37, 709 N.Y.S.2d 898, 731 N.E.2d 614 [2000] ). We further conclude that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of prohibition or declaratory relief. Those forms of relief are not appropriate where a criminal defendant may "raise legal arguments and receive appropriate relief ... in the criminal prosecution" ( Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould , 14 N.Y.3d 614, 633, 904 N.Y.S.2d 312, 930 N.E.2d 233 [2010], cert. denied 562 U.S. 953, 131 S.Ct. 353, 178 L.Ed.2d 251 [2010] ). Petitioner may raise the legal arguments he now raises in an appeal from any subsequent judgment of conviction (see e.g. People v. Chavis , 151 A.D.3d 1757, 1758, 56...