Herald v. University Bd. of Regents
| Decision Date | 19 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 128263.,COA No. 9. |
| Citation | 475 Mich. 463,719 N.W.2d 19 |
| Parties | HERALD COMPANY, INC, d/b/a Booth Newspapers, Inc. and Ann Arbor News, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF REGENTS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Soble Rowe Krichbaum, L.L.P. (by Jonathan D. Rowe and Matthew E. Krichbaum), Ann Arbor, for the plaintiff.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Mary Massaron Ross and Michael S. Bogren), Detroit, for the defendant.
Debra A. Kowich, Eileen K. Jennings, William C. Collins, Marvin Krislov, Carol L. J. Hustoles, Victor A. Zambardi, and Robert A. Noto, Ann Arbor, for amici curiae the Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Western Michigan University, Central Michigan University Board of Trustees, Saginaw Valley State University, the Board of Control of Michigan Technological University, the Board of Trustees of Oakland University, the Board of Control of Northern Michigan University, and the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University.
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn L.L.P. (by Herschel P. Fink and Brian D. Wassom), Detroit, for Detroit Free Press, Inc.
Bernardi, Ronayne & Glusac, P.C. (by John J. Ronayne, III; and Elise N. Reed), Detroit, for Michigan Association of Broadcasters and Michigan Press Association.
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham), Kalamazoo, for Michigan Townships Association.
The question presented in this case is whether the Washtenaw Circuit Court (the circuit court) properly withheld from disclosure a letter (Doyle letter) written by Eastern Michigan University's (EMU) Vice President of Finance Patrick Doyle to a member of defendant EMU Board of Regents, Jan Brandon. The circuit court held that the letter was exempt as a frank communication under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq. The Doyle letter was written at Brandon's request as part of defendant's investigation of allegations that the then-president of EMU, Samuel Kirkpatrick, had run the construction of a new president's house (University House project) precipitously over budget.
Applying the balancing test set forth in the statutory language of MCL 15.243(1)(m), the frank communication exemption, the circuit court concluded that the public interest in encouraging frank communication clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure and, therefore, that the Doyle letter was exempt from disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision, determining that the circuit court did not commit clear error. We granted leave to appeal.
We affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, but we take this opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard of review of discretionary determinations in FOIA cases. In Federated Publications, Inc. v. City of Lansing,1 we held that appellate courts must review the trial court's discretionary determinations in FOIA cases for clear error. We continue to hold that the clear error standard of review is appropriate where the parties challenge the factual findings of the trial court. However, where the parties do not dispute the underlying facts but rather challenge the trial court's exercise of discretion, we hold that an appellate court must review that determination for an abuse of discretion, which this Court now defines as a determination that is outside the principled range of outcomes.2
In this case, the parties do not dispute the underlying facts. Rather, they dispute the import of those facts as they factor into the weighted balancing test of the frank communication exemption. Accordingly, we review the circuit court's decision to affirm the nondisclosure of the Doyle letter for an abuse of discretion. We hold that the circuit court reached a decision that was within the principled range of outcomes when it determined the balance of competing interests favored nondisclosure and that it therefore did not abuse its discretion.
We also hold that, pursuant to MCL 15.244, the public body must "to the extent practicable, facilitate a separation of exempt from nonexempt information" and "make the nonexempt material available for examination and copying." Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court to separate this material from the Doyle letter and make the nonexempt material available to plaintiff.
Established by the Michigan Constitution, which confers upon it "general supervision of the institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds,"3 defendant has broad constitutional and statutory4 oversight to govern Eastern Michigan University. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, defendant investigated the University House project controversy as it unfolded in 2003. The Doyle letter arose out of this internal investigation.
Plaintiff Herald Company, Inc., doing business as Booth Newspapers, Inc., and the Ann Arbor News, sent FOIA requests to defendant on September 10 and 11, 2003, as it conducted its own investigation, seeking numerous documents related to the University House project.5 In an October 1, 2003, letter, defendant granted plaintiff's FOIA requests except where defendant indicated either the documents sought did not exist or were in the possession of a separate corporate entity, the EMU Foundation. Defendant sent a second letter to plaintiff on October 7, 2003, that specifically identified the Doyle letter and advised plaintiff that it would not disclose the letter pursuant to the frank communication exemption of the FOIA.
