Henry v. State
| Decision Date | 16 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S95A0843,S95A0843 |
| Citation | 462 S.E.2d 737,265 Ga. 732 |
| Parties | HENRY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Curtis Wayne Miller, Miller, Rucker & Associates, Lithonia, John B. Sumner, Woodstock, for Henry.
Harry N. Gordon, Dist. Atty., Athens, Hon. Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Gerald W. Brown, Asst. Dist. Atty., Athens, for State.
Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Richard J. Warren, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta.
Ronald Francis Henry was convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury in connection with the shooting death of Iraj Rouhani. The jury found aggravating circumstances existed and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without parole as punishment for the murder. See OCGA § 17-10-30.1(a). Henry was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder, and to consecutive life sentences for the armed robbery and kidnapping. 1
Rouhani was fatally shot in the head in a back room of the jewelry store he owned. A shopkeeper in an adjacent store heard gunshots coming from Rouhani's store and testified that a "black male ... walked out [of the jewelry store]" and was "carrying a bag, a plastic bag." Henry, an African American, was arrested a few minutes later in possession of a .25 calibre pistol and a plastic bag containing jewelry. A videotape from the store's surveillance camera, recovered from a downtown parking deck, depicted Henry pointing a pistol at the victim, striking him in the head, dragging him by the neck into a back room, filling a plastic bag with contents from the display cases, and removing a cassette from the video recorder. Bullets collected from the crime scene were matched to the pistol recovered from Henry. A State's expert witness testified that blood found at the crime scene was Henry's. Expert testimony indicated that the muzzle of the murder weapon was in contact with the victim's head at the time the fatal shot was fired. Henry confessed to the crimes in a taped interview with police.
1. Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Henry guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Henry asserts that the State's use of peremptory strikes to excuse two African American prospective jurors, Wade and Clark, violated the principles established in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). He maintains that the explanations offered by the State were pretextual. "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion).
The State explained that it excused Wade because of her familial relationship to Larry Foster, who had been prosecuted for several offenses, including murder. The State asserted that it struck Clark because it had prosecuted her son for a felony offense. Prior convictions or arrest histories of a family member are a sufficiently race neutral reason to exercise a peremptory strike. Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 426 S.E.2d 844 (1993), cert. denied,--- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993). The State also reported that Wade was listed as a State's witness in a case dismissed by the prosecution where Foster was the victim of a shooting. Although Wade failed to disclose any relationship to Foster on her jury questionnaire, the State learned from police that in the shooting investigation Wade identified herself as Foster's cousin. The State's concern that Wade might harbor resentment toward the prosecutor's office because it dismissed the case in which Foster was a shooting victim was neither unreasonable nor racially motivated on its face. "A reasonable suspicion about a prospective juror's impartiality that falls short of justifying an excusal for cause might well justify the exercise of a peremptory strike." Hall v. State, 261 Ga. 778, 780, 415 S.E.2d 158 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205, 112 S.Ct. 2993, 120 L.Ed.2d 870 (1992). The trial court was authorized to find that the explanations offered by the State for the excusal of the two prospective jurors were sufficiently race neutral under Batson, supra. Henry failed to establish that the reasons given by the State were merely pretexts for purposeful racial discrimination. See Purkett v. Elem,514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), rehearing denied,--- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2635, 132 L.Ed.2d 874 (1995).
3. (a) Henry alleges that he was denied the right to jury panels drawn from a fair cross section of the community because students attending the University of Georgia were not adequately represented. "The test for an attack on a traverse jury is two-fold: first, the defendant must prove that the group is a cognizable group; secondly, the defendant must show that the group has been consistently underrepresented." Potts v. State, 259 Ga. 812, 813, 388 S.E.2d 678 (1990). Henry failed in both regards.
Although Henry proffered evidence that college students have a significant impact on the community, he did not establish that college students possess a "definite composition, ... a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience ..., [or] that there is a community of interest among members of the group such that the group's interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process." Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256, 104 S.Ct. 3546, 3548, 82 L.Ed.2d 849, 851 (1984). See also Potts, supra at 813, 388 S.E.2d 678. "[C]ollege students do not qualify as a cognizable group...." United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir.1992). Henry also failed to establish an accurate figure representing the number of students attending the University of Georgia who were qualified to serve on a jury, or that such group was consistently underrepresented in the venire due to systematic exclusion by the State. See Willis, supra at 1217.
(b) Henry also contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for funds to hire an expert to conduct a demographic study of the student population. However, Henry failed to demonstrate that funds for such an expert were critical to his defense. "The granting or denial of a motion for appointment of expert witnesses lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 365 S.E.2d 115 (1988) (citation omitted). The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
4. (a) At the time of arrest, Henry was read his Miranda rights and asked his name. He responded with profanity. Henry contends that the response constituted an assertion of his right to remain silent, and that subsequent statements he made were therefore inadmissible. The utterance of profanity was not an invocation of the right to remain silent.
(b) The trial court admitted a videotaped statement Henry made to police after his release from the hospital for treatment of a cut sustained during the robbery. After Henry was again read his Miranda rights, the following colloquy occurred:
Henry contends that his response to the initial question regarding his desire for a lawyer was an invocation of his right to counsel, whereupon all interrogation should have ceased. It was not.
In the course of a custodial interrogation a suspect may make an "ambiguous statement or inartful statement with reference to his desire for an attorney...." Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267, 270, 336 S.E.2d 812 (1985) (citations omitted). Henry's response was at best an ambiguous and equivocal statement regarding his desire to assert his right to counsel. See Hall, supra (). Where such ambiguous or equivocal references to counsel are made, "law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2356, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).
Once an equivocal request for an attorney is made, " 'further questioning thereafter must be limited to clarifying that request until it is clarified.' " Hall, 255 Ga. at 272, 336 S.E.2d 812 (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir.1979)). See also Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.1979). Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to adopt such a rule requiring police officers to ask clarifying questions, it has approved of such police practice. Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2356, 129 L.Ed.2d 362. The officer's questioning of Henry conformed to the requirements of Hall.
(c) Henry also submits that his videotaped statement was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of OCGA § 24-3-50. He maintains that police statements made during the interview encouraging him to tell the truth and relating that things were "just going to get worse if you lie," constituted coercion and rendered his statement involuntary. Encouraging a suspect to tell the truth does not constitute hope of benefit so as to render involuntary any statement made thereafter. Cansler v. State, 261 Ga. 693, 409 S.E.2d 504 (1991); Fowler v. State...
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