Henry–Davenport v. Sch. Dist. of Fairfield Cnty.

• Decision Date: 03 June 2011
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 0:08–3258–MJP.
• Citation: 832 F.Supp.2d 602,280 Ed. Law Rep. 86
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Jannette HENRY–DAVENPORT, Plaintiff, v. The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF FAIRFIELD COUNTY, Defendant.

832 F.Supp.2d 602

280 Ed. Law Rep. 86

Jannette HENRY–DAVENPORT, Plaintiff,

v.The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF FAIRFIELD COUNTY, Defendant.

C.A. No. 0:08–3258–MJP.

United States District Court,

D. South Carolina,

Rock Hill Division.

June 3, 2011.

Glenn Walters, Orangeburg, SC, for Plaintiff.

Brian Quisenberry, Carol B. Ervin, Young Clement Rivers and Tisdale, Charleston, SC, for Defendant.

ORDER

MATTHEW J. PERRY, JR., Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.This employment dispute arises out of Plaintiff's demotion from the administrative level of Deputy Superintendent to a Director level position and the corresponding salary reduction.For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I.BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a certified educator employed as an administrator with the Defendant Fairfield County School District(hereafter “District”).All of Plaintiff's claims arise out of her demotion in 2008 from the position of Deputy Superintendent of Human Resources to Director of Food Services and corresponding salary reduction.

Dr. Samantha Ingram was hired as the Superintendent of the School District in July of 2007.The District's Board of Trustees expected Dr. Ingram to analyze and restructure the District's organization to improve efficiency and performance.On April 8, 2008, as part of a District-wide administrative reorganization, the Superintendent notified Plaintiffshe would be issued an administrative contract and that her salary would be reduced to $75,000 for the 2008–2009 school year.Plaintiff received notice of her specific reassignment to the Director of Food Service position no later than May 12, 2008.The District paid Plaintiff her full salary as Deputy Superintendent through the end of the 2007–2008 contract year.It is undisputed the District provided Plaintiff a job at the teacher level or higher at all times in question.The District provided Plaintiff with a timely administrative contract for the 2008–2009 school year.

Plaintiff's Complaint asserts four causes of action against the School District: violation of the Teacher Act; violation of procedural due process; violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and, a request for temporary relief.¹Plaintiff previously abandoned her covenant of good faith claim and the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's claim for temporary relief.²

Plaintiff contends her demotion and salary reduction constituted a discharge under the Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act(hereafter “Teacher Act”), S.C.Code § 59–25–410, et. seq., thereby affording her a hearing to contest the decision.Plaintiff also contends the District's failure to provide her a dismissal hearing violated her due process rights.

Plaintiff relies on the Teacher Act as the underpinning for her claim of a continuing right to be paid at the level of a Deputy Superintendent.³The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on November 20, 2009, both stating there was no genuine issue of fact for trial.⁴

Plaintiff's summary judgment motion cited to the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson v. Spartanburg County Sch. Dist. No. 7,314 S.C. 340, 444 S.E.2d 501(1994), for support that the District's failure to provide her a hearing to contest her administrative demotion and salary reduction violated her statutory and due process rights.⁵

Defendant based its motion for summary judgment on the grounds that state law provided Plaintiff no rights to her administrative position or salary, and therefore, Plaintiff could not prove a violation of the Teacher Act or the Due Process clause.⁶Defendant argued that S.C.Code § 59–24–15 expressly states that Teacher Act rights are not granted for the position or salary of an administrator and thereby overruled the Johnson decisionPlaintiff relies upon.

On January 22, 2010, this Court denied both parties' motions “pending a resolution of the certified question.”⁷This Court went on to issue an Order of Certification to the South Carolina Supreme Court.This Court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court to clarify the impact of S.C.Code § 59–24–15 on Plaintiff's claims.On January 18, 2011, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion answering the certified question.⁸The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Johnson.The South Carolina Supreme Court held “the legislature enacted section 59–24–15 after the Johnson decision, and the plain language of the statute directly contradicts the holding in Johnson.The statute plainly states that an administrator has no rights in her ‘position or salary,’ and the legislature made no exception or distinction concerning the administrator's status as a certified educator.”⁹

Defendant renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment after the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its opinion, arguing that the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion is outcome determinative as to both the Teacher Act claim and the 42 U.S.C. 1983 due process claim.

