Henry v. Jersey City Police Dep't, Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-05480-SDW-LDW

• Decision Date: 20 April 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-05480-SDW-LDW
• Parties: TEVIN HENRY, Plaintiff, v. JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

TEVIN HENRY, Plaintiff, v. JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-05480-SDW-LDW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

April 20, 2016

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant New Jersey Transit Corporation ("NJT")¹ and the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants State of New Jersey and Hudson County Prosecutor's Office ("HCPO") (collectively, "Defendants"), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).² This Court, having considered the parties' submissions, decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motions are GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Tevin Henry ("Plaintiff") was riding a bicycle on or about November 1, 2012, at approximately 9:30 p.m., in Jersey City, New Jersey, when "one of the Defendants flashed [his or her] headlights at . . . Plaintiff." (Am. Compl. 4 ¶¶ 3-4.) After the headlight flashing, Plaintiff heard someone yell "freeze" and then saw between ten and twelve people run toward him. (Id. at 5 ¶¶ 5-6.) According to Plaintiff, he stopped, dropped his bicycle to the ground, and put his hands in the air. (Id. at 5 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was then "immediately assaulted by the Defendants," who "pushed [Plaintiff's] face into the ground[,] . . . began hitting him with flashlights and night sticks [sic] in the face[,] . . . . twisted his ankles and kicked and stepped on his chest." (Id. at 5 ¶¶ 9, 10.)

Plaintiff also claims he was searched after the alleged assault. (Id. at 5 ¶ 11.) Although Defendants purportedly accused Plaintiff of possessing a firearm, the search only yielded a flashlight, which Defendants subsequently broke. (Id. at 5 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was released "a short time later." (Id. at 5 ¶ 12.)

According to Plaintiff, his assailants were a group of law enforcement officers or officials from the Jersey City Police Department, Hudson County Prosecutor's Office, Hudson County Sheriff's Office, and New Jersey Transit Police Department. (Id. at 2-3 ¶¶ 2-5.) Plaintiff claims the assault caused him to sustain "severe and grievous permanent injuries." (Id. at 5 ¶14.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County; which Defendants County of Hudson and Hudson County Sheriff's Office subsequently removed to this Court on September 2, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) On October 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, naming a number of individual police officers andentities as defendants, including Defendants NJT, State of New Jersey, and HCPO. (Dkt. No. 28.) The Amended Complaint seeks damages, costs, and fees from Defendants for deliberate indifference, recklessness, negligence, assault, battery, intentional misconduct, and violation of Plaintiff's equal protection and due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985; the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2 ("NJCRA"); and "all applicable New Jersey State Laws." (See Am. Compl.)

On November 12, 2015, Defendant NJT filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 35.) On January 8, 2016, Defendants State of New Jersey and HCPO filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, also pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 45.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) by challenging jurisdiction facially or factually. Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction "considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not present a question of federal law . . . ." Id. at 358. In contrast, a factual challenge "is an argument that there is no subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case . . . do not support the asserted jurisdiction." Id. Drawing this distinction is important because it "determines how the pleading must be reviewed." Id. at 357-58 (citing In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)). In analyzing a facial challenge, "the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documentsreferenced therein and attached thereto . . . ." Constitution Party of Pennsylvania, 757 F.3d at 348 (citing In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d at 243). Whereas in considering a factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, the court "may look beyond the pleadings to ascertain the facts." Constitution Party of Pennsylvania, 757 F.3d at 348. Furthermore, in considering a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, "the plaintiff's allegations enjoy no presumption of truthfulness, and [the plaintiff] bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction." Meehan v. Taylor, No. CIV. 12-4079, 2013 WL 4517943, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2013) (first citing CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008); then citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. ¶ Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint allege "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 "requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of an entitlement to relief").

In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "the tenet that a court must acceptas true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are "plausible" is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the "well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint should be dismissed for failing to "show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief" as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants argue in their Motions that they are entitled to immunity from suit in this Court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. No. 35-4 at 5-24; Dkt. No. 45-1 at 6-11.) As Plaintiff withdrew his claims against Defendant State of New Jersey, those claims are dismissed. (See Dkt. No. 52 at 2.) Therefore, this Court must determine whether Defendants NJT and HCPO are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

a. NJT is Entitled to Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment states:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although these terms provide states with immunity from private claims in federal court by citizens of other states, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment also provides immunity for states from claims by their own citizens. See Pennhurst States Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). In addition, Eleventh Amendmentimmunity extends to entities, such as state departments and agencies, in cases where the "state is the real party in interest," because the entity is an arm of the state. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (1989) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)); Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 545 (3d Cir. 2007), amended on reh'g (Mar. 8, 2007) (first citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); then citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 101).

In order to determine whether a defendant-entity in a particular federal case is an arm of the state such that the state is the real party in interest, courts apply the three-factor test outlined in Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659. The three-factor test requires the court to determine: "(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would come from the state . . . ; (2) The status of the agency under state law . . . ; and (3) What degree of autonomy the agency has." Id.

In Fitchik, the Third Circuit determined that NJT was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 644. However, in reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit gave primacy to the first Fitchik factor (whether the state would pay a judgment against NJT). Id. at 659-60; see also id. at 664 ("The majority reaches this result by relying, in essence, only on its analysis of . . . the impact of a judgment against [NJT] on the treasury of the State of New...