Herbst v. Daukas

• Decision Date: 15 December 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-88-323 (PCD).
• Citation: 701 F. Supp. 964
• Parties: John C. HERBST v. Paul T. DAUKAS, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

701 F. Supp. 964

John C. HERBST v. Paul T. DAUKAS, et al.

Civ. No. H-88-323 (PCD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

December 15, 1988.

Martha Stone, Connecticut Civ. Liberties Union Foundation, Hartford, Conn., John Williams, Williams & Wise, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.

Joel M. Ellis, West Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

DORSEY, District Judge.

On May 19, 1988, plaintiff, a Lieutenant in the Rocky Hill Police Department, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Mayor, the Town Manager, and the members of the Town Council of Rocky Hill. Plaintiff challenges his demotion to the position of Sergeant and a pattern of harassment to which he alleges he has been subjected for more than a year as retaliation for his exercise of his first and fourteenth amendment rights in exposing "pervasive racism" within the Rocky Hill Police Department.

On June 28, 1988, defendants moved to dismiss as against the Mayor and members of the Town Council ("Town Council Defendants") on the ground that their status as municipal legislators affords them absolute immunity from damages or injunctive relief. Town Council Defendants contend they are not attacking plaintiff's "harassment" claims at this time, but are asserting the defense of legislative immunity only in regard to their elimination of one Lieutenant's position in the budgetary process which resulted in the "demotion" of plaintiff to Sergeant. See Reply Memorandum at 2 n. 1. Town Council Defendants also seek to dismiss all pendent state claims.

Facts

In his complaint, the material allegations of which are taken as true for the purposes of this motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), plaintiff alleges defendants engaged in a course of conduct intended to retaliate against and punish him for his comments regarding the existence of racism within the Rocky Hill Police Department in response to an order to explain his actions of April 7, 1987, in calling back a police cruiser that had been dispatched to investigate the activities of two "Puerto Rican looking fellows." Complaint, ¶¶ 14, 16, 17, 20(a)(r), 23, 24. This retaliatory conduct included a demand that plaintiff publicly apologize for "labeling the community as racist," id., ¶ 20(g); a "suggestion" to the Chief of Police that plaintiff be removed from "daytime administrative duties and placed on a rotating shift," id., ¶ 20(d), (n); a directive to the Chief of Police that the new police vehicle assigned to plaintiff be taken away and "used as a line patrol vehicle by non-supervisory personnel," id., ¶ 20(i), (p); and defendants' unanimous order that "plaintiff be demoted from the position of Lieutenant to the position of Sergeant effective July 1, 1988," id., ¶ 23.¹ Plaintiff alleges that these actions were intended to deprive him of his constitutional rights protected by the first and fourteenth amendment. Id., ¶ 8.

Discussion

A. Dismissal Standard

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint. Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1015 (2d Cir.1983). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. See Doyle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 583 F.Supp. 554, 557 (D.Conn.1984). "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This principle is applied with particular strictness when the plaintiff contends there has been a violation of his civil rights. Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir.1985). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

B. Legislative Immunity

In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), the Supreme Court held that state legislators were absolutely immune from suits for damages under § 1983. The Court reviewed the common law tradition of legislative freedom from damage suits arising out of the discharge of legislative duty and concluded that Congress did not intend to abrogate this freedom. Id. at 372-76, 71 S.Ct. at 786-88. Further, the Court noted that "legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good." Id. at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788. Thus, "the claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege." Id.

This doctrine of absolute immunity was extended to appointed regional members acting in a legislative capacity for an agency created by a compact between two states. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979). The Court found that the reasoning of Tenney was "equally applicable to federal, state, and regional legislators." Id. at 405, 99 S.Ct. at 1179. However, the Court expressly declined to decide whether the doctrine of absolute immunity applied to "individuals performing legislative functions at the purely local level." Id. at 404 n. 26, 99 S.Ct. at 1179 n. 26.

However, since Lake Country, several circuits have extended legislative immunity to local legislators acting in a legislative capacity. See Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791 (1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1251, 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.1980); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.1980). While the Second Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, see United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 456 (2d Cir.1988), at least two district judges within this circuit have held that the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity protects local legislators from suit for actions taken in their legislative capacity. See Dusanenko v. Maloney, 560 F.Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.1983), aff'd on other grounds, 726 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.1984); Goldberg v. Village of Spring Valley, 538 F.Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y.1982). In these cases, the courts found no distinction between the need to protect legislative decision-making at the state or regional level and such a need at the municipal level. "Those who are charged with the conduct of government in our cities and towns must have that same freedom to carry out their responsibilities as their consciences demand, free from the fear that political disagreements may result in legal actions." Dusanenko, 560 F.Supp. at 827.

Although the doctrine of immunity does limit the recourse of those wronged by unlawful legislative acts, it reflects the belief that the legislative process is better served by limiting recourse and not exposing legislators to the burdens of defending a lawsuit and possible liability. The Supreme Court in Tenney emphasized the role of the electoral process as a means for discouraging or correcting legislative abuses. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378, 71 S.Ct. at 789. In addition, the case for absolute immunity of local legislators is buttressed by the absence of any immunity for municipalities under § 1983 for their unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., Goldberg, 538 F.Supp. at 650; see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Local governing entities can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the action alleged to be unconstitutional "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. This absence of municipal immunity provides an additional check on unconstitutional acts of municipal legislators, as well as an effective remedy for wronged individuals. See Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 613; Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 951 n. 3 (7th Cir.1988).

Having determined that absolute immunity extends to local legislators, it is necessary to determine whether the Town Council Defendants were "acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity" when they eliminated one Lieutenant's position from the town budget resulting in plaintiff's "demotion." Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 71 S.Ct. at 788. See also Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 731-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974-76, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on May 16, 1988, the Town Council Defendants unanimously ordered that plaintiff be demoted from the position of Lieutenant to the position of Sergeant effective July 1, 1988. Complaint, ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges that his demotion was in retaliation for the exercise of his constitutional rights. Id., ¶ 24. In addition, plaintiff alleges that the Town Council Defendants "occupy the highest policy and administrative positions in the Town of Rocky Hill and the actions of defendants, carried out in their official capacities, are the actions and policies of the Town of Rocky Hill, Connecticut." Complaint, ¶ 12.²

The Town Council Defendants contend that plaintiff's demotion was the result of legislative budgetary action and that the elimination of one Lieutenant's position from the budget was within their delegated powers. Plaintiff, however, does not challenge the authority of the Town Council to act upon appropriations for the Police Department, but seeks only to enjoin his demotion as an illegal act in...