Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 17 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1053.,12–1053.
• Citation: 723 F.3d 91
• Parties: Carlos HERNANDEZ–CUEVAS, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. William TAYLOR and Steven M. Martz, Defendants, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

723 F.3d 91

Carlos HERNANDEZ–CUEVAS, Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.William TAYLOR and Steven M. Martz, Defendants, Appellants.

No. 12–1053.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

July 17, 2013.

Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Rosa E. Rodriguez–Velez, United States Attorney, Barbara L. Herwig, and Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr. were on brief, for appellants.

Jose F. Quetglas Jordan, with whom Pedro R. Vazquez and the Quetglas Law Offices were on brief, for appellee.

Before THOMPSON, STAHL, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

This case requires us to decide for the first time whether an individual who alleges that the unlawful conduct of law enforcement officers caused him to be held for three months in pretrial detention without probable cause states a Fourth Amendment claim actionable through a Bivens suit. ¹ Often called a “Fourth Amendmentmalicious prosecution” claim, the existence and contours of such a claim are the subject of considerable discord among the Courts of Appeals. After reviewing the relevant case law, we conclude that an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure but upon probable cause continues through the pretrial period, ² and that, in certain circumstances, injured parties can vindicate that right through a § 1983 or Bivens action. Furthermore, because we agree with the district court that Hernandez–Cuevas has pleaded facts which, if true, would be sufficient to establish that Taylor and Martz violated his Fourth Amendment rights, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from the complaint and documents incorporated into the complaint.

In 2004, plaintiff Carlos Hernandez–Cuevas was 40 years old and living in a rented room in a multi-unit building located at 1655 Santa Ana Street in Carolina, Puerto Rico. Hernandez–Cuevas is dark-skinned, approximately 5'10? tall, and thin, weighing about 150 pounds.

That same year, a joint federal-Commonwealth task force consisting of FBI agents and local police officers opened a special investigation targeting a significant drug and money laundering conspiracy operating in Carolina. The task force employed at least two confidential informants, referred to in the complaint as “UI–1” and “UI–2.” Working undercover, UI–1 and UI–2 arranged a meeting on July 20, 2004 with several members of the money laundering conspiracy in the parking lot of the Pueblo Supermarket on Route 187 in Carolina, “where a courier acting under the direction of such co-conspirators was to deliver proceeds of drug sales to UI–1.”

The task force agents set up a surveillance unit to observe this transaction. According to a contemporaneous surveillance report, the agents at the scene saw a white and silver Mitsubishi Montero with license plate number DMV–656 enter the parking lot and park next to UI–1's car. The driver of the Montero, referred to in the complaint as “UNSUB # 1,” rolled down his window and spoke with UI–1. Both cars then left the parking lot.

Some time later, UI–1 returned to the parking lot, this time tailed by a white Jeep Cherokee with license plate number FDA–680. Two unknown males were inside the Jeep: the driver, referred to in the complaint as “UNSUB # 2,” and a passenger, referred to as “UNSUB # 3.” In their surveillance report, the FBI officers at the scene described UNSUB # 3 as a “black male, with black hair, 5 feet and 7 inches tall, a heavy build, and in his late fifties.”

The Jeep pulled up alongside UI–1's car. UNSUB # 3 exited the Jeep and placed two bags containing $321,956 in cash in the trunk of UI–1's car. UNSUB # 3 then returned to the Jeep, which left the parking lot. FBI agents from the surveillance unit followed the Jeep, and saw the driver drop UNSUB # 3 off on Santa Ana Street in Carolina. The agents last observed UNSUB # 3 walking toward the “porch area” of the multi-unit building located at 1655 Santa Ana Street, where Hernandez–Cuevas lived.

