Henry v Henry

Citation48 S.W.3d 468
Parties<!--48 S.W.3d 468 (Tex.App.-Houston 2001) NORMA JEAN HENRY, Appellant v. IAN FRANCIS HENRY, Appellee NO. 14-98-01032-CV Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.)
Decision Date07 June 2001
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Panel consists of Justices Sears, Draughn, and Lee.*

OPINION

Norman Lee, Justice (Assigned).

Norma Jean Henry appeals from a trial court judgment granting divorce on the ground of her cruel treatment of her husband, Ian Francis Henry. In three points of error, Norma challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of cruel treatment; (2) the division of the community estate; and (3) the assessment of attorney's fees against her. We will affirm the parts of the judgment regarding cruel treatment and attorney's fees (to the extent based on a suit affecting the parent-child relationship), and we will reverse and remand for a new division of the property.

I. Marital History

Ian and Norma were married on June 30, 1990. The couple resided in Red Deer, Canada, and Ian worked as a millwright for Nova, where he had worked for the nine previous years. Norma was working part-time as a nurse while going to school to become a registered nurse. The couple's first child, Aaron, was born on July 14, 1991, and a second son, Dillon, was born on December 28, 1992.

In 1994, Ian learned that his employer was downsizing and that he would be eligible for a severance package. The couple then began looking to move. Norma found a job with a hospital in Corpus Christi and moved to Texas in May of 1995. Ian stayed in Canada with the children for nine more weeks in order to sell the house and complete his employment. For the next year, Norma worked the night shift at the hospital, and Ian was unemployed. The first of four marital separations occurred in late December of 1995.

In August 1996, the family moved to League City. Ian began working for Brown and Root, and Norma began working for Vitas. A second marital separation occurred in November 1996 and a third in January 1997. In March 1997, Ian began working a fourteen day on/ fourteen day off schedule for Shell Offshore. A fourth separation began on April 8, 1997, and Ian filed for divorce on April 16.

On January 19, 1998, Ian and Norma entered into a mediated settlement agreement, which purported to resolve all issues relating to the children and the division of property except for the disposition of three accounts and the couple's vehicles. After a two day trial, the trial court granted divorce on the ground of cruel treatment as plead by Ian. The court also awarded a majority of the three accounts to Ian, granted certain reimbursement claims in his favor, and ordered Norma to pay Ian's attorney's fees.

II. Cruel Treatment

Norma first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding of cruel treatment. Findings of fact in a bench trial have the same force and dignity as a jury verdict; thus an appellate court reviews sufficiency challenges to findings of fact by the same standards as apply in reviewing a jury's findings. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). In reviewing for legal sufficiency, we consider only the evidence and inferences supporting the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 953 S.W.2d 733, 738 (Tex. 1997). If more than a scintilla of probative evidence supports the finding, the no evidence challenge fails. Id. More than a scintilla of evidence exists where the evidence supporting the finding, as a whole, rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119 (1998). In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we weigh all of the evidence in the record and overturn the finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996).

Although seldom used since the advent of no-fault divorce, it is still possible for a court to grant a divorce on the ground of cruel treatment. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.002 (Vernon 1998). To constitute cruel treatment, the conduct of the accused party must rise to such a level as to render the couples' living together insupportable. Id.; Finn v. Finn, 185 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1945, no writ). "Insupportable" in this context means "incapable of being borne, unendurable, insufferable, intolerable." Cantwell v. Cantwell, 217 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1948, writ. dism'd). Mere trivial matters or disagreements do not justify the granting of divorce for cruel treatment. Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1969, no writ). See also Golden v. Golden, 238 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1951, no writ)(complaining spouse suffered only some nervousness and embarrassment). Acts occurring after separation can support a finding of cruel treatment. Redwine v. Redwine, 198 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1946, no writ).

A. Legal Sufficiency

We first examine the record for the legal sufficiency of the evidence concerning cruel treatment, considering only evidence and inferences that support the finding. See Minnesota Mining, 953 S.W.2d at 738. Ian claims that after the move to Texas, Norma underwent a lifestyle change and began going out with a group of single girls from work. He further stated that at times she made him feel excluded from family and social activities, including when she took one of the children on a yacht owned by a single male doctor friend and when she joined a volleyball club but did not invite him to join. Ian further complains that Norma took a vacation back to Canada with the children at a time when he could not go because he had just started a new job.