In response, Plaintiff argued that applying S.C.Code 59–24–15 to defeat her Teacher Act claim would be a retroactive application of the statute.Plaintiff also argued that the South Carolina Supreme Court's answer to the certified question could not be applied “retroactively” to her claims.Plaintiff further argued that she retained rights as a certified administrator under Article 3 of Chapter 19 and Article 5 of Chapter 25, and that these rights were not affected by the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion.Alternatively, Plaintiff contended that Defendant violated the Teacher Act by failing to timely notify her of her administrative assignment in accordance with S.C.Code 59–25–410.Additionally, Plaintiff filed an affidavit stating she always believed the District could not demote her or cut her salary without affording her hearing before the District's Board of Trustees.Plaintiff's affidavit went on to state that she based this belief the District's Policy CFC which states that “the board will review administrative transfers involving a loss of rank and/or income in a grievance hearing upon a specific request of the affected administrator.”Plaintiff asserted that Policy CFC constituted a separate basis for her alleged property interest in her position and salary as Deputy Superintendent.

This Court heard oral arguments on May 3, 2011.For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment is granted where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¹⁰“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, the nonmoving party must produce ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’ rather than resting upon the bald assertions of his pleadings.”¹¹“Genuineness means that the evidence must create fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice.A trial, after all, is not an entitlement.It exists to resolve what reasonable minds would recognize as real factual disputes.”¹²The “obligation of the nonmoving party is ‘particularly strong when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof.’ ”¹³“Summary judgment is not ‘a disfavored procedural shortcut,’ but an important mechanism for weeding out ‘claims and defenses that have no factual bases.’ ”¹⁴

III.DISCUSSIONA.Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act

The South Carolina Teacher Employment and Dismissal Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 59–25–410 to 530(“Teacher Act”) provides procedures for dismissal, suspension, and notice of reemployment for certified educators.¹⁵The Teacher Act defines “teacher” as “all employees possessing a professional certificate issued by the state department of education, except those employees working pursuant to multi-year contracts.”¹⁶The Teacher Act provides certified educators the right to notice of reemployment by April 15 each school year and the right to a hearing prior to dismissal or nonrenewal.¹⁷The Teacher Act contains no language expressly providinga right to a hearing to contest a transfer or reassignment.

In 1984 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered whether a demotion from an administrative position could constitute a “discharge” triggering the protections of the Teacher Act.¹⁸In Snipes v. McAndrew two principals who were issued contracts as assistant principals for the new school year and thereby demoted argued they were entitled to contest the demotion under the Teacher Act.¹⁹The Snipes court held the Act affords a hearing only when the teacher is dismissed or nonrenewed.The Court found no distinction in the Act between educators employed as administrators and teachers: “[a] close reading of the Act reveals no distinction between administrative or supervisory personnel and teachers.‘Where a principal is protected by the tenure statute only from dismissal as a teacher, a principal may properly be demoted to the position of a teacher.’ ”²⁰The Snipes court reasoned that a transfer, reassignment, or demotion is not equivalent to dismissal or non renewal of a teacher's contract.²¹The Snipes Court concluded that the school principals were not entitled to an adversarial hearing to contest their reassignment.

The Act provides for a full, adversarial hearing when a teacher is dismissed or nonrenewed. §§ 59–25–420,59–25–430,59–25–460 of the Code.Nowhere does it provide for a full, adversarial hearing when a teacher is merely transferred, reassigned, or demoted.We are of the opinion that policy decisions concerning where an employee will best serve the school district are better left to school officials, not the courts.Unless the legislature decides to...