Henry v. State Compensation Ins. Fund

• Citation: 1999 MT 126,982 P.2d 456
• Decision Date: 03 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-351.,98-351.
• Parties: Jerry HENRY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Respondent and Insurer for, Appliance Care, Inc., Respondent and Employer and Insured.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

982 P.2d 456

1999 MT 126

Jerry HENRY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Respondent and Insurer for,

Appliance Care, Inc., Respondent and Employer and Insured.

No. 98-351.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Heard February 18, 1999.

Submitted February 19, 1999.

Decided June 3, 1999.

Steve M. Fletcher (argued), Bulman Law Associates, Missoula, Montana, for Appellant.

Carrie Garber (argued), State Compensation Insurance Fund, Helena, Montana, for Respondent.

Patricia O'Brien Cotter (argued), Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Great Falls, Montana, for Amicus Curiae.

Justice WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR. delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Workers' Compensation Court held that the Montana Legislature's failure to provide vocational rehabilitation benefits to diseased workers under the Occupational Disease Act (ODA), like it provided to injured workers under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), does not violate the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution. Jerry Henry appeals. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 The dispositive issue presented on appeal is whether the Occupational Disease Act violates the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution because it fails to provide vocational rehabilitation benefits to diseased workers.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties stipulated to the following facts:

¶ 4 1. On April 1, 1995, Henry was injured while employed with Appliance Care, Inc., in Lake County, Montana. Henry suffered a herniated disc in his back when he was moving and lifting appliances. The claim was treated and accepted as an occupational disease.

¶ 5 2. The State Fund accepted liability for the claim as an occupational disease and medical and compensation benefits were paid. Henry reached maximum medical improvement and the parties settled the case pursuant to § 39-72-405, MCA.

¶ 6 3. Henry requested rehabilitation benefits after reaching maximum medical improvement, but the State Fund denied all liability for rehabilitation benefits because the claim was accepted under the Occupational Disease Act.

¶ 7 4. Henry was unable to return to his job at the time of his injury because of his herniated disc.

¶ 8 5. Henry is married and has three children, ages 9, 8, and 3 [at that time].

¶ 9 Although the parties settled the claim, Henry reserved the right to challenge the State Fund's denial of his request for rehabilitation benefits. Henry contended that the ODA's failure to provide rehabilitation benefits violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The Workers' Compensation Court disagreed. The court cited Eastman v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1989), 237 Mont. 332, 777 P.2d 862 and held that the failure to provide rehabilitation benefits to workers suffering from occupational diseases does not violate the equal protection clause of the Montana Constitution. Henry then filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 Resolution of this issue involves a question of constitutional law. The standard for reviewing conclusions of law is whether they are correct. State v. Butler, 1999 MT 70, ¶ 7, ___ Mont. ___, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 1000, ¶ 7, 56 St. Rep. 291, ¶ 7 (citation omitted).

¶ 11 All legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Butler, ¶ 8.

OVERVIEW OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AND THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT

¶ 12 We begin our analysis with a brief historical overview of the relevant provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act. Historically, the workers' compensation system was an outgrowth of tort law. It was premised on a compromise whereby workers gave up their right to sue employers in tort for work-related injuries in exchange for a guaranteed compensation system. The injured worker gave up his right to receive full compensation for his injury in exchange for receiving a speedy and certain award; compensation did not depend upon the fault of the employer, nor was it denied based upon the fault of the employee. Based upon the legal environment existing at the time that workers' compensation laws were first enacted, this bargain was perceived as fair. See Haas, Theodore F., On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability, 21 Ga.L.Rev. 843, 846-47, 862-868 (1987).

¶ 13 Because of its historical underpinnings, the workers' compensation system was designed to compensate only victims of industrial accidents, and not workers suffering from occupational diseases. As was explained in 3 Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, § 41.20 (1998):

To the extent that compensation acts were thought of as substituting nonfault liability for the kind of injuries that were potential subjects of fault liability, there was thought to be no place for occupational diseases, which (in the sense of a disease due to the "normal" conditions of the industry as distinguished from the negligence of the employer) had consistently been held incapable of supporting a common-law action.

