Herbert v. Pouya
| Decision Date | 03 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-CV-1413-NR |
| Parties | BRANDON HERBERT, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN POUYA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Brandon Herbert, a.k.a. "Peanut," is a resident of Turtle Creek, Pennsylvania who designs tour merchandise for rap artists. Some of his prominent clients have included Mac Miller, Sir Michael Rocks, and, more recently, Defendant Kevin Pouya. In this lawsuit, Mr. Herbert alleges that he designed certain merchandise sold on several of Mr. Pouya's tours, that Mr. Pouya agreed via text message to pay him up to half of the proceeds related to those sales, and that Mr. Pouya subsequently refused to pay him anything despite earning hundreds of thousands of dollars selling Mr. Herbert's merchandise. Based on these allegations, Mr. Herbert asserts claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
Now before the Court is Mr. Pouya's motion to dismiss that lawsuit, for three reasons. First, he argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is not domiciled in Pennsylvania (he lives in Florida) and did not have any purposeful contact with Pennsylvania related to the alleged contract. Second, for similar reasons, Mr. Pouya argues that venue is improper in this District. And third, Mr. Pouya argues that Mr. Herbert's claims fail as a matter of law; that is, the claims should be dismissed because he fails to plead the "existence and essential terms of a contract," "neglects to plead any evidence of damages," fails to "adequately plead the necessary elements of an unjust enrichment claim," and seeks certain types of damages (punitive damages, attorneys' fees, lost wages, and front pay) that he is not entitled to recover.
After careful consideration, the Court will deny Mr. Pouya's motion, except that the Court will grant his request to strike Mr. Herbert's demands for certain types of damages. As explained below, Mr. Herbert has presented sufficient evidence to establish that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Pouya in this case and, further, has adequately pled claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. However, the Court agrees with Mr. Pouya that punitive damages, lost wages, front pay, and attorneys' fees are unavailable to Mr. Herbert as a matter of law.
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(2) for "lack of personal jurisdiction." In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the Court is required to accept as true the allegations in the pleadings and all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). However, Rule 12(b)(2) "does not limit the scope of the court's review to the face of the pleadings." In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538, 556-57 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). Instead, "[c]onsideration of affidavits submitted by the parties is appropriate and, typically, necessary." Id. (citing Patterson by Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1990)).
"Although plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proving personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, such a showing is unnecessary at the preliminary stages of litigation." Id. (citing Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992)). "Rather, plaintiffs must merely allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction over the person." Id. (citation omitted). That said, once a defendant challenges the existence of personal jurisdiction, theplaintiff may not "rely on the bare pleadings alone" to withstand the challenge, and must "respond with actual proofs, not mere allegations." Patterson, 893 F.2d at 604 (citation omitted). "When [a] plaintiff responds with affidavits or other evidence in support of its position, however, the court is bound to accept [those] representations and defer final determination as to the merits of the allegations until a pretrial hearing or the time of trial." In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 557 (citations omitted).
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3) for "improper venue." In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), the Court must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint, unless those allegations are contradicted by the defendants' affidavits." Bockman v. First Am. Mktg. Corp., 459 F. App'x 157, 158 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, if the Court "examines facts outside the complaint to determine venue," it still "must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor." N. Am. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Herman, No. 17-157, 2018 WL 581069, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2018) (Gibson, J.) (cleaned up).
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Yet "detailed pleading is not generally required." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Instead, the Federal Rules "demand only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. (cleaned up). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "Although the plausibility standard 'does not impose a probability requirement,' it does require a pleading to show 'more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Id. (citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden of showing that no plausible claim exists. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991).
In his motion to dismiss, Mr. Pouya argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, that venue is improper in this District, and that Mr. Herbert's claims are insufficiently pled, for various reasons. The Court will address these arguments in turn, beginning with the threshold jurisdictional issue.
To begin with, the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Mr. Pouya. "A District Court typically exercises personal jurisdiction according to the law of the state where it sits, in this case Pennsylvania." Cruickshank-Wallace v. CNA Fin. Corp., 769 F. App'x 77, 79 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction "based on the most minimum contact with th[e] Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa. C.S. § 5322(b). Thus, to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists, the Court asks "whether, under the Due Process Clause, the defendant has certain minimum contacts with [Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offendtraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).
"Due process shields persons from the judgments of a forum with which they have established no substantial ties or relationship." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001). "In order to be subject to personal jurisdiction, a defendant's conduct in connection with the forum state must be such that he may reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. (cleaned up). Once challenged, "the burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted).
"Personal jurisdiction can be either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction." Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Here, neither party argues that Mr. Pouya is subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, so the Court focuses its analysis on whether specific jurisdiction exists. "Specific jurisdiction is established when a non-resident defendant has purposefully directed his activities at a resident of the forum and the injury arises from or is related to those activities." Gen. Elec. Co., 270 F.3d at 150 (cleaned up).
As a baseline, "[m]erely entering into a contract with a resident of a forum is not always sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Penco Prod., Inc. v. WEC Mfg., LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d 740, 749 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). Instead, "[i]n contract cases, courts should inquire whether the defendant's contacts with the forum were instrumental in either the formation of the contract or its breach." Id. (citation omitted). In performing that inquiry, courts must examine "the totality of the circumstances, including the location and character of the contract negotiations, the terms of the contract, and the parties' actual course of dealing." Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). That is, "courts consider whether the nonresident defendant solicited, negotiated, or executedthe contract in the forum state." Penco Prod., Inc., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (citations omitted). Also relevant is "whether the nonresident defendant knew or should have known that it was dealing with [a party] located in the forum state." Id (citation omitted). Finally, although not required, "courts in the Third Circuit often emphasize visits or some physical presence in the forum when finding specific personal jurisdiction." Id. (citations...
To continue reading
Request your trial