Henry v. Sheffield
| Decision Date | 16 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. CA 09–332 S.,CA 09–332 S. |
| Citation | 856 F.Supp.2d 345 |
| Parties | Nathan HENRY; Corinna Laszlo–Henry, Plaintiffs, v. Richard B. SHEFFIELD; Brian G. Bardorf; William R. Harvey; Quentin Anthony; Mary Jo Carr; Harvey Carr & Hadfield; Douglas Davies Henry; Margaret Kemp Henry; individually and as Executrix of the Estate of David Vaughan Henry and as constructive trustee over certain property for the benefit of Nathan Henry and Corinna Laszlo–Henry, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Charles D. Blackman, Lederberg & Blackman LLP, Providence, RI, for Plaintiffs.
Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Olenn & Penza, Warwick, RI, Peter Brent Regan, Sayer Regan & Thayer LLP, Newport, RI, for Defendants.
Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants Richard B. Sheffield, Brian G. Bardorf, William R. Harvey, Quentin Anthony, Mary Jo Carr, and Harvey Carr & Hadfield (collectively, the “Movant Defendants”). (Defs.' Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 31.) The Movant Defendants move for summary judgment as to all claims asserted against them by Plaintiff Corinna Laszlo–Henry (“Plaintiff” or “Corinna”).1 For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The Court's brief recitation of facts begins with Captain Eugene Henry (“Captain Henry”), who executed a will on August 21, 1992 (the “1992 will”). Captain Henry's 1992 will provided that trusts be established for his two sons—Defendant Douglas Davies Henry (“Doug”) and David Vaughan Henry (“David”). (Ex. A to Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts 2, ECF No. 32.) David is the father of Plaintiff Corinna and co-Plaintiff Nathan Henry.
The terms of the two trusts were not identical. Doug was to receive trust income for five years after Captain Henry's death and would thereafter receive the corpus. ( Id. at 3.) David, on the other hand, would receive trust income for life, and upon David's death, the corpus would pass to his living “descendants.” ( Id. at 2–3.)
On December 2, 1994, Captain Henry executed a codicil to his will (the “1994 codicil”), which modified the terms of David's trust. Pursuant to the 1994 codicil, David would receive income for five years, after which the corpus would be distributed to his living “descendants.” (Ex. 6 to Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts 2, ECF No. 35–6.) What remains in dispute is Captain Henry's intent in executing the codicil—while Defendants contend that Captain Henry intended to make David's trust mirror Doug's trust, the codicil as drafted did not have that effect.
Captain Henry died on June 21, 1995. On July 10, 1995, Defendant Doug filed a petition to open a probate estate in the Portsmouth Probate Court. Appended to that petition was an affidavit sworn by Defendant Sheffield, the attorney who drafted the 1994 codicil. (Ex. C, ECF No. 32.) Sheffield averred that “certain words [in the 1994 codicil] were omitted inadvertently from the second paragraph of the David Vaughn [ sic ] Henry Trust” ( id. at ¶ 7) and that he could “unequivocally state that Eugene B. Henry intended that his sons, David and Douglas, with respect to the net income from their respective trusts, were to be treated equally.” ( Id. at ¶ 8.) In his affidavit, Sheffield also provided text “to accurately reflect the intention of Eugene B. Henry,” which provided that David would receive income for five years and would thereafter receive the corpus. ( Id. at ¶ 9.) It is undisputed that Plaintiffs Corinna and Nathan did not receive notice of these probate proceedings. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 53, ECF No. 35.)
On July 11, 1995, a decree (the “1995 decree”) entered in the Portsmouth Probate Court, in which the court (1) admitted the 1992 will to probate; (2) found that the 1994 codicil erroneously omitted certain words that Captain Henry intended to include; and (3) corrected and amended the 1994 codicil to conform to the intention of Captain Henry by substituting the language contained in Sheffield's affidavit. (Ex. D, ECF No. 32.) Thereafter, a trust was created for David—he received income for five years, and the corpus was disbursed to him in June of 2000.
In the fall of 2004, Plaintiff Corinna “learned ... that changes that might concern her had been undertaken in the probate of her grandfather's will.” (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 62, ECF No. 35.) Corinna contacted the Portsmouth Probate Court in December of 2004 or January of 2005, and she received a copy of the probate court file from the clerk in February of 2005. ( Id. at ¶ 63.)
More than three years later, on November 20, 2008, co-Plaintiff Nathan filed a motion in the Portsmouth Probate Court to reopen the estate and vacate the 1995 decree. (Ex. F, ECF No. 32.) The 1995 decree was vacated on January 1, 2009, a decision which was unsuccessfully appealed to the Superior Court. David died shortly thereafter on February 16, 2009, survived by his wife Defendant Margaret “Peggy” Kemp Henry.
