Henry v. Vaughn Indus., LLC

• Citation: 450 F.Supp.3d 671
• Decision Date: 31 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 5:18-CV-498-D,5:18-CV-498-D
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Sean HENRY, Plaintiff, v. VAUGHN INDUSTRIES, LLC, Defendant.

450 F.Supp.3d 671

Sean HENRY, Plaintiff,

v.VAUGHN INDUSTRIES, LLC, Defendant.

No. 5:18-CV-498-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

Signed March 31, 2020

Wilson F. Fong, Hensel Law, PLLC, Greensboro, NC, for Plaintiff.

David T. Andrews, Andrews Law, LLC, Twinsburg, OH, Kerry A. Shad, Taylor M. Dewberry, Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, Patrick D. Lawler, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Raleigh, NC, for Defendant.

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge

On October 22, 2018, Sean Henry ("Henry" or "plaintiff"), an African-American, filed a complaint against Vaughn Industries, LLC ("Vaughn" or "defendant") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [D.E. 1]. Henry alleges that he began working at Vaughn as a safety employee through a temporary staffing firm and that Vaughn racially discriminated against him when Vaughn did not hire him as a full-time Vaughn employee and later terminated his employment as a temporary employee. See id. Henry also alleges that Vaughn retaliated against him for participating in an internal investigation of another employee's misconduct in November 2016. See id. On July 26, 2019, Vaughn moved for summary judgment [D.E. 18] and filed a memorandum and statement of material facts in support [D.E. 19, 20, 21]. On August 16, 2019, Henry responded in opposition [D.E. 24] and filed a statement of material facts [D.E. 22, 23]. On August 30, 2019, Vaughn replied [D.E. 25] and responded to Henry's statement of material facts [D.E. 26]. As explained below, the court grants Vaughn's motion for summary judgment.

I.

Vaughn is an electrical construction contractor based in Carey, Ohio. See Blair Aff. [D.E. 21-1] ¶ 1. Vaughn specializes in "electrical, mechanical (HVAC and Pipefitting), plumbing, high voltage substation, high voltage transmission and distribution, and renewable energy construction." Blair. Aff., Exs. [D.E. 21-1] 7–8. In 2016, Vaughn began a project in Wilson, North Carolina to build eight solar fields (the "Wilson Project"). See Blair Aff. ¶ 2. In the same year, Vaughn contracted with Aerotek, a staffing firm for temporary workers, to help Vaughn locate temporary "Safety Specialists" to work on the Wilson Project. See id. at ¶ 3. A "Safety Specialist" is "responsible for monitoring compliance with Vaughn's safety policy and ensuring compliance with safety regulations issued by the state and federal enforcement agencies." Id. at ¶ 4; see Livingston Aff. [D.E. 21-2] ¶ 4. Vaughn Safety Specialists must have a valid driver's license to drive to and from job sites. See Livingston Aff. ¶¶ 6, 10.

On September 26, 2016, Henry began working through Aerotek as a temporary Safety Specialist on the Wilson Project. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 5. On the same date, Vaughn assigned Brenda Upchurch ("Upchurch") as a human resources coordinator for the Wilson Project. See Blair Aff. ¶ 10. Upchurch assisted Vaughn with human resources related to Vaughn's temporary workers including to recruit and train temporary employees, to coordinate with temporary-employee agencies, and to act as the temporary employees' "HR point of contact" for the Wilson Project. See id. at ¶ 11.

Before working at Vaughn, Henry worked in a supervisory capacity at another electrical safety job. See Henry Dep. [D.E. 21-3] 6–7. At several points during his employment, Vaughn employees asked Henry to get a valid driver's license so that his employment could continue. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 7; Blair Aff., Exs. at 12–15. Henry, however, did not have a valid driver's license throughout his employment as a temporary employee with Vaughn and repeatedly stated that he was working through a legal process to get his driver's license reinstated. See Blair Aff. ¶ 8; Livingston Aff. ¶¶ 6–8; Henry Dep. at 10. Vaughn's Safety Director, Robert Livingston ("Livingston"), believed that Henry's driver's license would soon be reinstated. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 9. In the interim, Livingston instructed Henry to get rides to the Wilson Project jobsites in Vaughn-provided transportation. See id. This option was available on the Wilson Project "because, as part of the facilitation of the work, and size of the workforce, Vaughn hired buses and vans to transport employees and temporary workers from Vaughn's offices or warehouses to the jobsites and, when necessary, between jobsites" in Wilson. Id.

