Herman v. Hamblet

• Decision Date: 31 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-392,79-392
• Citation: 81 Ill.App.3d 1050,36 Ill.Dec. 835,401 N.E.2d 973
• Parties: , 36 Ill.Dec. 835 Harvey HERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. HAMBLET; Herrick, McNeill, McElroy & Peregrine; Thomas H. Miner; AMH Industries, Inc., an Illinois Corporation; AMH Industries of Nevada, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 973

401 N.E.2d 973

81 Ill.App.3d 1050, 36 Ill.Dec. 835

Harvey HERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. HAMBLET; Herrick, McNeill, McElroy & Peregrine Thomas H. Miner; AMH Industries, Inc., an Illinois Corporation; AMH Industries of Nevada Inc., a Nevada Corporation Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-392.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Jan. 31, 1980.

Gordon James Arnett, Chicago (Tim Biasiello, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Peter C. John of Phelan, Pope & John, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

ROMITI, Justice:

The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants Michael J. Hamblet, the law firm of Herrick, McNeill, McElroy & Peregrine (hereinafter Herrick), Thomas H. Miner and two AMH Corporations (hereinafter AMH), alleging many claims for recovery. Hamblet and Herrick moved to strike the complaint and for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the plaintiff had signed a general release. The trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint as to Hamblet and Herrick. Later the action was dismissed as to the remaining defendants.

We find that we have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the second order of dismissal because that appeal was not timely filed. As to Hamblet and Herrick, we find that the plaintiff's multitudinous contentions on appeal as to the ownership of stock, the authenticity of the last page of the release, the form of the motion on the pleadings, the use of a lie detector test, and the entry of an order contradicting a statement of the judge at the hearing are either irrelevant or without merit. We also find that the complaint was properly dismissed because it improperly purported to allege multiple causes of action in a single count.

The plaintiff in his complaint, which will be discussed in greater detail later, alleged various claims arising out of conduct preceding and following the signing by the plaintiff of a settlement agreement dated February 11, 1975. Among them were certain claims against Hamblet and against Herrick, the law firm in which Hamblet was a partner. Hamblet allegedly at one time had been the plaintiff's attorney but later during the period in question represented AMH in the negotiations with the plaintiff. Hamblet and Herrick moved for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the claims were barred by a release and that they were not responsible for any breaches of the settlement agreement by AMH and Miner. In the same motion they also moved for dismissal because, inter alia, the complaint purported to state seven causes of action against multiple defendants in the same count. Attached to this motion was the nine page settlement agreement. Each page of the agreement was initialled by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's signature appears on page eight of the agreement. Paragraph six on page five of the agreement reads as follows:

"6. The Hermans agree to and do hereby release, unconditionally remise and forever discharge both said AMH Corporations, their officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents and attorneys, whether individually or in their corporate capacities, and the affiliates, successors and assigns of the said AMH Corporations and the said AMH Corporations on behalf of themselves, their agents, officers, employees, directors, affiliates, successors and assigns, agree to and do hereby release, unconditionally remise and forever discharge the Hermans, their heirs and administrators from all claims, demands, causes of action, rights and obligations of every kind, whether liquidated or unliquidated, in law or in equity, under the common law or by statute, in their own right or by derivative right, which they now have or may have against each other, including, but not by way of limitation, those arising in any way out of their employment relationship or ownership of shares of stock in either AMH Corporations or other business relations to the date of this Agreement, all such matters having been fully compromised and settled. It is expressly agreed that the foregoing is intended as a General Release of any or all existing accrued claims or causes of action between or against the said parties, but not of any claims or causes of action which may arise by virtue of any breach or failure to perform the still executory provisions of this Agreement."

While the attorneys are not referred to by name in paragraph six, paragraph five reads in part "The Hermans represent * * * that all claims * * * have been fully disclosed to the present officers and directors of the said AMH Corporations or their attorneys, Herrick, McNeill, McElroy & Peregrine * * * ."