On February 5, 2004, plaintiff filed simultaneously in the circuit court a complaint and an emergency motion to compel disclosure of the Doyle letter under the FOIA. After a hearing and viewing the letter in camera, the circuit court issued a written opinion and concluded that the Doyle letter met the statutory definition of a frank communication. In resolving the required statutory balancing test, the circuit court concluded that the balance favored nondisclosure. It permitted defendant to withhold the Doyle letter in its entirety.
In a split, published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court.6 Chief Judge Whitbeck filed a dissent, arguing that the circuit court committed clear error by misconstruing the balancing test. We subsequently granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal.7
This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.8 To effectuate the intent of the Legislature, we interpret every word, phrase, and clause in a statute to avoid rendering any portion of the statute nugatory or surplusage.9
In addition, certain FOIA provisions require the trial court to balance competing interests.10 In Federated, this Court announced the appropriate standard of review of discretionary determinations in FOIA cases. While discussing both factual findings and discretionary determinations, we stated in Federated that when an appellate court is called upon to evaluate the trial court's discretionary determinations, it must defer to the trial court's decision unless there was clear error.11 Clear error exists only when the appellate court "is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."12
Federated inadvertently misstated the appropriate standard of review for discretionary determinations in FOIA cases.13 In Michigan, the clear error standard has historically been applied when reviewing a trial court's factual findings14 whereas the abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing matters left to the trial court's discretion.15 We take this opportunity to refine our position in Federated. First, we continue to hold that legal determinations are reviewed under a de novo standard. Second, we also hold that the clear error standard of review is appropriate in FOIA cases where a party challenges the underlying facts that support the trial court's decision. In that case, the appellate court must defer to the trial court's view of the facts unless the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the trial court. Finally, when an appellate court reviews a decision committed to the trial court's discretion, such as the balancing test at issue in this case, we hold that the appellate court must review the discretionary determination for an abuse of discretion and cannot disturb the trial court's decision unless it falls outside the principled range of outcomes.16
The Legislature codified the FOIA to facilitate disclosure to the public of public records held by public bodies.17 However, by expressly codifying exemptions to the FOIA, the Legislature shielded some "affairs of government" from public view. The FOIA exemptions signal particular instances where the policy of offering the public full and complete information about government operations is overcome by a more significant policy interest favoring nondisclosure.18 In many of these instances, the Legislature has made a policy determination that full disclosure of certain public records could prove harmful to the proper functioning of the public body. Indeed, in Federated we instructed that a circuit court "should remain cognizant of the special consideration that the Legislature has accorded an exemptible class of records."19
The frank communication exemption at issue in this case provides that a public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record
[c]ommunications and notes within a public body or between public bodies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover other than purely factual materials and are preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or action. This exemption does not apply unless the public body shows that in the particular instance the public interest in encouraging frank...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Potter v. McLeary
...MCL 333.1105(1). 14. See Odom v. Wayne Co., 482 Mich. 459, 471, 760 N.W.2d 217 (2008), citing Herald Co., Inc. v. Eastern Michigan Univ. Bd of Regents, 475 Mich. 463, 470, 719 N.W.2d 19 (2006). 15. Ante at 9. 16. See Mossman v. Millenbach Motor Sales, 284 Mich. 562, 568, 280 N.W. 50 (1938),......
-
Federation of Personnel v. University, Docket No. 133819.
...873 (2000). 9. Wood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 401, 403, 668 N.W.2d 353 (2003); Herald Co., Inc. v. Eastern Michigan Univ. Bd. of Regents, 475 Mich. 463, 471-472, 719 N.W.2d 19 (2006). 10. Herald Co., 463 Mich. at 117-118, 614 N.W.2d 873 (citations 11. MCL 15.231(2). 12. MCL 15.232(......
-
Paquin v. City of St. Ignace, Docket No. 156823
...Inc. v. City of Lansing , 467 Mich. 98, 112, 649 N.W.2d 383 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Herald Co., Inc. v. Eastern Mich. Univ. Bd. of Regents , 475 Mich. 463, 719 N.W.2d 19 (2006) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, our caselaw has been somewhat unclear in addressing the "likely to ......
-
Henry v. Dow Chemical Co.
...753 (2005). 15. Id. 16. Id. at 705, 691 N.W.2d 753. 17. Id. at 706, 691 N.W.2d 753. 18. Herald Co., Inc. v. Eastern Michigan Univ. Bd. of Regents, 475 Mich. 463, 471-472, 719 N.W.2d 19 (2006). In Herald, this Court clarified, in the context of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), that if ......