Herkelrath v. Stookey
| Decision Date | 30 June 1872 |
| Citation | 1872 WL 8223,63 Ill. 486 |
| Parties | CHRISTIAN HERKELRATH et al.v.JAMES M. STOOKEY. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. JOSEPH GILLESPIE, Judge, presiding.
This case was in this court at the January term, 1871, and is reported 58 Ill. 21.
Messrs. KŒRNER & DILL, for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. WM. H. UNDERWOOD, and Messrs. KASE & WILDERMAN, for the defendant in error.
This was a contest between the mortgagees in a chattel mortgage and a creditor of the mortgagor, and turned on the validity of the mortgage. The court instructed the jury, if the mortgage was made to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, it was void, even though the mortgagees had just claims against the mortgagor. If this instruction had been so framed as to require both the mortgagor and mortgagees to have participated in the fraudulent intent in order to avoid the mortgage, it would have been unobjectionable. The jury, however, would probably understand such an instruction as referring only to the intent of the mortgagor. A fraudulent intent on his part alone would not vitiate the instrument. Hessing v. McCloskey, 37 Ill. 351; Ewing v. Runkle, 20 ib. 448.
None of the instructions for the defendant in error are sufciently explicit in this respect. The second is objectionable for another reason. In that instruction the jury are told, “if the mortgage was made by a father to two of his sons, in the night time, under suspicious circumstances, and at the same time the father transferred to said sons all his land and personal property, and the property in the chattel mortgage was subject to be consumed or destroyed in its use by the mortgagor, these are circumstances from which the jury may infer that the transaction was a fraudulent one.”
The first objection to this instruction is, that the mortgage was not made to the sons alone, but to them and to several other persons. Another and fatal objection is, that while the circumstances named in the instruction may be suspicious, they do not raise a legal presumption of fraud. They are to be considered in connection with all the other evidence, and it is for the jury to determine, from the entire evidence, what inference is to be drawn, without being instructed by the court as to what weight they are to attach to any particular portion of it. When the court says that a certain inference may be...
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Anderson v. Warner
...is no presumption of fraud because the parties are relatives: Nelson v. Smith, 28 Ill. 495; Waterman v. Donalson, 43 Ill. 29; Herkelrath v. Stookey, 63 Ill. 486. A constructive delivery was all that was necessary even as against attaching creditors: Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384; Wilkes v. ......
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Perea v. Colorado Nat. Bank of Texas
... ... should not interfere to formulate conclusions for them ... Leasure v. Coburn, 57 Ind. 274; Herkelrath v ... Stookey, 63 Ill. 486; King v. Russell, 40 Tex ... 133; Waite, Fraud. Conv. § 226. When fraudulent intent is not ... apparent on the face ... ...
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Perea v. Colo. Nat. Bank of Tex..
...from badges of fraud, and the court should not interfere to formulate conclusions for them. Leasure v. Coburn, 57 Ind. 274; Herkelrath v. Stookey, 63 Ill. 486; King v. Russell, 40 Tex. 133; Waite, Fraud. Conv. § 226. When fraudulent intent is not apparent on the face of the deed, it is a qu......
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State To Use of Salomon v. Mason
...it, and, therefore, it is all the more erroneous to require them to find fraud. Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances [3 Ed.] p. 34; Herkelrath v. Stookey, 63 Ill. 486; Leasure v. Colburn, 57 Ind. 374; Kane Drake, 27 Ind. 29. Fifth. And, finally, because there was no evidence of such an inadequacy......