Henyard v. MV Transp. & Pace Suburban Bus Serv.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 15 C 10835,15 C 10835 |
| Parties | PEARL HENYARD, Plaintiff, v. MV TRANSPORTATION and PACE SUBURBAN BUS SERVICE, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Pearl Henyard brings this Title VII suit against her former employers, MV Transportation and Pace Suburban Bus Service (collectively "Defendants"). R. 80, Am. Compl. ¶¶3-4.1 In her amended complaint, Henyard alleges that she experienced discrimination and harassment based on her sex. Id. ¶¶10, 22. After making a complaint to her employers about the discrimination and harassment, Henyard alleges she was later retaliated against. Id. ¶ 23. In addition to her Title VII claims, Henyard also brings several other federal claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 18 U.S.C. § 113, and 45 C.F.R. § 46; and one state law claim under the Illinois Eavesdropping Act, 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. Id. ¶10. The Defendants move to dismiss all claims. R. 83, Defs.' Mot. Dismiss. For the reasonsset forth below, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations in the Amended Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Henyard was employed as a bus driver by MV Transportation and Pace Suburban Bus Service. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4. During her employment, Henyard worked holidays in November 2014, December 2014, and January 2015. Id. ¶ 11; R. 86, Pl.'s Resp. at 2.2 But the Defendants did not timely pay Henyard for her work on those days. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Instead, the Defendants had Henyard go through somewhat of a wild-goose chase to obtain her pay. Pl.'s Resp. at 2. Henyard constantly asked the operation manager, Jaricho Worthy, about her delayed pay. Id. Whenever she asked him, however, Worthy directed Henyard to a woman by the name of Nicole in the payroll department, who then directed Henyard back to Worthy. Id. It was not until four or five months later that the Defendants finally paid Henyard for her holiday hours. Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Pl.'s Resp. at 2.
Henyard experienced similar delays when requesting medical leave. Am. Compl. ¶ 12; Pl.'s Resp. at 2-3. To obtain time off, an employee working for theDefendants must submit a written request form no less than one week before and no more than four weeks before the day requested. Pl. Resp. at 2. Whenever Henyard put in her written requests, she had to repeatedly ask Worthy to sign them. Id. at 2-3. Worthy would not approve Henyard's requests until the day right before the requested day off. Id.
According to Henyard, the Defendants also denied her work assignments and changed her bus route which consequently "changed the quality of the job." Am. Compl. ¶ 13. Specifically, the Defendants removed, cancelled, and moved certain trips from Henyard's scheduled routes from April to July 2014. Pl. Resp. at 4. After July, the Defendants re-added one or two trips from Henyard's original bus route, but Henyard "would have preferred to have had a regular schedule" like other employees. Id.
Additionally, while working for the Defendants, Henyard's coworker repeatedly said "verbal things to try to entice her," and her supervisor constantly harmed and insulted her. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. In January 2015, one of Henyard's coworkers touched or slapped her rear. Pl. Resp. at 5. After this incident, every time Henyard would see this coworker at work, she would say things like "you are a cute chocolate girl," "you like me," and "you missed me," followed by what Henyard describes as "an obnoxious noise as through she [was] laughing." Id. Henyard's supervisor also constantly harmed and insulted Henyard. Am. Compl. ¶ 14; Pl.'s Resp. at 3. One such example of this, is when her supervisor, Worthy, "pulled [her] scarf" and "choked" her. Pl.'s Resp. at 3.
Eventually, in July 2015, Henyard complained about these experiences. Pl.'s Resp. at 7; Am. Compl. ¶ 15. Three days later, when Henyard returned to work, "30 to 40 pieces of substance flew out of the vehicle's vent." Id. As a result, Henyard sustained numerous injuries. Id. On a different occasion, but also after she had made her complaint, Henyard noticed a black greasy substance as well as a white powdery substance on her finger that caused it to go numb. Pl.'s Resp. at 7. Finally, in September 2015, Henyard filed an EEOC complaint based on these allegations. Id.; R. 1, Compl.
Throughout her employment, the Defendants also recorded Henyard without her consent. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. The buses contained a dash cam that can record what is happening inside it. Id. The Defendants' policy requires employees to consent to being recorded when there is a sudden "jerk, bump, [or] shift," of the bus or when the driver turns on the camera for purposes of recording incidents related to the bus or passengers. Id. Whenever either of these occur, the dash cam records for only ten to fifteen seconds. Id. As an employee, Henyard consented to being recorded under those circumstances. Id. But the Defendants recorded Henyard "throughout [the] duration of [the] job," to which Henyard did not consent. Id. While driving the Defendants' buses, Henyard took private phone calls on speaker phone, and had private conversations with passengers. Pl.'s Resp. at 7.
Eventually, Henyard filed this employment-discrimination suit against the Defendants and several others. Am. Compl. Henyard later filed two amended complaints without leave to do so. See R. 64, R. 76. The Court allowed the most recentversion to be filed but only as to the currently named Defendants. R. 79, 2/27/18 Minute Entry. In addition to her Title VII claims, Henyard also brings several other federal claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 18 U.S.C. § 113, as well as 45 C.F.R. § 46, and one state law claim under the Illinois Eavesdropping Act, 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. Am. Compl. The Defendants now move to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (alteration in original) (cleaned up).3 The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)) (cleaned up).
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Policeof Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
"[W]hen evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint," the Court may also consider "facts alleged by a plaintiff in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss ... so long as they are consistent of the allegations in the complaint." Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up); see also Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (). Moreover, in evaluating a pro se complaint, the Court applies a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Smith, 803 F.3d at 309.
Henyard brings several Title VII claims. She alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, and also that she was subjected to harassment by her coworker and her supervisor. Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Henyard also alleges that she was retaliated against after she filed an EEOC complaint. Id. ¶ 23.The Defendants move to dismiss all three claims. The Court addresses each of the Defendants arguments in turn.
As a preliminary matter, the Defendants argue that Henyard's Title VII claims were not filed on time. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 5. Specifically, they argue that Henyard did not file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred as required by law. Id. But "dismissing a complaint as untimely at the pleading stage is an unusual step, since a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as statute of limitations." Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2015). This unusual step is appropriate "only where the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense. Id.
Here, the Defendants contend that Henyard failed to "suppl[y] a single date or time frame during which the alleged harassment and discrimination occurred." Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 5. Without those specifics, however, it is not possible to decide the statute of limitations issue on the pleadings. See Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester, 782 F.3d at 928. Although discovery might very well uncover that Henyard's Title VII claims are indeed untimely, the Court cannot decide this issue now....
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