On November 15, 2016, Vaughn hired Tim Rice ("Rice") as a Quality Control Supervisor for the Wilson Project. See Blair Aff. ¶ 13. On November 16, 2016, a Wilson Project foreman, Scott Dawson, was notified that Rice made homophobic and racist statements when giving instructions to employees. See id. Upchurch gathered statements from ten employees who heard Rice's statements. See id. at ¶ 14. Of the ten employees that provided statements, all were temporary workers, eight were African-American, one was white, and one was an "unknown" race. See id. On November 18, 2019, Vaughn fired Rice for violating Vaughn's equal employment and anti-harassment policies. See id. at ¶ 15. After Rice's firing, Henry alleges that Brian Tschanen ("Tschanen"), Vaughn's Division Manager for solar construction, did not allow Henry to park "up front," "impeded" Henry's work by sometimes not following Henry's advice, and did not give Henry a key to the building in which Henry sometimes worked when Henry's supervisor was on medical leave. Henry Dep. at 24.¹

In early 2017, Vaughn sought to hire a Safety Coordinator to oversee Vaughn's safety operations throughout the southeastern United States. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 10. The Vaughn Safety Coordinator also would oversee the Wilson Project jobsite, and the position required a valid driver's license. See id. The Vaughn Safety Coordinator would manage the overall safety operation for the remainder of the Wilson Project and also would be responsible for managing the safety projects at other jobsites throughout the southeast after Vaughn completed the Wilson Project. See id.

On February 7, 2017, Henry asked JoAnn Blair ("Blair"), Vaughn's Human Resources Manager, about whether he could join Vaughn as a full-time employee. See Blair Aff. ¶ 17. Blair responded that, in order to be a full-time employee, Henry "needed to get the driver's license issue resolved." Id. Henry also spoke with Livingston. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 12. Livingston told Henry that he was happy with his work, but that he needed to get the driver's license issue resolved due to the Vaughn Safety Coordinator's extensive travel. See id. Livingston also told Henry that Vaughn would prefer someone with an OSHA 500/510 certification. See id.

Vaughn hired Sandy Singles ("Singles"), who is white, as Vaughn Safety Coordinator. See id. Singles possessed a valid driver's license. See Blair Aff. ¶ 16. Henry never reviewed Singles's resume. See Henry Dep. at 18. Upchurch did not make the decision to hire Singles. See Blair Aff. ¶ 12. Tschanen did not make the decision to hire Singles, and did not establish the requirements for the Vaughn Safety Coordinator position. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 17.

In March 2017, Vaughn's work on the Wilson Project was nearing completion. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 13. As a result, Vaughn's president, Matt Plotts, told Livingston that Vaughn needed to reduce the number of safety personnel on site. See id. Henry was the last remaining safety employee assigned through a temporary staffing firm working on the Wilson Project. See id. Thus, on March 17, 2017, Vaughn terminated Henry's temporary employment. See id.; Blair Aff. ¶ 14. Tschanen had no role in the decision to terminate Henry's employment. See Livingston Aff. ¶ 17. Upchurch did not make the decision to terminate Henry's employment. See Blair Aff. ¶ 12.

In his complaint, Henry alleges: (1) failure to hire for the Safety Coordinator position in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; (2) termination based on race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; and (3) retaliation in violation 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See [D.E. 1] ¶¶ 40–69.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment must initially demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, but "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis and quotation omitted). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Harris, 550 U.S. at 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's position [is] insufficient ...." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th...