Heredia v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

• Decision Date: 05 February 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 90-1773 (JAF).
• Citation: 783 F. Supp. 1550
• Parties: Migdalia HEREDIA, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

783 F. Supp. 1550

Migdalia HEREDIA, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.

Civ. No. 90-1773 (JAF).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 5, 1992.

Raymond Rivera-Esteves, Juan A. Hernandez Rivera & Assoc., San Juan, P.R., for plaintiff.

José Vázquez-Garcia, Asst. U.S. Atty., Daniel F. López-Romo, U.S. Atty., D. Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge.

On January 23, 1991, this court issued a Remand Order in which we found that the Secretary of Health and Human Services' ("Secretary") decision denying plaintiff Migdalia Heredia's application for disability benefits was not based on substantial evidence. We remanded the action to the Secretary for additional proceedings. Specifically, we ordered that a residual functional capacity assessment be done to determine to what extent plaintiff's medical impairments affected her ability to function in employment settings. We also recommended that a vocational expert give testimony explaining the exertional requirements for a school cook, the position formerly held by plaintiff, so as to determine whether, in fact, she could return to her former position as the ALJ had originally found. Finally, we ordered the ALJ to make detailed findings as to plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain as mandated by Avery v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 797 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.1986).

Almost nine months later, on October 18, 1991, plaintiff moved the court to issue a final judgment in the above-mentioned remand order. Plaintiff seeks the issuance of this judgment in order to apply for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412.¹ Plaintiff also filed an application for attorney's fees. The Secretary opposed plaintiff's motion arguing that our January 1991 remand order constituted a final judgment and, as such, rendered untimely plaintiff's fee application, since it was filed more than thirty days after the remand order became final and unappealable. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G). The government also argued that even if plaintiff's application is found to be timely, no decision can be made as plaintiff has not as yet attained the status of "prevailing party." On November 20, 1991, we ordered plaintiff to file with the court any administrative disposition of plaintiff's claim subsequent to our January 1991 remand order. In response to our order, plaintiff's counsel informed the court that: he had erroneously represented that there had been an administrative determination; a further administrative hearing was held before the ALJ on December 3, 1991; and no decision had as yet been rendered. Thereafter, while the parties' motions were pending before this court, on January 30, 1992, plaintiff filed a copy of the ALJ's decision dated December 19, 1991, in which it was determined that plaintiff was entitled to a period of disability and disability insurance benefits commencing March 16, 1989.² (Docket Document No. 17).

After reviewing the three most recent United States Supreme Court decisions discussing the issues before us, Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 104 L.Ed.2d 941 (1989); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), recent lower court case law interpreting these decisions, and the parties' positions argued in their memoranda of law, we grant plaintiff's motion for an issuance of judgment and will issue a final judgment, since the administrative proceedings have terminated and plaintiff has returned to the court with the Secretary's final decision.³

We begin with the relevant language of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g):

(g) Judicial review

Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. sentence four.⁴ The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based. sentence six. Such additional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the extent provided for review of the original findings of fact and decision. The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

In the first of the United States Supreme Court cases, Sullivan v. Hudson, the Court held that,

where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine the claimant's entitlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand are an integral part of the "civil action" for judicial review, and thus attorney's fees for representation on remand are available subject to the other limitations of the EAJA.

490 U.S. at 892, 109 S.Ct. at 2258. In Hudson, it was the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that vacated the Secretary's decision and ordered the district court to remand the action for further proceedings. Id. at 880-81. The Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history of the EAJA, as well as the structure of administrative proceedings and judicial review under section 205(g) and commented that,

the detailed provisions for the transfer of proceedings from the court to the Secretary and for the filing of the Secretary's subsequent findings with the court suggest a degree of direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Id. at 885, 109 S.Ct. at 2254. The Court also discussed the nature of district court remand orders where factual or legal errors have been found. According to the Court, these orders: will often include detailed instructions concerning the scope of the remand, the evidence to be adduced, and the legal or factual issues to be addressed; will be subject to further judicial review and reversal if not followed since deviation from the court's order is itself legal error; and will allow the Court to "retain jurisdiction over the action pending the Secretary's decision and its filing with the court." Id. at 885-86, 109 S.Ct. at 2254.

The Supreme Court then discussed two points relating to the application of the EAJA which emerged from the analysis of the judicial review mechanisms of section 205(g) benefit determinations. Id. at 886-87, 109 S.Ct. at 2254-55. First, the Court noted that normally the claimant will not attain the status of "prevailing party" until the post-remand administrative proceedings are completed. Remand is not enough in and of itself to attain "prevailing party" status. Second, the Court recognized that a party can only apply for attorney fees under the EAJA "within thirty days of final judgment in the action," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), and that often there will be "no final judgment in a claimant's civil action for judicial review until the administrative proceedings on remand are complete." The Court, thus, recognized that,

for purposes of the EAJA, the Social Security claimant's status as a prevailing party and the final judgment in her "civil action ... for review of agency action" are often completely dependent on the successful completion of the remand proceedings before the Secretary. Moreover, the remanding court continues to retain jurisdiction over the action within the meaning of the EAJA, and may exercise that jurisdiction to determine if its legal instructions on remand have been followed by the Secretary.

Id. at 887-88, 109 S.Ct. at 2255. The Court also looked to its own past decisions interpreting other fee-shifting statutes where administrative proceedings "are intimately tied to the resolution of the judicial action and necessary to the attainment of the results Congress sought to promote by providing the fees," Id. at 888, 109 S.Ct. at 2255, in support of its conclusion that certain subsequent administrative proceedings are "part and parcel" of the judicial action. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (Clean Air Act); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980) (Title VII).

The next term, the Supreme Court decided Sullivan v. Finkelstein. The precise issue before the Court was whether the Secretary could immediately appeal a district court order which effectively "declared invalid regulations that limit the kinds of inquiries that must be made to determine whether a person is entitled to disability insurance benefits and remanded a claim for benefits to the Secretary for consideration without those restrictions." 496...