Hermanson v. Baca
| Decision Date | 12 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:17-cv-00721-HDM-CLB |
| Parties | JAMES E. HERMANSON, Petitioner, v. ISIDRO BACA,[1] et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Petitioner James E. Hermanson has filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state-court conviction pursuant to a guilty plea, of sexual assault of a child under sixteen. (ECF No. 21). The second amended petition, filed by counsel, is before the Court for adjudication of the merits. Respondents have answered (ECF No. 53), and Hermanson has replied. (ECF No. 54).
For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Hermanson's habeas petition, denies him a certificate of appealability and directs the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.
On March 16, 2013, Hermanson was arrested after his minor stepdaughter, M.M., disclosed to law enforcement that he had engaged in “[i]nappropriate sexual conduct” with her. (ECF No. 151 at 104-06, 108-09). When officers arrived at his house to arrest him, Hermanson was unconscious. (Id. at 13). Feeling “severely depressed” about M.M.'s allegations, Hermanson had attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on “psych meds, pain pills, and Flexeril.” (Id. at 12-13, 15, 32). The arresting officers woke him up and took him to a Yerington hospital, where he stayed before being transported by Care Flight to a hospital in Reno. (Id. at 14).
Following his hospital stays, Hermanson was taken to the Lyon County Jail. (Id.) There, Hermanson tried to commit suicide again, first by banging his head against a wall and then by eating the “plastic on [his] mattress.” (Id. at 15-16). Hermanson was taken to a hospital, where a doctor filled out a form “committing [him] to the mental hospital in Reno.” (Id. at 16). Instead of taking him to the “mental hospital,” however, the escorting officer took him back to the jail. (Id.)
On the evening of March 18, 2013, law enforcement interviewed Hermanson at the jail. (Id. at 109-12). Following the reading of his Miranda rights, Hermanson admitted that he had touched M.M.'s clitoris “one time” because “she asked [him] to.” (Id. at 125-28). Hermanson acknowledged that this admission “was enough to put [him] in prison” for “lewdness.” (Id. at 128).
Two days later, on March 20, 2013, Hermanson was charged with one count of lewdness with a child under fourteen, specifically M.M. (ECF No. 14-2). On May 1, 2013, Hermanson was charged with an additional count of sexual assault of a child under sixteen. (ECF No. 14-3). This new charge related to allegations that Hermanson had engaged in sexual conduct with K.H., his niece. (Id. at 2; ECF No. 15-1 at 68). The amended criminal complaint, which contained both counts, noted that Hermanson had previously been convicted of lewdness with a child under fourteen. (ECF No. 14-3 at 1-2). As a result of this prior conviction, Hermanson faced a potential sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See NRS § 200.366(4) (West 2013); NRS § 201.230(3) (West 2013).
On July 1, 2013, Hermanson pled guilty to one count of sexual assault of a child under sixteen. (ECF No. 14-7). In exchange, the State agreed to (i) drop the charge of lewdness with a child under fourteen, and (ii) not seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the remaining count. (Id. at 1; ECF No. 15-1 at 21-22). Instead, Hermanson would receive a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. (ECF No. 14-7 at 2). Following the entry of his guilty plea, Hermanson was sentenced to life with parole eligibility after twenty-five years. (ECF No. 14-9).
Hermanson did not pursue a direct appeal. Instead, he sought habeas relief in Nevada state court. (ECF No. 14-10). Counsel was appointed, and Hermanson filed a supplemental petition on April 15, 2015. (ECF No. 14-16). Following an evidentiary hearing, the state district court denied Hermanson's petition. (ECF No. 15-2). The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the petition on January 19, 2017. (ECF No. 16-7). While his appeal was pending, Hermanson filed another state habeas petition, which was subsequently denied as successive. (ECF No. 16-2; ECF No. 16-11).
This Court received Hermanson's pro se federal habeas petition on December 14, 2017. (ECF No. 1). Following the appointment of counsel, Hermanson filed a first amended petition and then a second amended petition. (ECF Nos. 13, 21). Respondents moved to dismiss Grounds 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the second amended petition. (ECF No. 31). This Court held that Ground 3 was unexhausted, and that Grounds 2, 4, and 5 were technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 43). The Court allowed Hermanson to return to state court to exhaust Ground 3 and agreed to defer consideration of whether Hermanson could excuse the default of Grounds 2, 4, and 5 until the merits disposition. (Id. at 7; ECF No. 45).
This action was stayed while Hermanson exhausted Ground 3, which alleged that his right to due process was violated because he was sentenced without a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). (ECF No. 45). Hermanson returned to state district court and filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. (ECF No. 512). The district court denied the motion, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on October 18, 2021. (ECF No. 51-2; ECF No. 51-7). Following the completion of the state-court proceedings, the Court reopened this action and ordered merits briefing on the second amended petition. (ECF No. 52).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) sets forth the standard of review generally applicable in habeas corpus cases:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state-court decision is contrary to established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1), “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (). A state-court decision is an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1) “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10).
“A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). And “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing the standard as “difficult to meet” and a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
In Strickland, the Supreme Court propounded a two-prong test for analysis of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requiring a petitioner to demonstrate that (i) the attorney's “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (ii) the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Courts considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must apply a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. The petitioner bears the burden of showing that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687.
Moreover to establish prejudice under Strickland, it is not enough for the petitioner “to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Rather, the errors must be “so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. When the ineffective-assistance claim challenges a guilty plea, the Strickland prejudice prong requires the petitioner to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the petitioner]...
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