On July 28, 2009, Plaintiffs Nathan and Corinna filed the instant action. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs set forth the following claims: (1) Count I, Restitution, against Defendant Peggy; (2) Count II, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, against Defendants Sheffield, Doug, and Peggy; (3) Count III, Tortious Interference with Inheritance, against Defendants Sheffield and Doug; (4) Count IV, Legal Malpractice, against Defendants Sheffield and Harvey; (5) Count V, Negligence, against Defendant Sheffield; (6) Count VI, Fraud, against Defendant Sheffield; and (7) Count VII, Vicarious Liability, against Defendants Sheffield, Bardorf, Harvey, Anthony, Carr, and the law firm of Harvey Carr & Hadfield. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 12.)
The Movant Defendants, which are those defendants implicated in Count VII, 2 have moved for summary judgment against Plaintiff Corinna 3 on all counts, except Count I.4 As to Count III, tortious interference with inheritance, the Movant Defendants argue that it is not a viable claim under Rhode Island law. As to Counts II, IV, V, and VI, Defendants contend that Plaintiff Corinna's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact, thereby entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.2009).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to address the question of whether a cause of action lies for tortious interference with inheritance under Rhode Island law. Accordingly, in borrowing Rhode Island law for this particular question, the Court must make “an informed prophecy of what [that] court would do in the same situation,” seeking “guidance in analogous state court decisions, persuasive adjudications by courts of sister states, learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in state decisional law.” Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir.1996). “As long as these signposts are legible, [this Court's] task is to ascertain the rule the state court would most likely follow under the circumstances, even if [the Court's] independent judgment on the question might differ.” Id.
The First Circuit made just such an informed prophecy on this very question in Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17 (1st Cir.2006). In Umsted, the court determined that “Rhode Island would adopt the majority position that a cause of action for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance, if it lies at all, would not lie where an adequate statutory remedy is available but has not been pursued.” Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has presented no argument to support a departure from Umsted.
Accordingly, as in Umsted, the “question remains, then whether the Probate Court offered [Plaintiff] an adequate remedy.” Id. A Rhode Island statutory provision entitled “Action in name of estate prosecuted by interested person,” provides as follows:
If an administrator, executor, or guardian shall be requested by any person legally interested in the estate of a deceased person, ... to commence an action or proceeding to recover any property, personal or real, which the legally interested person may have reason to believe should be recovered for the benefit of the estate, and if the administrator, executor, or guardian shall, for fifteen (15) days after written notice so to do, ... refuse, neglect or for any reason be incompetent, to commence the action or proceeding, the legally interested person may institute proceedings in the name of the estate of the deceased person, or person under guardianship, in the same manner and to the same extent as the administrator, executor, or guardian may do....
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33–18–17. As legatees under Captain Henry's will, as well as intestate heirs, there is no question that Plaintiffs Corinna and Nathan qualify as persons “legally interested in the estate of a deceased person.” See Umsted, 446 F.3d at 23. Accordingly, in their capacity as beneficiaries of Captain Henry's estate, Plaintiffs “had standing to bring the state court action for what [they] perceive[ ] to be ‘the benefit of the estate’ and [their] interest in it.” Haffenreffer v. Coleman, C.A. No. 06–299T, 2007 WL 2972575, at *3 (D.R.I. Oct. 10, 2007) (emphasis added).
In Umsted, the court held that the statute could have been utilized to recover real property that, according to the plaintiffs, had been wrongfully conveyed out of the estate prior to the death of the testator. Umsted, 446 F.3d at 23. And the court further observed that, “[i]f successful, the property would have been returned to the estate, where it would then have passed pursuant to the terms of [the] will.” Id. Plaintiff first argues that Umsted is distinguishable because the “wrongful conduct” in the instant case, vi...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Patterson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.
...not made before the Magistrate Judge. 4. In diversity cases, state law governs the tolling of the limitations period. Henry v. Sheffield, 856 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.R.I.2012). Massachusetts law provides for a three year statute of limitations for tort claims and a four year statute of limitations......
-
Chu v. Legion of Christ, Inc.
...from “an action to recover that property ... as a means of carrying out the [decedent's] testamentary intent.” See Henry v. Sheffield, 856 F.Supp.2d 345, 350–51 (D.R.I.2012) (holding that claim that trust should have been distributed directly to plaintiffs was “for the benefit of the estate......
-
Americans United for Life v. Legion of Christ of North America, Inc.
...a more limited approach. See Klein, supra at 264-65. As noted above, Rhode Island has not yet had occasion to consider the tort. Henry, 856 F.Supp.2d at 350. to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B, "[o]ne who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from ......
-
Glassie v. Doucette
...on their Counterclaims, Defendants may recover additional assets to be included in the estate." Id. see also Henry v. Sheffield , 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351-52 (D.R.I. 2012) (probate exception not applicable to in personam actions to recover property allegedly wrongfully distributed). On the ......