Herbert v. State
Citation | 484 N.E.2d 68 |
Decision Date | 23 October 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 1-785A185,1-785A185 |
Parties | Jerry T. HERBERT, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Roger P. Hoffman, Westport, for defendant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jay Rodia, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-appellant, Jerry T. Herbert (Herbert), was convicted of driving while intoxicated under IND.CODE 9-11-2-2, a Class A misdemeanor, by the Decatur County Court without the intervention of a jury. From a sentence of a suspended license, fine, jail term, and suspended sentence, he appeals.
We affirm.
The facts most favorable to support the conviction are as follows. At 1:15 a.m. on March 10, 1985, Indiana State Police Trooper, Mark Mitchell, while patrolling south on State Road 3 in Decatur County, observed Herbert driving his automobile northbound on the same highway. Perceiving that Herbert was probably exceeding the speed limit of 55 m.p.h. and drifting across the centerline, officer Mitchell pulled over to the side of the road, observed Herbert go past, and clocked his speed on a VASCAR at 67.3 m.p.h. After pursuit wherein he again confirmed the speed and the drifting across the centerline, Mitchell stopped Herbert. As Herbert exited the door on the driver's side he stumbled. Mitchell, who knew Herbert from a previous case, smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Herbert as he talked to him and noted that his eyes were watery, glassy and bloodshot. Thereupon, Mitchell advised Herbert of implied consent and of his intention to administer a breathalyzer test. He told Herbert he should take it, and an alcohol-sensor test was administered at the scene, but a field sobriety test for intoxication was not. Herbert was taken to the Decatur County Jail. At the jail a field sobriety test was administered consisting of tests such as walking, heel to toe, standing, leaning back, finger to nose, etc. The tests indicated instability. The breathalyzer test, taken at 1:48 a.m., registered .17 plus. Mitchell testified that Herbert, in his opinion, was under the influence and was unable to drive safely.
Herbert raises four issues on appeal, restated by us as three issues as follows:
I. IND.CODE 9-11-4-2 provides for alternative fluid tests upon request by a defendant, and the arresting officer denied him his rights by refusing to transport him to a place for the tests.
II. Error in admitting into evidence State's Exhibit NO. 5, an alcohol influence report, and officer Mitchell's subsequent oral testimony after Herbert refused to sign a waiver of rights.
III. Officer Mitchell did not have probable cause to stop Herbert, take him into custody, or administer the breathalyzer test.
Issue I. Alternative Tests.
IND.CODE 9-11-4-2 provides as follows:
The officer testified that after he administered the breathalyzer test he advised Herbert orally and in writing that he had a right to have fluid samples taken for independent chemical testing of alcohol or drug presence, and that an opportunity would be afforded for such samples to be taken. The officer told him, however, that they would not transport him if someone would not come to the jail. Herbert did not make a request of the officer for the independent analysis. The officer testified that he offered Herbert the opportunity to make any phone calls he wished, but Herbert made no request for an independent analysis, and made no such request of anyone by phone, but only called a friend to remove his vehicle from the highway.
Herbert testified at trial that he called his lawyer, Hoffman, and asked him to call the Decatur County Hospital and ask them to send someone to administer the test. He understood Hoffman complied with his request but no one came. Herbert objected to the admission of the result of the breathalyzer test because he was not given an independent test.
Herbert argues here that he is entitled to an alternative test, and the officer had a duty to transport him to a place where the test could be administered. He relies entirely upon IND.CODE 9-11-4-2. We disagree.
Nothing in this particular section or in IND.CODE 9-11-4 suggests the result that Herbert argues. The section is unambiguous and needs no construction. Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts may not substitute language which they believe the legislature intended. Romack v. State (1983), Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 1346. The fundamental rule of construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Words will be given the plain and ordinary meaning unless a different meaning is manifested. Park 100 Development Co. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 220. There is no...
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