Henry v. Purnell
Citation | 501 F.3d 374 |
Decision Date | 20 September 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 06-1523.,06-1523. |
Parties | Frederick P. HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert PURNELL, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
John Francis Breads, Jr., Local Government Insurance Trust, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Eric M. May, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, SHEDD, Circuit Judge, and WIDENER, Senior Circuit Judge.1
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge SHEDD wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge WILLIAMS joined.
While attempting to use a Taser to stop Frederick P. Henry from fleeing arrest, Somerset County (Maryland) Deputy Sheriff Robert Purnell mistakenly drew his firearm, rather than his Taser, from his holster. Not realizing the mistake, Purnell then shot and wounded Henry. Consequently, Henry filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, claiming that Purnell violated his right to be free from the use of excessive force during arrest. Purnell moved for summary judgment, arguing that he did not violate Henry's rights and, in any event, that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim and Maryland statutory immunity on the state-law claim. The district court denied the motion, Henry v. Purnell, 428 F.Supp.2d 393 (D.Md.2006), and Purnell now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's order in part, vacate it in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.
We have jurisdiction to review "final decisions" of district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of . . . § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity also provides a basis for consideration of other district court rulings that are "inextricably intertwined with the decision of the lower court to deny qualified immunity" or when "consideration of the additional issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the qualified immunity question." Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir.1996). Claims are "inextricably intertwined" when the resolution of one claim necessarily resolves the other claim. Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 207 n. 10 (4th Cir.2003).
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [government] conduct." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Thus, qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
When a government official properly asserts qualified immunity, the threshold question that a court must answer is whether the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.2 "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id. However, "if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established" — that is, "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 201, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
The "answer to both Saucier questions must be in the affirmative in order for a plaintiff to defeat a . . . motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds." Batten v. Gomez, 324 F.3d 288, 293-94 (4th Cir.2003).3 The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the first question — i.e., whether a constitutional violation occurred. Bryant v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir.1993) (); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) ( ); Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir.2006) ( ); Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 642 (4th Cir.2002) ( ). The defendant bears the burden of proof on the second question — i.e., entitlement to qualified immunity. Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir.2003) (); see also Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 739 (4th Cir.2003) (same); Tanner v. Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir.1985) (); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1014 (4th Cir.1981) ();4 cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) ( ); but cf. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 n. 24, 102 S.Ct. 2727 ( ).5
With these principles in mind, we begin our Saucier analysis by considering the initial question of whether the facts, when viewed in Henry's favor, show that Purnell used excessive force in arresting him and, therefore, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ( ). Purnell primarily argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he did not "seize" Henry within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) ( ).
The first step in assessing whether Purnell violated Henry's Fourth Amendment right is to determine the relevant facts. Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Because the parties do not challenge the district court's basic statement of the underlying facts, which appear to be presented favorably for Henry, we adopt and set forth that statement:
Having identified the relevant facts, we now turn to the question of whether these facts establish that Purnell seized Henry within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied." Brendlin v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (citations and internal...
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