Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007AP983.,2007AP983. |
| Citation | 2009 WI 27,762 N.W.2d 652 |
| Parties | HERITAGE FARMS, INC., Audrey Bunchkowski, Russell Bunchkowski, Ruth Dutcher, Howard Dutcher, Sally Freitag, Amy Holzwart, James Holzwart, Kathleen Khin, Glenwood Zellmer, Daryl Lloyd, Donald Lloyd, Judy Maas, Jeffrey Maas, Carolyn Mueller, Lois Rucich, George Rucich, Donna Semrow, Harland Semrow, Beverly Singer, Norman A. Singer Trust, Joan Singer, Gordon Singer, Singer Living Trust, Inga Stoellinger, Otto Stoellinger, Catherine Swanton, Swanton Family Trust, Christine Toliver, Alan Toliver, Krista Zimmer and Norman Zimmer, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance Company of America and Acuity, a mutual insurance company, Involuntary-Plaintiffs, v. MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY, J.J.J. Recreation Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, American Family Mutual Insurance Company and Jeffrey Knaack, Defendants-Respondents. Ted Schwochert, Paul B. Schwochert, Helen Schwochert and Sue Schroeder, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, v. Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, American Family Mutual Insurance Company and Jeffrey Knaack, Defendants-Respondents. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Plaintiff, v. Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, American Family Mutual Insurance Company and Jeffrey Knaack, Defendants. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Mark L. Thomsen, Charles David Schmidt, and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by Charles David Schmidt.
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief filed by John V. McCoy, Brian D. Parish, and McCoy & Hofbauer, S.C., Waukesha, and oral argument by John V. McCoy.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Charlotte Gibson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, on behalf of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.
This is a review of a published court of appeals' decision1 that affirmed the decision of the Waushara County Circuit Court, Thomas T. Flugaur, Judge. The circuit court concluded that Heritage Farms, Inc.2 could not be awarded double damages and attorney fees pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) (2007-08)3 because that statute applies only to railroad corporations and none of the defendants are a railroad corporation. The court of appeals affirmed, and as a result, Heritage Farms petitioned this court for review. We granted the petition for review and reverse the court of appeals.
¶ 2 This case presents two issues for review. First, does Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) apply only to a certain class of tortfeasor? We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is not limited to a specific class of tortfeasor such as a railroad corporation, and a violation under Wis. Stat. § 26.20 is not a prerequisite for the applicability of § 26.21(1). Second, does § 26.21(1) require a showing of "gross negligence"? We conclude that the term "negligence" in § 26.21(1) does not require a showing of "gross negligence."
¶ 3 Between March 3 and March 8, 2003,4 Jeffrey Knaack ignited a large debris pile, which consisted of leaves, pine needles, brush, stumps, and building materials. Knaack was responsible for maintaining this burn pile at the Lake of the Woods Campground as a favor to Jack Scimeca who owned the property and operated the business. On April 14, 2003, the March burn pile fire escaped the Lake of the Woods Campground, and as a result, burned 572 acres of land.
¶ 4 Heritage Farms filed a civil action against the defendants5 (hereinafter referred to as "Markel") claiming negligence, trespass, and nuisance. Heritage Farms sought double compensatory damages and attorney fees pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1). Markel moved the court for partial summary judgment asserting that § 26.21(1) did not apply because none of the defendants were a railroad corporation and none had violated Wis. Stat. § 26.20. The circuit court granted that motion and concluded that § 26.21(1) applies only to railroad corporations. After a four week jury trial, a verdict was returned that awarded Heritage Farms $568,422 in damages.6 Heritage Farms subsequently moved the circuit court to reconsider its previous ruling regarding the applicability of § 26.21(1). The circuit court denied Heritage Farms' motion to reconsider. Heritage Farms appealed that ruling and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. The court of appeals concluded that § 26.21(1) applied only to railroad corporations and did not decide the issue of whether "gross negligence" was required. Heritage Farms petitioned this court for review, which we accepted.
¶ 5 The issues in this case are questions of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo but benefiting from the lower courts' analyses. C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶ 14, 310 Wis.2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900.
¶ 6 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. This court begins statutory interpretation with the language of the statute. Id., ¶ 45. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning." Id.
¶ 7 Context and structure of a statute are important to the meaning of the statute. Id., ¶ 46. "Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results." Id. Moreover, the "[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage." Id. "A statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-related statutes—that is, from its context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole." Id., ¶ 49.
¶ 8 "`If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning.'" Id., ¶ 46 (citation omitted). If statutory language is unambiguous, we do not need to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation. Id.
¶ 9 The two issues presented in this case require us to interpret Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) and related statutes. We address both issues in detail below.
¶ 10 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21, "Civil liability for forest fires," provides:
(1) In addition to the penalties provided in s. 26.20, the United States, the state, the county or private owners, whose property is injured or destroyed by forest fires, may recover, in a civil action, double the amount of damages suffered, if the fires occurred through willfulness, malice or negligence. In a civil action, a court may award reasonable costs for legal representation to provide owners recovering damages under this subsection.
(2) Persons causing fires in violation of this chapter shall be liable to the state in an action for debt, to the full amount of all damages done to the state lands and for all expenses incurred by the towns fighting forest fires and shall be liable to municipalities in an action for debt, to the full amount of all damages to the municipal lands and for all expenses incurred by the municipalities fighting such fires.
¶ 11 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.20, "Fire protection devices," includes a number of subsections pertaining to actions that must be taken by those corporations that operate on or maintain a railway.7 Subsection (9) of Wis. Stat. § 26.20, "Penalty," provides:
(a) Any corporation, by its officers, agents, or employees, violating this section, shall forfeit not more than $500.
(b) Any corporation, by its officers, agents or employees, willfully violating this section shall be fined not more than $1,000.
(c) Any conductor, individual in charge of a train or officer, agent or employee of a railway who violates this section shall forfeit not more than $500.
¶ 12 Markel argues that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) does not apply to all tortfeasors, but rather, it argues that the statute applies only to those tortfeasors who violate Wis. Stat. § 26.20, i.e., railroad corporations. Since no railroad corporation is involved in this case, Markel argues that it cannot be penalized under § 26.21(1). Markel reasons that § 26.21(1) is limited by § 26.20 because § 26.21(1) states "[i]n addition to the penalties provided in s. 26.20." Markel also asserts that other portions of chapter 26, Wisconsin case law, and the statute's legislative history all support the interpretation that § 26.21(1) applies only to railroad corporations. Heritage Farms, on the other hand, argues that § 26.21(1) applies to all tortfeasors. Heritage Farms reasons that nothing in the statutory provision specifically limits the statute's scope to a specific class of tortfeasor such as railroad corporations, and to apply § 26.21(1) in such a manner would lead to absurd results. Heritage Farms supports its interpretation by relying on the legislative history, historical context, and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) conclusion that § 26.21(1) is not limited to a specific class of tortfeasor.
¶ 13 We agree with Heritage Farms, and as a result, we reverse the court of appeals' decision. We conclude that ...
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