Hensel v. Beckward

• Decision Date: 27 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 75,75
• Citation: 273 Md. 426,330 A.2d 196
• Parties: Russell William HENSEL et al. v. Garfield BECKWARD et ux.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 426

273 Md. 426

330 A.2d 196

Russell William HENSEL et al. v.Garfield BECKWARD et ux.

No. 75.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 27, 1974.

Robert H. Reinhart, Cumberland (Walsh, Walsh & Reinhart, Cumberland, on the brief), for appellants.

Louis A. Fatkin, Cumberland (Fatkin & Brubaker, Cumberland, on the brief), for appellees.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

In Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 240-241, 297 A.2d 235(1972), the most recent case of this Court which discusses Maryland's motor vehicle 'boulevard rule,'Maryland Code(1957, 1970 Repl.Vol.) Art. 66 1/2, § 11-403, ¹we indicated our hope that, with the views expressed there, no longer would this statute give rise to either 'lingering doubts about the absoluteness of its application,' or, other than through legislative enactment, further 'attempts to create new exceptions to it.'The present litigation, however, has dashed this hope, as once again we are faced with a case in which the application of the 'bounevard rule' is sought to be avoided.Like the Rock of Gibraltar we remain firm and will not allow the legislative mandates contained in this right-of-way statute to be judicially either bypassed or otherwise eroded through new waves of attack.

This action was filed in the Circuit Court for Allegany County(Gett, J.) and is here on certiorari after a reversal by the Court of Special Appeals of the trial court's judgment which was entered in favor of the defendant-petitioner as a result of a directed verdict.In considering the correctness of that ruling, we are required to review the evidence, though to a substantial degree controverted, in the light most favorable to the respondent, the party against whom the verdict was directed.Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. 214, 230-231, 300 A.2d 665(1973).The relevant portions of the evidence when so considered reveal that the accident, which gave rise to this case, occurred on a clear but moonless night in February 1970, when an automobile driven by the respondent, Garfield Beckward, collided with a vehicle driven by the petitioner, Russell William Hensel.²That collision occurred in Allegany County at the unilluminated intersection of Vocke Road, a four-lane divided highway running east and west, and Maryland Route 49, a two-lane highway running north and south with a stop sign which controlled the entry of traffic on Route 49 into its intersection with Vocke Road.The evidence also shows that when Beckward approached that intersection he came to a complete stop on Route 49, whereupon he, together with his wife who was beside him on the front seat, each looked twice, both to the east and to the west, for traffic proceeding on Vocke Road.Seeing no vehicular movement and therefore satisfied as to the apparent safety of moving out into the intersection, Beckward began to drive very slowly across the two eastbound lanes of Vocke Road toward the median, while both he and his wife continued to watch for traffic which might approach from their left.When the Beckwards were about half way across that side of the highway, the petitioner's car suddenly appeared in the illumination of their headlights.This second vehicle was about 20 to 25 feet away when first spotted by the Beckwards, and was proceeding, they say at a fast rate of speed in an easterly direction with unlit headlights.The collision which followed caused beckward to be catapulated from his automobile onto the road curb, and tragically resulted in his being hospitalized for six months, after which he returned to his home permanently paralyzed from the neck down.

After all the evidence was presented, Judge Getty, relying principally on our decision in Creaser v. Owens, supra, directed a verdict, and we think quite correctly, in favor of Hensel on the ground that, under the 'boulevard rule,' Beckward as the unfavored driver, though he halted at the stop sign, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way to the Hensel vehicle traveling on the favored highway.

In Creaser, a school bus driver, traveling on an unfavored highway, properly stopped at the stop sign and looked for traffic proceeding on the favored highway before venturing into the intersection.Though her visability beyond 200 feet to her left was obstructed by a hill and a curve in the 'boulevard,' the bus driver slowly 'creeped out' into the intersection, only to be surprised by a speeding car which 'jumped' over the hill and collided with the bus.While recognizing the possible harshness of the result, this Court held that because the bus driver failed to yield the right-of-way to the favored driver as required by the 'boulevard'statute, the unfavored operator was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.In so ruling we stated:

'In order to make crystal clear our holding here, we emphasize that if an unfavored driver is involved in an accident with a favored vehicle under circumstances where the boulevard law is applicable then in a suit based on that collision the unfavored driver is deemed to be negligent as a matter of law.And, if the unfavored driver is a plaintiff, his suit is defeated unless the doctrine of last clear chance rescues his claim.Whereas, if the unfavored driver is a defendanthe is liable except in the rare case when the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the favored driver is properly submitted to a jury, i. e., whether he was guilty of negligence that was a proximate cause of the accident.'(all citations omitted)267 Md. at 245, 297 A.2d at 239.

Despite the definitive nature of this and other statements in Creaser concerning the 'boulevard rule,' as to its precise requirements to both stop and yield, as well as to the strictness of its application to vehicular traffic at designated intersecting highways, the Court of Special Appeals³ reversed the judgment of the trial court, asserting that under the circumstances present here, the 'boulevard rule' is inapplicable to accidents occurring at the intersections of through streets with stop streets.Beckward v. Hensel, 20 Md.App. 544, 316 A.2d 309(1974).In arriving at this determination the majority did not take issue with the Creaser decision that the 'boulevard rule' must be rigorously followed 'when it is applicable.'But they in effect reason, relying principally on Nicholson v. Page, 255 Md. 659, 259 A.2d 319(1969), ⁴ that not all accidents occurring between favored and unfavored drivers at an intersection controlled by a stop sign are governed by the 'boulevard rule,' as 'under certain circumstances (, such at those in this case,) the conduct of a favored driver could be such as to alter the relative rights and obligations of drivers at an intersection.'20 Md.App. at 553, 316 A.2d at 314.Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals decided that the trial judge, in relying on the 'boulevard rule' to direct the verdict in favor of the petitioner, erred when he ruled that as a matter of law Beckward was guilty of negligence which contributed to the happening of the accident.Instead, that court determined that the trial judge should have allowed the issue of the accident's proximate cause to be decided by the jury.In support of this conclusion it reasoned that Hensel, in traveling along Vocke Road into its intersection with Route 49, normally would have been entitled to all the perquisites possessed by a driver on a favored highway, but here, by making 'it impossible for his presence on the highway to be anticipated by the unfavored driver,'20 Md.App. at 553, 316 A.2d at 314, he had, by that action, altered the 'relative rights' of the two motorists so as to permit recovery by Beckward.

We do not agree with this analysis espoused by the majority opinion for the Court of Special Appeals as we fail to perceive a basic legal distinction, permitting different results, between the facts of this case and those of Creaser.In each there existed a natural visibility hindrance to the unfavored driver (the black of the night in one and a hill and a curve in the road in the other) which was combined with an affirmative failure by both favored drivers to comply with the requirements of the motor vehicle statute(failure to turn on headlights in the present case compared with driving considerably in excess of the speed limit in Creaser).In explaining our decision it becomes unnecessary for us now to go back and review each of this Court's prior 'boulevard rule'cases since that has been done by several of our recent opinions, particularly Creaser.Consequently, we only...