Hermanson v. Seppala

• Decision Date: 02 July 1930
• Citation: 272 Mass. 197,172 N.E. 87
• Parties: HERMANSON v. SEPPALA.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

272 Mass. 197

172 N.E. 87

HERMANSON

v.SEPPALA.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

July 2, 1930.

Appeal from Superior Court, Essex County; Hammond, Judge.

Suit by Ulrika J. Hermanson, alias, against Samuel Seppala. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.

Motion to dismiss appeal denied, and decree affirmed.Nutter, McClennen & Fish, of Boston(G. P. Davis and W. E. Hays, both of Boston, of counsel), for appellant.

J. G. Annala, of Fitchburg, for appellee.

FIELD, J.

This is a suit in equity brought in the superior court for the cancellation of a deed, dated August 16, 1919, purporting to have been executed by the plaintiff, and to convey certain real estate in Gloucester to the defendant, and for other relief. This bill of complaint was a substitute for the bill (filed May 1, 1924, and later amended) considered on demurrer in Hermanson v. Seppala, 255 Mass. 607, 152 N. E. 363. The case was referred to a master who made a report to which objections were filed. The objections, which by force of equity rule 26 (1926) became exceptions, were overruled, and the report was confirmed by an interlocutory decree. Thereafter a final decree was entered, whereby it was adjudged that the plaintiff, when she executed the deed, ‘was not of sound mind and did not have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature or effect of her act and * * * is entitled to avoid said deed,’ and that ‘said deed is null and void and the defendant took no title thereunder’; and it was ordered that ‘the defendant forthwith deliver up said deed to the plaintiff for cancellation’ and ‘be perpetually enjoined from interfering in any manner with the plaintiff or with any person or persons claiming under her in the exercise of her or their right, title or interest in said premises or in the free use and enjoyment thereof,’ and that the defendant pay the costs of suit. The defendant appealed from the final decree only.

The plaintiff filed a motion in this court to dismiss the defendant's appeal ‘for the reasons that the appeal does not claim that the defendant was aggrieved by the decree, ruling, opinion or judgment therein made or entered.’ The appeal recites that the defendant ‘appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth from the Final Decree.’ This is sufficient. Obviously such an appeal implies a claim that the appellant is a ‘party aggrieved’ by the decree appealed from. G. L. c. 214, § 19, as amended by St. 1929, c. 265, § 5.

No appeal was taken from the interlocutory decree overruling the exceptions and confirming the report, and it is not contended by the defendant that the final decree was erroneously affected thereby so as to require revision under G. L. c. 214, § 27. See Centebar v. Selectmen of Watertown (Mass.) 167 N. E. 303, and cases cited. The question is, therefore, ‘whether the final decree was within the scope of the bill and supported by the facts found.’ Ledoux v. Lariviere, 261 Mass. 242, 244, 158 N.E. 779, 780, and cases cited.

The master found, among others, the following facts: In August, 1919, the plaintiff entered into an oral arrangement or agreement with the defendant ‘whereby the former was to convey to the latter all her land and the two tenement houses and the eight outbuildings thereon,’ being the premises in question, ‘and all the personal property upon the premises except her household furniture and her two cows, upon the following terms and conditions: The plaintiff was to reserve and collect for her own use, the rents from tenants up to October 1, 1919, and to assume and pay the taxes on the property, real and personal, for the year 1919, which amounted to $78, and the defendant was (a) to assume and pay the outstanding mortgages (aggregating $1,850) on the real estate held by the Granite Savings Bank of Rockport, (b) to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $150, by permitting her to use and occupy, for a period of fifty months at the rental of $3 per month, the tenement then occupied by her in the westerly house, consisting of three attic rooms and one room on the second floor, and (c) to give to the plaintiff an agreement in writing to reconvey the property to her whenever she requested, the terms of the reconveyance not being expressly stated.’ On August 16, 1919, the plaintiff executed a deed of the premises to the defendant. No ‘agreement to reconvey was made or tendered by the defendant, and no mention of such an agreement was made’ when the deed was executed. The ‘fair merket value of the property conveyed to the defendant at the time of the conveyance was $6,000 at least.’ ‘Immediately after receiving the deed, the defendant took possession of the property. * * * The plaintiff continued to occupy the same small tenement she had previously occupied, receiving from the defendant each month, a receipt or voucher * * * for $3, on account of the rent. * * *’ After October 1, 1919, ‘the defendant collected all the rents from the other tenants of the premises.’ He made repairs and improvements. By some time in November, 1923, the period of fifty months having expired, the defendant had requested the plaintiff to vacate the premises.

The master found specifically that ‘the plaintiff when she made the conveyance in question was not of sound mind and did not understand nor have the mental capacity to understand the nature or effect of her act.’ This finding must stand. The evidence is not reported and the finding is not inconsistent with other findings or plainly wrong. See Glover v. Waltham Laundry Co., 235 Mass. 330, 334, 127 N. E. 420. The deed of an insane person conveying land is voidable. Allis v. Billings, 6 Metc. 415,39 Am. Dec. 744;Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 16, 126 N.E. 271. It ‘is ineffectual to convey a title to land, good against the grantor or against his heirs and devisees, unless it is confirmed by the grantor himself, when of sound mind, or by his legally constituted guardian, or by his heirs or devisees. * * * And such deed may be disaffirmed without returning the consideration money, or placing the other party in statu quo’ (Brigham v. Fayerweather, 144 Mass. 48, 51, 10 N. E. 735, 737), if, in the meantime, the privilege to disaffirm has not been terminated by ratification (Allis v. Billings, 6 Metc. 415, 421,39 Am. Dec. 744;Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 279, 66 Am. Dec. 414). ‘A bill in equity may be maintained to set aside...