At the hearing on the motion the plaintiff contended that the ninth page of the agreement attached to the motion was a forgery and that his initials on that page were also forged. He claimed that the correct last page was signed by Fraser for the corporation and not by Anderson as was the copy submitted to the court. This contention apparently was fueled by the fact that Anderson had been made president of the corporations without plaintiff's knowledge although plaintiff was a major stockholder. It was stipulated that the initials on the first eight pages were the plaintiff's and the plaintiff apparently did not contend that he was not bound by those pages. Because the plaintiff contended that page nine and the initials on it were forged, the court ordered that the page be submitted to a handwriting expert and that the plaintiff submit to a lie detector test. The plaintiff made no objection at the time. The handwriting expert concluded that the initials appearing on page nine were by the same person who initialled the first eight pages. The lie detector test was inconclusive. The court then entered judgment on the pleadings for the defendant attorneys and also dismissed the complaint as to them on July 12, 1978. The order was made final and appealable. The plaintiff then moved for a rehearing and that motion was denied on September 13, 1978 by an order which was made final and appealable as provided by Supreme Court Rule 304(a). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 304(a).) The plaintiff appealed on October 12, 1978.

On November 29, 1978 the suit against the remaining defendants was dismissed. On January 4, 1979 the plaintiff filed an amendment to the October 12, 1978 notice of appeal adding the defendants dismissed by the November 29, 1978 order. No other notice of appeal from the November order was filed. The defendants' motion to strike the amendment was denied by the trial court on February 23, 1979.

I.

This court has no jurisdiction to review the November 29 order since the appeal was not timely filed. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. (Sabath v. Mansfield (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 1008, 18 Ill.Dec. 8, 377 N.E.2d 161; Danaher v. Knightsbridge Company (1978), 56 Ill.App.3d 977, 14 Ill.Dec. 583, 372 N.E.2d 862, leave to appeal denied; Johnson v. Coleman (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 671, 7 Ill.Dec. 817, 365 N.E.2d 102, leave to appeal denied; Huber v. Maggio (1975), 31 Ill.App.3d 624, 333 N.E.2d 270; Hale v. Ault (1974), 24 Ill.App.3d 10, 321 N.E.2d 151, leave to appeal denied.) Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 303(a)), provides that an appeal must be taken within thirty days. This meant that the plaintiff was required to appeal from the November order by Friday, December 29, 1978. This the plaintiff did not do. Nor did he file a motion in this court for an extension of time. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 303(e).) While it is true that the trial court denied the motion to strike the amendment, the trial court had no power to extend the time in which an appeal could be filed. Huber v. Maggio (1975), 31 Ill.App.3d 624, 333 N.E.2d 270.

The plaintiff attempted to appeal by filing, after expiration of the time for filing of a notice of appeal, an amendment to his October 12 notice of appeal. While an appellant may amend a notice of appeal (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 303(c)(4)), such an amendment may not be used to avoid the requirement that a subsequent order be timely appealed. To allow such amendment would be tantamount to allowing the appellant to confer jurisdiction upon the court where none existed before. (Hale v. Ault (1974), 24 Ill.App.3d 10, 321 N.E.2d 151, leave to appeal denied.) Moreover, an amendment to a notice of appeal relates back to the time of the filing of the notice of appeal. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110A, par. 303(c)(4); Hale v. Ault (1974), 24 Ill.App.3d 10, 321 N.E.2d 151, leave to appeal denied.) But if we were to allow the amendment here, it could not relate back to the notice of appeal since the November 29th order did not exist when the appeal was taken. (Hale v. Ault (1974), 24 Ill.App.3d 10, 321 N.E.2d 151, leave to appeal denied.) Accordingly, the appeal of the order dismissing the suit against AMH and Miner must be dismissed.

II.

The plaintiff's appeal from the judgment against Hamblet and Herrick is, of course, properly before this court. It appears that the only issues raised in plaintiff's principal brief are: that the release did not release the plaintiff's ownership of stock; that the motion was improper as combining a section 45 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, par. 45), and section 48 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, par. 48), motion; that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was defective since it did not state how the complaint was insufficient; that in making the motion the defendants, in effect, admitted the fact stated in plaintiff's affidavit that the last page of the agreement was fraudulently substituted for the page signed by the plaintiff; that the court erred in signing an order dismissing the case as against Hamblet and Herrick when the court had just stated that there would be a ruling against those same defendants; that the plaintiff was deprived of equal protection by the judge's order...