Henry v. Purnell

Citation501 F.3d 374
Decision Date20 September 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-1523.,06-1523.
PartiesFrederick P. HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert PURNELL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

John Francis Breads, Jr., Local Government Insurance Trust, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Eric M. May, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, SHEDD, Circuit Judge, and WIDENER, Senior Circuit Judge.1

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge SHEDD wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge WILLIAMS joined.

OPINION

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

While attempting to use a Taser to stop Frederick P. Henry from fleeing arrest, Somerset County (Maryland) Deputy Sheriff Robert Purnell mistakenly drew his firearm, rather than his Taser, from his holster. Not realizing the mistake, Purnell then shot and wounded Henry. Consequently, Henry filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, claiming that Purnell violated his right to be free from the use of excessive force during arrest. Purnell moved for summary judgment, arguing that he did not violate Henry's rights and, in any event, that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim and Maryland statutory immunity on the state-law claim. The district court denied the motion, Henry v. Purnell, 428 F.Supp.2d 393 (D.Md.2006), and Purnell now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's order in part, vacate it in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

I

We have jurisdiction to review "final decisions" of district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of . . . § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity also provides a basis for consideration of other district court rulings that are "inextricably intertwined with the decision of the lower court to deny qualified immunity" or when "consideration of the additional issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the qualified immunity question." Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir.1996). Claims are "inextricably intertwined" when the resolution of one claim necessarily resolves the other claim. Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 207 n. 10 (4th Cir.2003).

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular [government] conduct." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Thus, qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

When a government official properly asserts qualified immunity, the threshold question that a court must answer is whether the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.2 "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id. However, "if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established" — that is, "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 201, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

The "answer to both Saucier questions must be in the affirmative in order for a plaintiff to defeat a . . . motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds." Batten v. Gomez, 324 F.3d 288, 293-94 (4th Cir.2003).3 The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the first question — i.e., whether a constitutional violation occurred. Bryant v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir.1993) ("Once the defendant raises a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law"); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (noting that the Court's qualified immunity holding in Harlow "related only to the scope of an affirmative defense" and did not change "the plaintiff's burden of proving a constitutional violation"); Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir.2006) (affirming summary judgment in qualified immunity appeal "because the plaintiff failed to bring forth admissible evidence from which the jury could conclude" that the officer used excessive force); Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 642 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that a § 1983 plaintiff "must prove the illegality of the seizure"). The defendant bears the burden of proof on the second question — i.e., entitlement to qualified immunity. Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir.2003) ("The burden of proof and persuasion with respect to a claim of qualified immunity is on the defendant official."); see also Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 739 (4th Cir.2003) (same); Tanner v. Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir.1985) ("It is a well established principle that qualified immunity . . . is a matter on which the burden of proof is allocated to the defendants."); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1014 (4th Cir.1981) ("the good faith immunity of individual police officers is an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant");4 cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (noting that in a § 1983 action "the burden is on the official claiming immunity to demonstrate his entitlement"); but cf. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 n. 24, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (explaining that the Court had not decided which party bears the burden of proof).5

II

With these principles in mind, we begin our Saucier analysis by considering the initial question of whether the facts, when viewed in Henry's favor, show that Purnell used excessive force in arresting him and, therefore, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (holding that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard"). Purnell primarily argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he did not "seize" Henry within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (noting that the "Fourth Amendment covers only `searches and seizures'").

A.

The first step in assessing whether Purnell violated Henry's Fourth Amendment right is to determine the relevant facts. Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Because the parties do not challenge the district court's basic statement of the underlying facts, which appear to be presented favorably for Henry, we adopt and set forth that statement:

"On October 9, 2003, an arrest warrant was issued for Henry for failing to obey a court order to either pay his child support arrearage or report to a detention center to serve a jail sentence for failure to pay. On October 20, Purnell went to Henry's last known address in Eden, Maryland, in an attempt to arrest him. The officer discovered Henry at that address but Henry avoided arrest by lying about his identity. Soon thereafter, Purnell learned that the man he had talked to was in fact Henry. Three days later, Purnell noticed Henry in a passing truck, followed him, and pulled into a driveway alongside the truck. Purnell ordered Henry out of the truck. Henry complied but fled before he could be handcuffed. Purnell claims Henry pushed him in the course of escaping; Henry denies that occurred. In any event, Purnell pulled out a Glock .40 caliber handgun and shot the fleeing Henry in the elbow. Henry stopped running and was arrested.

"The parties have stipulated that Purnell did not intend to shoot Henry with his handgun. Rather, he intended to unholster and discharge his Taser, a non-lethal device that immobilizes a suspect via an electromuscular disruption. The Taser was holstered on Purnell's right side, just below his holstered handgun. Purnell has testified on deposition that he reached for the Taser because he felt endangered by Henry's actions. He asserts that he thought Henry might be running to get a weapon.

"Purnell did not realize he had fired the handgun until after the weapon discharged. He immediately told Henry and another witness at the scene that he had not meant to shoot Henry and that he had grabbed the wrong weapon." Henry, 428 F.Supp.2d at 394-95.6

B.

Having identified the relevant facts, we now turn to the question of whether these facts establish that Purnell seized Henry within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied." Brendlin v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (citations and internal...

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