Herman v. Berrien County
| Decision Date | 18 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 134097.,Calendar No. 5. |
| Citation | 481 Mich. 352,750 N.W.2d 570 |
| Parties | Joe HERMAN, Sue Herman, Jay Jollay, Sarah Jollay, Jerry Jollay, Neal Kreitner, Tony Peterson, Liz Peterson, Randy Bjorge, Annette Bjorge, and Tina Buck, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF BERRIEN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Rhoades McKee P.C., (by Gregory G. Timmer and Michael C. Walton), and Westrate & Thomas, (by Mark A. Westrate), Grand Rapids, Dowagiac, for the plaintiffs.
Lewis Reed & Allen P.C., (by Michael B. Ortega and Robert C. Engels), and R. McKinley Elliott, Kalamazoo, Niles, for the defendant.
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall P.C., (by John H. Bauckham), Kalamazoo, for amicus curiae the Michigan Townships Association and the Michigan Municipal League.
This case involves further analysis of the issue presented in Pittsfield Charter Twp. v. Washtenaw Co., 468 Mich. 702, 664 N.W.2d 193 (2003), in which we held that the county commissioners act (CCA)1 has priority over the Township Zoning Act (TZA).2 Today we are asked to gauge the scope of that priority, which relates to a county's power to "site" and "erect" "building(s)," by defining the CCA's term "site." In defining that term, we hold that land uses that are ancillary to the county building and not indispensable to its normal use are not covered by the CCA's grant of priority over local regulations. Therefore, in this particular case, Berrien County's outdoor shooting ranges do not have priority over the township ordinances that plaintiffs rely on because they are land uses that are not indispensable to the normal use of the county building. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
This case involves a piece of property that is located in Berrien County and Coloma Township. The property consists of a 14-acre parcel of land. The property is controlled by defendant, Berrien County, under a 20-year lease from a party that is unrelated to this case. The county entered into the lease in March 2005. The county leased the property with the intention of using it for a firearms training facility, which various law enforcement agencies would use for training exercises. Accordingly, in May 2005, the county contracted with DLZ Michigan, Inc., to design a master plan and conduct a feasibility study for the proposed facility. This master plan included constructing a building of more than 3,000 square feet at the center of the parcel to serve as a training and support building. This building would have a parking lot with 24 standard parking spaces (and three handicapped spaces), multiple outdoor light poles, and a driveway. The facility would also have numerous outdoor shooting ranges. The ranges were to be set up like the spokes of a wheel that require the shooter to fire out from the center of the parcel. The center of the parcel is where the building would be located. See aerial photograph infra at note 4. The county initially planned on building the ranges first and erecting the building later.3 During the course of this litigation, construction of both the shooting ranges and the building was started and is now completed.4
Operation of the county's shooting ranges would contravene several local ordinances. First, under the township's zoning ordinance, the shooting ranges are not a permitted land use given the property's current zoning status (primary agricultural). Additionally, gun clubs are not permitted in this zoning status unless the Coloma Charter Township Board has issued a special land use permit, which the county has not received. Finally, the gun ranges produce noise levels that purportedly exceed the township's anti-noise ordinance.5
The shooting range facility has been the topic of a hotly contested public debate. Its supporters note that it provides an invaluable public service by simulating real-life conditions that law enforcement officers encounter in the field, preparing them to better serve the citizenry. Further, the supporters argue that indoor shooting ranges are simply inadequate to properly mimic field conditions. Opponents of the shooting ranges raised myriad concerns relating to the proximity of the ranges to other civilian land uses:
(1) Annually, 221,000 rounds will be fired.
(2) Automatic guns, semi-automatic guns, handguns, shotguns, and rifles are used. One type of gun used, the .308 caliber rifle, can fire a bullet 2.4 miles.
(3) The ranges all point outward from the property's center, toward the surrounding privately owned parcels.
(4) There are children's sports fields within one mile of the ranges.
(5) The ranges are within 2.4 miles of the Coloma schools and within one mile of over 50 homes.
