Hensley v. Orendorff

• Decision Date: 14 November 1907
• Parties: HENSLEY v. ORENDORFF ET AL. [a1]
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

44 So. 869

152 Ala. 599

HENSLEY v. ORENDORFF ET AL. ^[a1]

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 14, 1907

Appeal from Circuit Court, Morgan County; D. W. Speake, Judge.

Detinue by James W. Hensley against Eliza A. Orendorff and others. Defendant Walton interpleaded, suggesting claimants. From a judgment for claimants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Callahan & Harris, for appellant.

O. Kyle and E. W. Godby, for appellees.

TYSON C.J.

This action is detinue for the recovery of personal property namely, one Monarch brick machine, and was brought against I Walton. Walton interpleaded under the statute, making the required affidavit. Section 2634 of the Code of 1896. The claimants suggested by him appeared, made themselves parties defendant, and after much pleading which was wholly unnecessary, based upon a misconception of the proper procedure in this character of cases, there was a verdict and judgment for the claimants.

The trial court, as shown by the record, treated the claimants who became by their interposition substituted defendants, as actors (plaintiffs) in the case, and directed by its ruling the issues to be made by the pleadings, and the trial to conform to this theory. This was clearly a mistake. We doubt not that a claimant who appears and defends in the place of the original defendant should propound his claim to the property in writing with such degree of clearness, certainty, and fullness as that the plaintiff may be informed of the character of his title and the court may be enabled to judge whether he has or has not a title to the property in controversy. But we apprehend that no stricter rule obtains with respect to the statement of his title, be it legal or equitable, than is required under the statute authorizing his intervention for the purpose of a trial of the right of property. Section 1484 of the Code of 1896. No good reason exists why the rule should be different in the two classes of cases. In each the contested issue between the plaintiff and the substituted defendant for all practicable purposes is the same. It is, to which of them does the property belong? And all the legal refinement as to the mode to be resorted to, in the way of pleading, must inevitably culminate in the issue we have stated. The obvious purpose sought to be accomplished by the statute was to institute a regulation by which a defendant, claiming no title to the property, could rid himself of the harassment of two actions and to enable the rival claimants to have their respective claims adjudicated in a cheap and summary way. We have used the word "regulation" advisedly.

No new right or remedy was created or conferred by the statute. It existed at common law in this class of actions. In actions of detinue, even at an early period in the history of the common law, a defendant, claiming no interest in the property, was permitted to suggest the claimant, and could require him to intervene and defend the action, or else disclaim title to the property. Indeed, the remedy of interpleader by a defendant so situated, except by bill in equity, did not obtain in any personal action under the common law, except in actions of detinue. 3 Reeves, History of English Law, pp. 448, 455; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 801.

The section of the Code of 1896 (section 2634) under which the remedy of interpleader was resorted in this case is unlike in this respect to the preceding section of the Code of 1896 (section 2633), in that the latter section not only created the right and remedy as well as the mode in which the remedy is to be invoked and pursued. It follows, therefore, that what is said in our cases with regard to the formation of the pleadings in cases brought under the latter section named has no application to this case. But none of these cases go so far as to impose upon the claimant, the substituted defendant, the burden resting upon a plaintiff, the actor in the action, whatever else they may hold with respect to the sufficiency of the statement of the claimant and the plaintiff's right to demur, answer, or reply to it.

In consonance with the spirit and purpose of the statute, the proceedings in this class of cases should be, as far as practicable, assimilated to and conducted as are proceedings in the statutory trial of the right to property authorized by section 1484; and, where the proceeding is under that statute, "the plaintiff must allege that he has the legal title to the property, the subject of the action, and...