Nearly a year passed, during which the FBI was unable to positively identify UNSUB # 3. “In a rush to indict someone as UNSUB # 3,” Martz, Taylor, and UI–1 conspired to manufacture evidence indicating that UNSUB # 3 was Hernandez–Cuevas. In furtherance of their plan, Martz and UI–1 “carried out a tainted photo identification.” On May 25, 2005, Martz e-mailed UI–1 pictures of six individuals, including a photograph of Hernandez–Cuevas. The following day, U–1 called Martz on the telephone and identified Hernandez–Cuevas as UNSUB # 3, even though Hernandez–Cuevas's physical appearance—tall, thin, and 40 years old—is strikingly different from the contemporaneous FBI report describing UNSUB # 3 as “5 feet and 7 inches tall, a heavy build, and in his late fifties.” Despite the discrepancies between Hernandez–Cuevas's appearance and the original surveillance description of UNSUB # 3, Martz wrote an internal FBI report based on UI–1's identification concluding that UNSUB # 3 was in fact Hernandez–Cuevas.

Another two years passed without further action in the case. Finally, on November 21, 2007, Taylor “either knowingly or in reckless disregard of the truth” included the false identification of Hernandez–Cuevas as UNSUB # 3 in a warrant affidavit, attesting that on July 20, 2004, Hernandez–Cuevas had delivered $321,956 in drug proceeds to UI–1.

On the basis of these false statements, a magistrate judge in Puerto Rico issued a warrant for Hernandez–Cuevas's arrest. According to the complaint, without Taylor's statements, the government would have been unable to establish probable cause to obtain the warrant. FBI agents arrested Hernandez–Cuevas on December 3, 2007 and brought him before a magistrate judge the following day. On December 6, 2007, he appeared again before a magistrate judge, who ordered him detained without bail pending trial and transferred him to a federal prison in New Jersey, where he was incarcerated for nearly three months awaiting further proceedings. On February 29, 2008, he was released on his own recognizance following a hearing before a magistrate judge in New Jersey; on April 18, 2008, the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey dismissed the charges against Hernandez–Cuevas.

Hernandez–Cuevas alleges that he was not in the parking lot of the Pueblo Supermarket on July 20, 2004, and that he has never been involved in the drug trade. He also alleges that he has never “owned, possessed, driven or traveled” in either of the cars observed by the FBI agents in the parking lot.

B. Procedural Background

Hernandez–Cuevas filed his complaint on March 2, 2009, alleging that Martz and Taylor's misconduct caused him to be held in federal custody for three months without probable cause.³ The defendants first moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that Puerto Rico's one-year limitations period had run by the time Hernandez–Cuevas filed his complaint on March 2, 2009. Under the government's theory, any Fourth Amendment claim of Hernandez–Cuevas had accrued in December 2007 on the day of his allegedly unlawful arrest. As such, the Puerto Rico one-year statute of limitations expired in December 2008, several months before Hernandez–Cuevas filed this complaint.

The district court agreed in part with the defendants, reasoning that if Hernandez–Cuevas had filed his complaint shortly after his arrest in December 2007, he would have had a straightforward Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. But because Hernandez–Cuevas failed to file his complaint until more than a year after his December 2007 arrest, the district court agreed with the government that any claim for damages flowing from the arrest itself was time-barred. See Torres v. Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that “the appropriate statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim is Puerto Rico's one-year period governing tort actions”); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (holding that accrual for § 1983 claims is governed by federal law and a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim accrues on the date of arrest); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Calero–Cólon v. Betancourt–Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir.1995) (discussing accrual rules for malicious prosecution and false arrest claims brought under § 1983).

The court disagreed, however, with the government's argument that the statute of limitations on all plausible Fourth Amendment claims had run by the time Hernandez–Cuevas filed his complaint. Instead, the court agreed with Hernandez–Cuevas that in addition to allegations that he sustained injuries from the arrest itself, the complaint alleged that he sustained injuries from the three months that he was held in federal custody without probable cause. Concluding that Hernandez–Cuevas was correct that the closest common law analogy for this claim was malicious prosecution, the court allowed him to proceed on this claim because malicious prosecution claims accrued at common law on the day that the proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor, see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390, 127 S.Ct. 1091, which in this case occurred on April 18, 2008, less than a year before Hernandez–Cuevas filed his complaint on March 2, 2009.⁴

The defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Taylor and Martz were entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied the defendants' motion. Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the court concluded that it had long been clearly established law that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from manufacturing probable cause by knowingly including false statements in a warrant affidavit.⁵

Taylor and Martz then filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of qualified immunity.

II.

We...