(6) Seasonally, up to 200 farm workers and their children are within range of the .308 rifle, and four migrant-worker residences are within 1,500 feet.
(7) The sheriff estimates that 25 percent of the training events will be conducted after dark.
(8) Property values within one mile of the range are estimated to have declined by an aggregate of $2.5 million; real estate agents report difficulty selling homes in close proximity to the facility.
Apparently having been persuaded by the local residents' concerns, in October 2005, the Coloma Charter Township Board voted unanimously not to support the facility. However, in November 2005, the county approved the facility, and construction on it proceeded.
Plaintiffs are a group of individuals who own property located in close proximity to the shooting ranges. In late November 2005, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action that aimed to stop operation of the facility. The complaint alleged that the county's facility was prohibited by the township's zoning ordinance; and the plaintiffs' amended complaint additionally alleged that the facility violated the township's anti-noise ordinance. After various circuit court proceedings, the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. The trial court, relying on Pittsfield, supra, simultaneously granted the county's motion for summary disposition and denied plaintiffs' dispositive motion. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published, split decision. Herman v. Berrien Co., 275 Mich.App. 382, 739 N.W.2d 635 (2007). The Court of Appeals majority also relied on Pittsfield, holding that the county is exempt from the township's regulations because they conflict with its express legislative authorization to site county buildings, which includes the county's shooting ranges. Id. at 384, 388-389, 739 N.W.2d 635. We granted plaintiffs' application for leave. Herman v. Berrien Co., 480 Mich. 961, 741 N.W.2d 383 (2007).
The case involves interpretation of the CCA. "Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which will be reviewed de novo." In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 413, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999); see also Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991).
We are again called on to analyze a purported conflict between the powers given to intermediate government entities and the powers given to local government entities. Specifically, this case involves the relationship between a county's power, under the CCA, to site county buildings and the powers given to local governments under the TZA and the Township Ordinance Act, MCL 41.181 et seq.6
While this particular case includes novel nuances, the broad question is one that we have previously encountered. In Dearden v. Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 269 N.W.2d 139 (1978), we analyzed a conflict between the Michigan Department of Corrections, in its attempts to use a building as a criminal rehabilitation center, and the city of Detroit's zoning ordinance, which precluded such land use. At that time, we acknowledged that "[n]o Michigan case has resolved, with finality, the question of whether our state or its agencies are inherently immune from local zoning ordinances." Id. at 262, 269 N.W.2d 139. Yet, we held that "the legislative intent, where it can be discerned, is the test for determining whether a governmental unit is immune from the provisions of local zoning ordinances." Id. at 264, 269 N.W.2d 139.7 The holding in Dearden continues to be the appropriate test for these particular conflict cases.
In Northville Charter Twp. v. Northville Pub. Schools, 469 Mich. 285, 666 N.W.2d 213 (2003), we examined whether the authority of the state superintendent of public instruction to control site plans of schools under the Revised School Code (RSC)8 had priority over the restrictions of a local zoning ordinance. Relying on the rule in Dearden, we held that the state superintendent's decision to build and operate a school was immune from the local zoning regulations because the Legislature evinced its intent to give the superintendent such priority by stating that the superintendent had "`sole and exclusive jurisdiction over ... site plans for those school buildings.'" Northville, supra at 290, 295, 666 N.W.2d 213, quoting MCL 380.1263(3)9 (emphasis omitted). The opinion also pointed out that the Legislature need not use the exact phrase "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" to bestow priority; but, when that phrase is used, it signifies a grant of priority. Id. at 291-292, 666 N.W.2d 213. In Northville, we also wrestled with the scope of priority in defining the RSC's phrase "site plan." The plurality opinion held that the phrase extended the priority of the superintendent's power in locating and operating schools to "everything on the property, i.e., the entire project." Id. at 292, 666 N.W.2d 213.10
Dearden and Northville make it clear that whenever the legal question of priority is presented, it must be resolved by thorough analysis...
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