Herbert v. District of Columbia

Decision Date10 April 1997
Docket NumberNo. 93-CV-407.,93-CV-407.
Citation691 A.2d 1175
PartiesKatherine HERBERT, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Judy L. Feinberg, Washington, DC, with whom Andrea L. Koyner was on the brief, for appellant.

Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Vanessa Ruiz, Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Michael F. Wasserman, Assistant Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellee District of Columbia.

Edward A. Gonsalves, Fairfax, VA, with whom Gary A. Godard and Christine Mougin-Boal were on the brief, for appellees Robert Yancey, M.D., and Barrington Barnes, M.D.

James W. Cobb, Washington, DC, filed a brief on behalf of appellees Professional Development Corporation and its officers and directors.

Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and TERRY and SCHWELB, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

The principal issue in this case, one of first impression in this court, is whether the trial court was correct when it ruled that the District of Columbia could delegate to a contractor its duty to provide necessary and appropriate medical care to prisoners incarcerated in its prison system. We hold that this ruling was erroneous, and thus we reverse the judgment in favor of the District and remand this case for further proceedings.

Appellant, Katherine Herbert, brought this suit against the District of Columbia, Professional Development Corporation (PDC), the directors and officers of PDC in their individual capacities, and PDC employees Robert Yancey, M.D., Barrington Barnes, M.D., and Charles Lawson, a physician's assistant. She sought to recover damages for injuries allegedly resulting from improper medical treatment which she received from Mr. Lawson while she was incarcerated in the District of Columbia Jail in July of 1987, and from the follow-up care provided by Drs. Yancey and Barnes. Before trial appellant moved for summary judgment against the District, arguing that it had a non-delegable duty to provide for the medical care of inmates in its prison system. This motion was denied. At the conclusion of the trial, the court directed verdicts in favor of the District, the directors and officers of PDC, and both Drs. Yancey and Barnes. Appellant noted this appeal, in which she challenges all of these rulings.1 We affirm the directed verdicts in favor of the directors and officers of PDC and the two doctors. As to the District, however, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

I
A. Health Care Services at the District of Columbia Jail

Early in 1986, the District and PDC entered into a one-year contract whereby PDC agreed to provide health care services for inmates at the D.C. Jail infirmary. Although this contract expired in 1987, PDC continued to render medical services at the infirmary under a month-to-month extension of the contract until January of 1988. Consequently, at all times relevant to this case, appellant was treated only by PDC personnel.

In the summer of 1987, PDC's performance of the contract was supervised primarily by two of its employees, Dr. Robert Yancey and Dr. Barrington Barnes. As Medical Director of the jail infirmary, Dr. Yancey oversaw all procedures by which medical services were provided to jail inmates. As Assistant Medical Director, Dr. Barnes was responsible for supervising the day-to-day operations of PDC personnel at the D.C. Jail. He also treated patients who had been admitted to the infirmary.

While the contract was in effect, the D.C. Jail infirmary was staffed by physicians, nurses, and physician's assistants, all employees of PDC. In general, the physicians would diagnose and prescribe treatment for inmates who were infirmary patients; the nurses would assist the physicians as needed in treating the patients; and the physician's assistants would provide basic health care and administrative services for both the physicians and the nurses (e.g., administering prescribed medicines and monitoring patient admissions). While PDC was in charge of the infirmary, the physician's assistants were responsible for providing sixty to eighty percent of the medical care to infirmary patients.2

The performance of the contract with PDC was monitored and supervised by health care personnel employed by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. Their personal observations were recorded in a series of evaluative reports, which were then forwarded to the Department. The contract included a requirement that PDC maintain malpractice insurance for all of its personnel working at the jail infirmary. Although the record is unclear on the particulars, it does show that, at the time of appellant's injuries, there was no insurance coverage for physician's assistant Charles Lawson.

B. Appellant's Injuries

On July 16, 1987, while incarcerated at the D.C. Jail, appellant became ill and was admitted to the infirmary. There she exhibited symptoms of nausea and abdominal cramping secondary to withdrawal from narcotic addiction. For reasons not explained in the record, Lawson took charge of appellant and injected approximately fifty cc. of a dextrose or dextrose-and-sodium-chloride solution into each of her thighs. At trial, all parties stipulated that these injections were entirely unauthorized and constituted medical malpractice by Lawson.

As a result of these injections, appellant developed a condition in her thighs later diagnosed as cellulitis. The areas where she had been injected experienced significant swelling, redness, and blistering. At trial appellant testified that she had suffered debilitating pain and had substantially lost the use of both her legs.

