Herd v. State
| Decision Date | 14 September 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 280,280 |
| Citation | 37 Md.App. 362,377 A.2d 574 |
| Parties | Calvin HERD v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender and Victoria A. Salner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Submitted to GILBERT, C. J., and MOYLAN and MASON, JJ.
In this, hopefully, the last appeal arising out of Patuxent Institution, we have been presented with a joint motion by the appellant, Calvin Herd, and the State, through the Attorney General, to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County. We shall comply with the joint interpellation and reverse the judgment.
Before recounting the facts from which this case arose, the Court acknowledges the spirit of fairness in which the Attorney General's office, in the person of Bruce C. Spizler, Esq., entered into the motion in the obvious interest of justice. Mr. Spizler is apparently cognizant of the old adage that the State wins when justice prevails.
We turn now to a brief discussion of the facts of this matter.
On March 23, 1976, appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of Albert D. Herd, Jr., and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The appellant was ordered to be referred to Patuxent Institution for evaluation as a possible defective delinquent. Thereafter, a petition was filed against appellant on February 15, 1977, alleging that he was in contempt of court for his failure to cooperate with the Patuxent psychiatrists. At a subsequent hearing on the petition, the appellant was adjudged to be in contempt, and he was sentenced, therefor, to ten years imprisonment, the term to run consecutively to the manslaughter sentence.
There are at least two reasons why this judgment must be reversed, and we, thus, see no reason to discuss all the issues raised.
Appellant argues that the "offense, if any, is a civil contempt." We agree.
The Maryland courts have consistently held that failure to cooperate with Patuxent Institution doctors constitutes only a civil contempt. Williams & Fulwood v. Director, 276 Md. 272, 313, 347 A.2d 179, 192 (1975); Meyers v. State, 23 Md.App. 275, 277-78, 326 A.2d 773, 775 (1974). See Savage v. State, 19 Md.App. 1, 15, 308 A.2d 701, 709 (1973).
In Meyers, we pointed out that:
23 Md.App. at 278, 326 A.2d at 775.
Because the punishment in a civil contempt is remedial in nature, contemners are said to "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets." In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). To turn the key and exit the prison the contemner has but to comply with the court order. Once he has done that, the contempt is purged. Obviously, the commitment for contempt must provide not only a penalty but the footpath for avoidance of the sanction.
The trial judge, in the case now before us, however, imposed a ten year sentence without pointing the way for the appellant to purge himself of the contempt. In so doing, he erred. The fact that the appellant was informed by the judge that if the appellant decided to "cooperate with the doctors at the (Patuxent) institution, then the (c)ourt will consider suspending the sentence," does not furnish the requisite opportunity for appellant to purge himself of the contempt. At best, if the court suspended the sentence, the appellant would still stand convicted of contempt. Moreover, the court's consideration of suspending the sentence does not of necessity mean that the court would suspend it. When the Court of Appeals and this Court speak of a "provision for purging" or "opportunity for purging," we mean that the contemner must be afforded the chance to rid himself of guilt and thus clear himself of the charge. To suspend the sentence and allow the conviction to stand falls well short of the mark. The sanction used by the trial court in the instant case was not remedial but penal, and in a civil contempt such as this, was impermissible.
The second reason that dictates reversal in the matter now before us stems from the legislative amendments to what, prior to July 1, 1977, was...
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