Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., s. 80-1646
| Decision Date | 18 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | 80-1704,Nos. 80-1646,s. 80-1646 |
| Citation | 648 F.2d 761 |
| Parties | 8 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 546 HERITAGE HOMES OF ATTLEBORO, INC., Plaintiff, Appellee, v. The SEEKONK WATER DISTRICT, Defendant, Appellant. HERITAGE HOMES OF ATTLEBORO, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The SEEKONK WATER DISTRICT, Defendant, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
John J. Graham, Boston, Mass., with whom William E. Hickey, Quincey, Mass., was on brief, for Seekonk Water Dist.
Stephen D. Clapp, N. Attleboro, Mass., with whom Armstrong, Pollis & Clapp, N. Attleboro, Mass., was on brief, for Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, ALDRICH, Circuit Judge and WYZANSKI, District Judge. *
This case returns to us after the district court found that there was overwhelming evidence to support the allegations that we previously found to have stated a claim. See Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1979). Heritage Homes is a corporation engaged in real estate development. It sued the defendant Seekonk Water District for refusing because Heritage was willing to sell homes to black persons to include a Heritage development within the District and thus to supply the development with water. The district court found the District liable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. It refused to award Heritage compensatory damages because "plaintiff has effectively passed its losses on to the buyers of its homes." Nonetheless it awarded $100,000.00 in punitive damages against the District "(i)n order to discourage the obviously racially discriminatory policy of the District." Both sides appeal. Since the nature of the claim is explained in our earlier opinion, here we add only such facts as become necessary to explain our reasoning.
Considering first the District's appeal, we briefly respond to those arguments by the District that merit comment. First, we have previously decided the District's arguments drawn from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development, 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). See 601 F.2d at 13.
Second, the District asserts that, because the actions of the Town Planning Board are not within the control of the District, the district court's reference to events at a Board meeting was "immaterial." The Board meeting took place immediately following a District meeting. Both were forums for expressions of hostile and incriminating opinion against Heritage's real estate development. Such circumstances permit an inference that persons opposing the development left the earlier meeting to attend the later one. Community attitudes and events can become relevant when "the acts of voters 'may fairly be said to represent official policy.' " 601 F.2d at 15. Ironically, elsewhere in its brief the District criticizes the district court for failing to appreciate "the necessity for considering much more than random scraps of a (District) proceeding to determine what happened." We do not think that the district court erred by referring to the entire context to assess the plaintiff's charge of racial motivation.
Third, the District claims that evidence of statements made at the District meeting was hearsay and thus improperly admitted. With one exception, the District did not object to the admission of this evidence. The single exception related to evidence that was offered on at least two other occasions without objection. We thus review for plain error, and have difficulty in finding any error at all. Our examination of these statements indicates that they were not offered to prove the truth of the matters they assert. For instance, one witness testified to hearing a person at the meeting state the developers would "bring all of the black people from East Providence to this project." Such statements demonstrate that those at the meeting made or heard racially hostile remarks prior to voting against the real estate development. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) & 803. The fact, not the truth of the assertion, is the critical element. The District's other evidentiary arguments either are inconsequential or seek to retry disputes of fact whose resolution is properly within the discretion of the finder of fact.
Fourth, the District's argument that its "decisionmaking process is not subject to evaluation" is foreclosed by Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (), since the District does not explain how it differs from a municipality for this purpose.
Finally, the odious character of the discrimination in this case is a sufficiently "aggravating circumstance( )" Fact Concerts, Inc. v. Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1067 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, -- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 782, 66 L.Ed.2d 603 (1980), to support the award of punitive damages. The record in this case was adequate to permit the finder of fact to conclude that the District engaged in a deliberate and remarkably overt display of racial discrimination. Although we share our dissenting brother's concern that courts ought not too quickly levy punitive damages against public bodies, we are struck by the thought that insulating such bodies (even where the improper motive, as here, is "overwhelmingly established") would result in allowing the most blatant discrimination to avoid the risk of punitive damages so long as there is open participation, while punishing only minions who act beyond the confines of council rooms. This would be a particularly ironic result in cases where actual damages are trivial, as they often are in cases of racial discrimination.
Turning to Heritage's appeal on its injury award, we note that it suffered two types of damages due to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Malone
...Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water District, 498 F.Supp. 463, 464-67 (D.Mass.1980), aff'd as to liability and remanded, 648 F.2d 761 (1st Cir.), vacated, 454 U.S. 807, 102 S.Ct. 81, 70 L.Ed.2d 76 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898, 102 S.Ct. 398, 70 L.Ed.2d 213 (1981), rev'd award of......
-
Blackburn v. Snow
...1035, 100 S.Ct. 710, 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1979). The decision is committed to the fact finder's discretion. Heritage Homes of Attleboro v. Seekonk Water District, 648 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898, 102 S.Ct. 398, 70 L.Ed.2d 213 (1981). Here, the trial court made a finding ......
-
RI Affiliate Am. Civ. Liberties v. RI LOTTERY
...to recover for the natural economic consequences of the Commission's denial of its application. See Heritage Homes of Attleboro v. Seekonk Water District, 648 F.2d 761, 763-64 (1st Cir.), remanded on other grounds, 454 U.S. 808, 102 S.Ct. 81, 70 L.Ed.2d 76 (1981); Fact Concerts, Inc. v. Cit......
-
Jeter v. Boswell
...which, in an appropriate case, provides an independent basis for awarding punitive damages. See, Heritage Homes of Attleboro v. Seekonk Water District, 648 F.2d 761, 763 (1st Cir.1981) cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2934, 73 L.Ed.2d 1333 (1982). See generally Johnson v. Railway Expres......