Ian testified that each of the four separations was instigated by Norma and that she never told him why she wanted him out of the house; she just told him to go. He attended marriage counseling without her and could only get her to go one time. During the fourth separation, the couple alternated who stayed in the apartment with the children, and Ian testified that Norma abandoned the family for eight days and refused to say where she was staying.

Ian stated that, after he filed for divorce, he got an apartment next door to the one where Norma and the children lived. He said that the lease was about to expire on the old apartment, and Norma invited him over for coffee one night, seduced him, and asked him if she and the children could move in with him. He assented. He then went to work offshore for two weeks, thinking they had reconciled, but when he returned she had moved most of their things out of the new apartment, and she told him she wanted to go through with the divorce.

Ian further testified that, after the divorce was filed, whenever he went to pick up the children for visitation, they were dressed in dirty or torn clothes, and Norma would not give him things for the children that he had requested and she had agreed to give. Also, when he went to pick up his personal property pursuant to the settlement agreement, he found the items sitting in a flower bed, and several things were missing. They arranged to exchange a bookcase, which had been missing from the first exchange, and when he went to pick it up, he found it face down on the road.

Ian's testimony presented evidence on which the court could have reasonably concluded that Norma's conduct constituted cruel treatment such that the marriage was made insupportable. See Merrell Dow, 953 S.W.2d at 711. The evidence is, therefore, legally sufficient to support the finding, and we will not disturb the trial court's conclusion.

B. Factual Sufficiency

We now examine the evidence for factual sufficiency, weighing all of the evidence in the record and overturning the finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Ortiz, 917 S.W.2d at 772. Norma disagreed that all of the separations were at her insistence. She testified that during one separation, Ian told her that he did not love her. She maintained that there was a communication problem in the marriage and that the fact that they both worked long and irregular hours made working through problems difficult. She stated that they attended marriage counseling in Canada at her request before they moved to Texas. She further testified that she never threatened legal action against Ian, as he contended, and that he had been saying that they should just agree on the divorce and not take it to court up to the time that he filed the lawsuit. She said that he moved some of his belongings out of the property before having her served and that he moved into the apartment next door to continue to exert control over the family. She stated that she did not seduce him during the pendency of the divorce. She tried to use a credit card during this period but found that Ian had cancelled it. She insisted that she did not intend to leave the bookcase in danger of being damaged, it just happened to fall over.

The vast majority of the evidence regarding cruel treatment in this case comes from the testimony of Ian and Norma. There were no other witnesses called at trial except for the trial attorneys, who principally testified regarding legal fees. The weight to be given the respective testimony of Ian and Norma, therefore, is largely a matter of judging the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. This court is not permitted to interfere with the fact finder's resolution of conflicts in the evidence or to pass on the weight or credibility...

To continue reading

Request your trial
54 cases
  • Lynch v. Lynch
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 14, 2017
    ...if the error materially affects the court's just and right division of the property." Kemp , 2013 WL 5891583, at *6 (citing Henry v. Henry , 48 S.W.3d 468, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (in turn relying on Jacobs v. Jacobs , 687 S.W.2d 731, 732–33 (Tex. 1985) ). Accordi......
  • In re Marriage of Stallworth
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 2, 2023
    ... ... of evidence exists ... to support the lower court's finding, the legal ... sufficiency challenge fails."); Henry v. Henry , ... 48 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no ... pet.) ("More than a scintilla of evidence exists where ... ...
  • Kelly v. Kelly
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 26, 2021
    ...by reason of years of service" or must be a "form of deferred compensation which is earned during each month of service." Henry v. Henry , 48 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (quoting Whorrall v. Whorrall , 691 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, writ dism'd)......
  • Sandone v. Miller-Sandone
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 31, 2003
    ...as part of a just and right division of property. Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247, 255(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Henry v. Henry, 48 S.W.3d 468, 480 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Capellen v. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT