Henry v. Saints

• Decision Date: 18 May 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-5971 SECTION: "J"(2)
• Parties: RODNEY HENRY v. NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA SAINTS L.L.C. ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

RODNEY HENRY v. NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA SAINTS L.L.C. ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 15-5971 SECTION: "J"(2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

May 18, 2016

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Compel Arbitration(Rec. Doc. 5) and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay Action Pending Arbitration, and Motion to Compel Arbitration(Rec. Doc. 12) filed by Defendants, New Orleans Louisiana Saints LLC, Tom Benson, and Gayle Benson; an opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 17) filed by Plaintiff, Rodney Henry; and Defendants' reply (Rec. Doc. 27).Having considered the motions and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motions should be GRANTED.

Also before the Court is a related Motion to Strike Declaration of Prof. Imre Stephen Szalai(Rec. Doc. 23) filed by Defendants, and Plaintiff's opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 30).Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.

Lastly, before the Court is a related Motion for Limited Discovery(Rec. Doc. 31) filed by Plaintiff, and Defendants' opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 34).Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of PlaintiffRodney Henry's employment and subsequent termination of employment with DefendantNew Orleans Louisiana Saints LLC("Saints").Plaintiff began working for the Saints as a personal assistant to the owner, Tom Benson, approximately twenty-five years ago.Plaintiff resigned from his position for a period of time after Hurricane Katrina but later returned in July 2010.Following his return, Plaintiff was employed again as Mr. Benson's personal assistant until his termination on or about June 24, 2015.

Plaintiff asserts causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; the Louisiana Wage Payment Act, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:631 et seq.; and Louisiana state law for unpaid wages.(Rec. Doc. 7, at 1.)Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the FLSA by willfully failing to pay him overtime wages and failing to maintain accurate records of the number of hours he worked per week.Id. at 3, 7.According to Plaintiff, while he was employed as Mr. Benson's personal assistant he was paid a salary and a bonus but not overtime.Id. at 3.

Further, Plaintiff claims that the Saints terminated him without paying the two-year termination fee owed to him by contract.Plaintiff alleges that he entered into an agreement ("Employment Agreement") in January 2014, whereby Mr. Benson personally reserved the right to terminate Plaintiff without having to pay a two-year termination fee.Id.Under the Employment Agreement, if anyone other than Mr. Benson himself terminated Plaintiff during Mr. Benson's lifetime, then the Saints must pay Plaintiff an amount equal to two times his previous year's gross salary.Id. at 8.Plaintiff alleges that the Saints breached the Employment Agreement, because Mr. Benson did not personally terminate Plaintiff's employment and the Saints did not pay him the two-year termination fee.Id.

In addition, Plaintiff asserts claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL"), La. Rev. Stat. § 23:301 et seq.Id. at 1.Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Benson's wife, Gayle Benson, harassed him, made racially derogatory comments to him and about him, and engaged in other disrespectful behavior.Id. at 8.According to Plaintiff, he reported Mrs. Benson's discriminatory behavior to the Saints but never heard back from anyone regarding his concerns.Id. at 9.Plaintiff claims that the Saints began reducing his job duties after he reported the discrimination and that he was ostracized at work.Id. at 10.Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that he provided testimony in a lawsuit involving the Benson family, which ultimately led to Mrs. Benson and the Saints abruptly terminating his employment as soon as the judge in that matter issued his decision.Id. at 10-11.

Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit against the Saints on November 17, 2015, claiming only that he was improperly denied overtime and that the Saints breached the Employment Agreement.(Rec. Doc. 1.)On January 15, 2016, in response to the original Complaint, the Saints filed the Motion to Compel Arbitration(Rec. Doc. 5), arguing that Plaintiff is required to submit his claims to arbitration pursuant to the agreement Plaintiff signed in connection with his most recent employment with the Saints.Three days later, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint, wherein he added Tom and Gayle Benson as defendants, and added the claims of employment discrimination and retaliation.¹(Rec. Doc. 7.)

Shortly thereafter, in response to the Amended Complaint, Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay Action Pending Arbitration, and Motion to Compel Arbitration(Rec. Doc. 12).Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motions on March 1, 2016.The Court granted Defendants leave to file a reply on March 7, 2016.Defendants then filed their Motion to Strike Declaration of Prof. Imre Stephen Szalai(Rec. Doc. 23), seeking to strike an exhibit attached to Plaintiff's opposition to the motions to compel.After a brief continuance to permit the parties to participate in a settlement conference, Plaintiff opposed the motion to strike on April 26, 2016.That same day, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Limited Discovery(Rec. Doc. 31), which Defendants opposed on May 9, 2016.The motions are now before the Court on the briefs.

LEGAL STANDARD

"In enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress declared a national policy in favor of arbitration."Snap-on Tools Corp. v. Mason, 18 F.3d 1261, 1263(5th Cir.1994)(citingSouthland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10(1984)).Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act("FAA") provides that "[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of any contract."9 U.S.C. § 2.Congress has therefore mandated the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.

Considered to be "the primary substantive provision of the Act,"§ 2 reflects "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24(1983).In effect, § 2 creates "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability."Id."[C]ongress' clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, [was] to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible."Snap-on Tools, 18 F.3d at 1263(alterations in original)(quotingMoses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22).Thus, there is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration.

The FAA requires district courts to "compel arbitration of otherwise arbitrable claims, when a motion to compel arbitration is made."Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1147 n.20(5th Cir.1985).Section 3 of the FAA provides:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under the agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

9 U.S.C. § 3.This provision is mandatory and demands a stay of the proceedings, at the request of a party, if the dispute is arbitrable and referred to arbitration.Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410, 417 n.6(5th Cir.2006).When all of the issues raised in the case are referable to arbitration, courts may dismiss, rather than stay, the case.Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164(5th Cir.1992).However, under those circumstances, dismissal is within the court's discretion; it is not required.Apache Bohai Corp., LDC v. Texaco China, B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 311 n.9(5th Cir.2003).

Courts employ a two-step analysis to determine whether a party may be compelled to arbitrate.Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 233(5th Cir.2009).The Court first inquires whether the party has agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue.Id. at 233-34.This question itself is further subdivided into two considerations: "(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement."Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 257-58(5th Cir.1996).To determine whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate, the Court applies ordinary principles of state contract law.Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 537-38(5th Cir.2003)."[T]he federal policy favoring arbitration does not apply to the determination of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties."Id. at 538.In analyzing arbitrability, courts apply federal substantive law.Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 531(5th Cir.2000).Thus, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to...