¶ 14 However, as the incidence of diseases such as silicosis and asbestosis increased, the law was expanded to provide benefits to workers suffering from such diseases. See Kutchins, Albert, The Most Exclusive Remedy Is No Remedy at All: Workers' Compensation Coverage for Occupational Diseases, 32 Lab.LJ. 212, 212 (1981). In 1959, the Montana Legislature created a statutory remedy for work-related diseases when it enacted the ODA, now codified at §§ 39-72-101 to 714, MCA.

¶ 15 Consistent with the historical circumstances that gave rise to the two Acts, coverage by each Act was thus dependent upon the worker's medical condition. What constituted an "injury" under the WCA was different than what constituted an "occupational disease" under the ODA. When the WCA was first enacted, "injury" was defined as follows:

(k) "Injury" means and shall include death resulting from injury.

....

(q) "Injury" or "injured" refers only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event, as distinguished from the contraction of disease.

1915 Mont. Law Ch. 96, Section 6.

¶ 16 In 1961, two years after the ODA was passed, the WCA defined "injury" to mean:

a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, resulting in either external or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as a result therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to injury.

1961 Mont. Law Ch. 162, Section 6. The legislature amended the definition a few more times prior to 1987, most notably in 1973, when it included within the definition of "injury" cardiovascular, pulmonary, or respiratory diseases contracted by firefighters during employment due to over-exertion in times of stress or danger or by cumulative exposure over four years to toxic gases. 1973 Mont. Law Ch. 488, Section 1.

¶ 17 Similarly, consistent with its historical purposes, when the ODA was enacted, it defined "occupational disease" as silicosis or poisoning by a variety of enumerated compounds. 1959 Mont. Laws Ch. 155, Section 4. In 1979, the legislature redefined it to mean "all diseases arising out of or contracted from and in the course of employment." 1979 Mont. Law Ch. 397, Section 85(11). For purposes relevant to this appeal, however, neither the definition of "injury" nor the definition of "occupational disease" was substantially changed until 1987.

¶ 18 In 1987, the Montana Legislature overhauled the workers' compensation system. In so doing, it significantly redefined what it means to be injured under the WCA and what it means to be diseased under the ODA. Rather than focusing on the nature of the medical condition as it historically did, the legislature instead focused in part on the number of work shifts over which a worker incurred an affliction.

¶ 19 Specifically, the legislature amended the WCA to define "injury" as follows:

(1) "Injury" or "injured" means:

(a) internal or external physical harm to the body;

(b) damage to prosthetic devices or appliances, except for damage to eyeglasses, contact lenses, dentures, or hearing aids; or

(c) death.

(2) An injury is caused by an accident. An accident is:

(a) an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain;

(b) identifiable by time and place of occurrence;

(c) identifiable by a member or part of the body affected; and

(d) caused by a specific event on a single day or during a single work shift.

1987 Mont. Law Ch. 464, Section 3, codified at § 39-71-119, MCA(1993)(emphasis added).

¶ 20 Similarly, the legislature amended the ODA to define "occupational disease" as follows:

"Occupational disease" means harm, damage, or death as set forth in XX-XX-XXX(1) [defining "injury" or "injured" under the Workers' Compensation Act] arising out of or contracted in the course and scope of employment and caused by events occurring on more than a single day or work shift. The term does not include a physical or mental condition arising from emotional or mental stress or from a nonphysical stimulus or activity.

1987 Mont. Law Ch. 464, Section 64, codified at § 39-72-102(10), MCA(emphasis added).

¶ 21 Thus, according to the 1987 definitions, a worker who obtains an affliction such as a herniated disc on one work shift, is considered "injured" and is thus covered by the WCA. At the same time, another worker who obtains that exact same affliction, a herniated disc, over the course of two work shifts, is considered "diseased" and is covered by the ODA. Moreover, many conditions that constituted "injuries" prior to 1987 are now considered "diseases" under the new definitions. For example, a worker such as Henry has an "occupational disease" under the ODA if he obtains a herniated disc over two work shifts, but would have had an "injury" under the WCA prior to 1987.

¶ 22 When the legislature overhauled the system in 1987, it also declared it to be the public policy of the State of Montana to return both injured and...