After an investigation by Dr. Yancey, Lawson was found to have been responsible for appellant's injuries, and Dr. Yancey recommended that he be fired. Before that could be done, however, Lawson suffered serious head injuries in an automobile accident which left him unable to recall the specifics of his actions in treating appellant. At the time of trial, Lawson's whereabouts were unknown.

As appellant's attending physician, Dr. Barnes prescribed a treatment program consisting of compresses of warm water and hydrogen peroxide applied to the wounds on her thighs. She also received pain medication to alleviate her suffering. While staying at the infirmary, appellant was also examined by Dr. Yancey and by physicians from D.C. General Hospital's surgical clinic. During the course of her treatment, Dr. Yancey consulted with the hospital's Chief of Surgery about the possibility of transferring her to D.C. General. Eventually, however, Dr. Yancey concluded that appellant could be more effectively treated if she remained in the jail infirmary. Appellant received treatment at the infirmary as an inpatient until her release from jail on September 16, 1987. Three months later, on December 17, she filed this suit.

In the months that followed, appellant filed a number of amendments adding and deleting certain defendants. Before trial, she moved for summary judgment against the District, arguing that the District's duty to provide for the physical health of inmates incarcerated in its prison system was non-delegable, and that the District was liable for her injuries on a theory of negligence per se. The court denied the motion.3

C. The Trial

Appellant's case was tried on several alternative theories:

1. That the District of Columbia, PDC, and PDC's corporate officers and employees (including Doctors Yancey and Barnes) were liable to appellant for their part in the negligent hiring of Charles Lawson, as well as for their failure to supervise his conduct adequately.
2. That Dr. Barnes committed malpractice in treating appellant for the injuries inflicted by Mr. Lawson, and that the remaining defendants were jointly and severally liable on that malpractice claim under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
3. That a master/servant relationship existed between the District and PDC, which made the District vicariously liable for the tortious acts of PDC and its employees.
4. That by allowing PDC to let its malpractice insurance on its employees lapse, the District had failed to supervise adequately the performance of its contract with PDC.
5. That the officers and directors of PDC had intentionally allowed the undercapitalization of the corporation and allowed its malpractice insurance coverage for its employees to lapse. Appellant argued that PDC's corporate veil should therefore be pierced, so that its officers and directors could be found personally liable for these tortious acts.
6. That appellant was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the District and PDC, and thus had standing to pursue a claim of breach of contract.

At the end of the trial, all the defendants (except Lawson, who did not take part in the trial) moved for a directed verdict. The court granted all the motions except that of PDC. With respect to appellant's claim that she was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the District and PDC, the trial judge noted that the pre-trial motions judge had ruled against appellant on this issue, adding that he would have ruled similarly on the basis of the evidence at trial. Appellant then moved for a directed verdict against PDC and Lawson and for an award of damages against them in the amount of $150,000. The trial judge granted that motion.

II

In her motion for summary judgment, appellant argued that the District had a non-delegable duty to provide her with necessary medical care while she was confined in its prison system. In ruling on the motion, the court noted initially that the cases appellant cited in support of her position merely defined the duty owed by the District, but did not say whether it was delegable or non-delegable. The court then ruled that that "the District of...

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3 cases
  • Herbert v. District of Columbia, 93-CV-407.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • August 13, 1998
    ...in detail in Judge Terry's opinion for a majority of the division that initially heard this appeal. See Herbert v. District of Columbia, 691 A.2d 1175, 1178-79 (D.C.1997) (Herbert I). We summarize only those facts relevant to the single issue addressed in this In 1986, DOC and Professional ......
  • Bahura v. SEW Investors
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • June 15, 2000
    ...on causation, "a lay jury could not have pinpointed the cause of Lasley's [injury] without blindly guessing"); Herbert v. District of Columbia, 691 A.2d 1175, 1184 (D.C.1997) (affirming directed verdict because in the absence of expert testimony regarding "a subject with which the average l......
  • Portillo v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • January 22, 2018
    ...of Columbia law applies to Portillo's claims. See id., ECF No. 26 at 2. 19. See D.C. Code § 24-211.02. 20. See Herbert v. District of Columbia, 691 A.2d 1175 (D.C. 1997), reh'g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 698 A.2d 1017 (D.C. 1997), opinion reinstated in part on reh'g, 716 A.2d 196 (D......
1 books & journal articles
  • Incompetent Jail and Prison Doctors
    • United States
    • Sage Prison Journal, The No. 80-2, June 2000
    • June 1, 2000
    ...Vaughn / INCOMPETENT JAIL AND PRISON DOCTORS 181 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).Herbert v. District of Columbia, 691 A.2d 1175 (D.C. App. 1997), rev’d, 716 A.2d 196 App. 1998) (en banc). Hill v. City of Saginaw, 399 N.W.2d 398 (Mich. App. 1986).Horton v. Collins, WL 54442......

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