Henry v. Okeechobee Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 18 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-12520 |
| Parties | FREDERICK HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OKEECHOBEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, a Florida Governmental Entity, SHERIFF OF OKEECHOBEE COUNTY, in his official capacity, BRANDON WILSON, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-14451-DMM
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
Frederick Henry appeals from two district court orders entered in favor of Noel Stephen in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Okeechobee County -- one partially dismissing Henry's complaint and a second denying Henry's motion to amend the complaint. Henry sued Sheriff Stephen and Correctional Officer Brandon Wilson, alleging one count of negligence under Florida state law, two counts of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations for inadequate conditions of confinement and a failure to train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and one count of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). At the motion to dismiss stage, the district court dismissed the three federal claims against Stephen and all four claims against Wilson. Then after the deadline to amend his complaint had passed, Henry moved to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his ADA and negligence claims. The district court denied that motion.
On appeal, Henry challenges the district court's order dismissing his ADA claim against Sheriff Stephen and its order denying his motion to amend his complaint. After careful review, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over the order denying the motion to amend, but we affirm the order dismissing the ADA claim.
The relevant facts, as alleged in Henry's first amended complaint, are these. Henry was a pretrial detainee in Okeechobee County Jail. He suffers from paraplegia and requires a wheelchair to move around. Henry explained that when he was detained, the jail provided him with a wheelchair, but it could not fit through the entrance of his holding cell. As a result, Officer Wilson put Henry in a room used by attorneys visiting with inmates. According to Henry that room did not have a bed, so Wilson placed a mattress on top of a desk and helped Henry onto the desk to sleep. In the middle of the night, Henry fell from the desk and suffered injuries. When Henry told Wilson about his injuries, Wilson allegedly refused to help and instructed Henry to lay on the floor with the mattress. Henry says he continued to complain about leg and back pain until he was transported to Raulerson Hospital, where he received diagnoses of neck, hip, and back sprains, knee pain, and a contusion.
Thereafter Henry sued the Okeechobee County Sheriff's Office and Sheriff Noel Stephen, in his official capacity, in Florida state court.[1] In that complaint, Henry brought the Florida negligence claim, in addition to the three federal claims -- the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violation under § 1983 for inadequate conditions of confinement, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violation under § 1983 for failure to train, and the ADA violation for disability discrimination. The defendants properly removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After removal, Henry amended his complaint, adding Officer Wilson as a defendant in his individual and official capacities under all four counts. Officer Wilson then moved to dismiss all four counts, and Sheriff Stephen moved to dismiss the three federal counts.
On June 15, 2021, the district court granted the motion to dismiss all four counts against Officer Wilson. The court also granted the motion to dismiss the two § 1983 claims and the ADA claim against Sheriff Stephen without prejudice, expressing skepticism that any amendment could state a claim but permitting one by June 25 "in an abundance of caution." That deadline to amend the complaint passed, and Henry did not amend the complaint. At that point, then, all that remained for the district court to decide was the outstanding negligence claim against Stephen, which Stephen had not moved to dismiss. On July 7, the district court ordered Henry to reply by the next day to confirm that he was forgoing any amendment to the three federal claims. Henry responded that he did not plan to amend the complaint and expressed his intent to file a motion for the district court to reconsider its order dismissing his ADA claim.
Sure enough, on July 13, Henry moved the district court to reconsider its order dismissing his ADA claim. The district court denied the motion the next day. Then, on July 16, Henry moved to amend his complaint. His proposed second amended complaint contained only two counts -- one for negligence under Florida law and one for disability discrimination under the ADA -- and alleged more facts to support those claims. On July 20, Sheriff Stephen moved for summary judgment on the only remaining count (the negligence claim) from the first amended complaint, and, a few days later, he filed a response opposing Henry's motion to amend the complaint. On July 27, without commenting on the merits of the proposed second amended complaint, the district court denied the motion to amend for failure to show good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. Henry then appealed the district court's order granting the motion to dismiss the ADA claim and its order denying the motion to amend.
Notably, at the time of appeal, Henry's negligence claim remained live, and Stephen's motion for summary judgment on that claim was still pending. After he filed the notice of appeal, however, Henry moved to remand the negligence claim to state court.
Over Stephen's opposition, the district court agreed and remanded the negligence claim to Florida state court and closed the case.
This timely appeal follows.
For starters, we must evaluate, on de novo review, whether we have appellate jurisdiction. See Frulla v. CRA Holdings, Inc., 543 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2008); Van Poyck v. Singletary, 11 F.3d 146, 148 (11th Cir. 1994). "To be appealable, an order must either be final or fall into a specific class of interlocutory orders that are made appealable by statute or jurisprudential exception." CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000). We first consider the district court order granting the motion to dismiss, and then its order denying the motion to amend the complaint. The punchline is that we have jurisdiction over the former, but not the latter.
Usually, we judge whether an appeal is timely based on the date of the notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(d)(1). If, by that date, the court entered an order "that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the courts to do but execute the judgment," then there is an appealable final order. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake Cnty., 947 F.3d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In this case, on the date of the notice of appeal, Henry's negligence claim against Stephen was still pending. Thus, the order granting Stephen's motion to dismiss the three federal counts was not an appealable final order.
That said, "we have appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders through a limited number of pathways," including statutes, rules, and judge-made doctrines. Jenkins v. Prime Ins. Co., 32 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022). First, among other things, a district court may certify for appeal "an order not otherwise appealable" if it "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Second, a district court "may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay," pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Third, a party can seek review under the judge-made collateral order doctrine if the interlocutory order "(1) conclusively determine[s] a disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) present[s] a question that would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Jenkins, 32 F.4th at 1345 (quotations omitted). Fourth, under the doctrine of practical finality, we review an order that "direct[s] immediate execution and subject[s] the losing party to irreparable harm if appellate review is delayed until conclusion of the case." Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal as Tr. of Mut. Benefits Keep Pol'y Tr., 22 F.4th 979, 992 (11th Cir. 2022). Fifth, we occasionally allow review of "an order of marginal finality . . . if the question presented is fundamental to further conduct of the case." Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Ft. Lauderdale v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989). However, none of these longstanding exceptions apply here, nor do the parties argue otherwise.
One avenue remains for Henry: cumulative finality. Under the doctrine of cumulative finality, "a premature notice of appeal is valid if it is filed from an order dismissing a claim or party, and is followed by a subsequent final judgment, even without a new notice of appeal being filed." Jimenez-Morales v. U.S. Att'y Gen. 821 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016); accord Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d 1378, 1385 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Olvarrieta, 812 F.2d 640, 642 (11th Cir. 1987); Govern v. Meese, 811 F.2d 1405, 1408 (11th Cir. 1987); Kramer v. Unitas, 831 F.2d 994, 997 (11th Cir. 1987); Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 941 F.2d 1484, 1486 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991). Our...
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