Henson v. Barnhart
| Decision Date | 29 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:03 CV 862.,1:03 CV 862. |
| Citation | 373 F.Supp.2d 674 |
| Parties | Lynette HENSON v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Administration. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
William Fred Krause, III, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Steven A. Ford, Anoka, MN, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OVERRULING PLAINIFF'S OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This appeal from an adverse administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration was referred to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this court. The magistrate judge recommends that the court affirm the Commissioner's decision. Plaintiff filed timely objections which require de novo review. See FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b).
Plaintiff's indistinct objections argue two points regarding her alleged disability due to depression, but neither can be sustained. First, and contrary to plaintiff's argument, the administrative law judge expressly found that plaintiff's alleged depression is not a severe impairment. ALJ Meyer's decision contains the following explicit finding:
The claimant has been diagnosed with reflux, depression, thyroid, and a hernia, which are medically determinable but not severe impairments.
Tr. 18 (emphasis added). Second, a reviewing court cannot re-weigh conflicting evidence and substitute its own findings in order to set aside an administrative law judge's factual determination as to whether a claimed impairment is severe.
Next, and continuing on the subject of plaintiff's depression, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erroneously rejected plaintiff's argument that an administrative law judge must state and discuss reasons why plaintiff does not meet or equal presumptively-disabling impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 ("the Listings"). The magistrate judge correctly concluded, however, that this case is not an appropriate occasion for considering whether to implement such a rule. Under administrative sequential analysis required by regulation, Step 3 analysis of any impairments that does not survive Step 2 analysis is foreclosed. When an alleged impairment is determined to be not a severe Step 2, further analysis of the impairment terminates. The magistrate judge cited and correctly applied Davis v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 293, 296 n. 4 (5th Cir.1984), wherein the governing court of appeals instructed lower trial courts that consideration of impairments at Step 3 occurs only when the adjudicator determines at Step 2 that a claimant has a severe impairment. There was no need for further consideration or discussion of that alleged impairment at Step 3.
Finally, plaintiff raises a similar objection with respect to another allegedly disabling impairment, sleep apnea. Since the Commissioner found this impairment severe, Step 3 analysis was required. Nevertheless, for reasons carefully articulated by the magistrate judge, plaintiff's argument that the administrative law judge was required to discuss at length why plaintiff's sleep apnea does not meet stringent Listings criteria must fail.
The magistrate judge accurately determined that under arcane administrative regulations, applicants must satisfy Listings criteria with respect to respiratory disorders, including sleep apnea, only by proving that they meet Listings criteria for certain cross-referenced impairments. The only such cross-referenced impairments for sleep apnea argued as applicable to plaintiff was Listing 12.02, which relates to organic mental disorders. For reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, no Step 3 analysis was permitted or proper with respect to plaintiff's depression. Accordingly, due to mootness, this case is not an appropriate vehicle for deciding whether the Commissioner must articulate reasons for Step 3 findings.1
ORDERIt is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct and the report of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED. A final judgment will be entered in this case in accordance with the magistrate judge's recommendation.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration's ("SSA") decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB").1 This case is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review, hearing if necessary, and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2001) and Loc. R. CV-72 & App. B, R.1(H) for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges, and Beaumont General Order 98-6.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405 authorizes United States district courts to conduct judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions regarding applications for social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2004). Judicial review is limited. The court's role is to determine whether (a) the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and (b) the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir.1995); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir.1992). If proper principles of law were applied, and if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 206, 230, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
By local orders, complaints seeking judicial review of administrative decisions denying applications for Social Security benefits are treated as appeals. The party seeking review is required to specify points of alleged error, and to submit a brief containing legal arguments directed to those points. The Commissioner is ordered to respond. The court limits its judicial review to points argued in the briefs. See Order Directing Filing of Briefs (Docket No. 7) and Notice to Parties in Social Security Appeal Cases (Docket No. 6).
Plaintiff, Lynette M. Henson, a 44-year-old female, applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on November 29, 2001. Tr. 87. Plaintiff claimed onset of disability as of December 17, 2000, due to (1) obstructed sleep apnea, (2) gastroesophageal reflux disease, (3) esophageal candida, and (4) an ulcer. Tr. 107. On her application form, she responded to a question regarding her medical records by stating that she was "seeing a therapist" with respect to "emotional or mental problems that limit [my] ability to work." Tr. 109.
Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, whereupon plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 68. In that request, plaintiff stated that she disagreed with the administrative determination of her claim because "I am unable to work due to all my illness." Id. In listing alleged illnesses, she included "Depression." Id.
ALJ Gerald L. Meyer conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 23, 2003, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. In addition, ALJ Meyer received testimony of a vocational expert ("VE"), Phillip Roddy.2 The remaining evidence consisted of written clinical notes and reports of treating sources,3 an ad hoc evaluative report of one examining physician,4 two ad hoc evaluative reports from reviewing physicians,5 and emergency room records.6
On May 14, 2003, ALJ Meyer issued a decision denying plaintiff's application. Tr. 22. Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council to reconsider. When the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request on July 18, 2003 (Tr. 7), ALJ Meyer's decision became the Commissioner's final decision. Plaintiff timely initiated suit in the federal court on September 16, 2003.
Regulations require a five-step sequential analysis for initial disability determinations.7 When a claimant is found not disabled at any step, remaining steps are not considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2004). The burden of proof is on a claimant at every stage, except for the initial inquiry at Step 5. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir.2002); Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1987).
The five-step sequential analysis for determining applications for benefits based on disability is approved by courts. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2297, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (citing Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1954, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983)) (The use of the sequential evaluation process "contribute[s] to the uniformity and efficiency of disability determinations").
ALJ Meyer determined at Step 2 that plaintiff carried her burden of proving that she has "severe impairments" within the meaning of the regulation. Specifically ALJ Meyer determined that plaintiff's arthritis and sleep apnea constitute severe impairments. Tr. 18. However, ALJ Meyer concluded at Step 3 that these impairments do not meet, equal or exceed certain presumptively disabling impairments catalogued in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, popularly known as "the Listings."8 Tr. 21, Finding 4.
This conclusion required ALJ Meyer to determine plaintiff's "residual functional capacity" before addressing the remaining steps.9 ALJ Meyer stated that he carefully considered all of the medical opinions in the record. Tr. 21, Finding 6. He then concluded that plaintiff has residual functional capacity for light work with limitations precluding climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds and precluding exposure to dangerous or moving machinery or unprotected heights. Tr. 21,...
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