Hernandez-Mejias, v. General Elec., No. CIV. 03-1289(JAF).

• Decision Date: 07 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 03-1289(JAF).
• Citation: 428 F.Supp.2d 4
• Parties: Jackeline HERNÁND-EMEJÍAS, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

428 F.Supp.2d 4

Jackeline HERNÁND-EMEJÍAS, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. 03-1289(JAF).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 7, 2005.

Maria S. Kortright—Soler, M. S. Kortright Soler Law Office, San Juan, PR, Pedro R. Vazquez, III, Pedro R. Vazquez Law Office, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiff.

Carl E. Schuster, Mariela Rexach-Rexach, Schuster Usera & Aguilo LLP, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, Jackeline Hernández—Mejláas, filed the present complaint against Defendants, General Electric Products ("GE") and Caribe GE Distribution Components ("Caribe GE"), alleging discrimination and unlawful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20003-17 (1994 & Supp.2005), as augmented by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Docket Document Nos. 1, 13.

I. Factual and Procedural Synopsis

Our determination based upon the Magistrate Judge's disposition is de novo. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). As required, we will review and weigh the evidence presented to the magistrate judge, Docket Document No. 78, 89, rather than merely relying on the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. LaCedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Det. Facility, 334 F.Supp.2d 114, 125 (D.E.:1.2004).

However, we exercise our discretion in accepting those parts of the Report and Recommendation to which Defendant does not object. Id.

Plaintiff worked as a temporary contract employee for Defendant Caribe. Her first employment contract was for December 21, 1998 to January 30, 1999. She signed another employment contract on January 29, 1999 for a period ending on July 30, 1999, and continued to sign either one-, four- or six-month contracts, consecutively, through November 30, 2000. Plaintiff became pregnant in August 2000 and informed Defendant of her condition. On September 21, 2000, Plaintiff took medical leave from work due to a pregnancy-related health complication. Plaintiff received statutory disability payments during her leave. Plaintiffs employment contract had expired during her medical absence, on November 30, 2000, and when she returned to work on December 11, 2000, she signed a new, one-month contract. Plaintiff again left work due to a pregnancy-related complication on March 10, 2001. She gave birth on April 12, 2001, and received disability benefits through June 14, 2001.

Two days prior to the expiration of her disability benefits' term, Plaintiff spoke with human resources Manager Awilda Rios regarding her return to work. According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff called Rios, who informed Plaintiff that due to a lack of work, Defendant would be unable to renew Plaintiff's work contract.

Ríos insists that she had tried to contact Plaintiff regarding a position in Defendant Caribe's Molding Department that was available to her, but that Plaintiff did not accept the position. Rios sent a letter to Plaintiff memorializing a June 27, 2001 conversation in which Plaintiff refused an offer for a Molding Department position, but that the letter was returned to Rios as "unclaimed/refused" on July 26, 2001. Docket Document No. 109.

Plaintiff filed the present complaint on March 17, 2003, alleging that she was discharged because of her pregnancy in violation of Title VII and the PDA. Docket Document No. 1. On November 29, 2004, Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that: (1) Plaintiff's discrimination claims are not sustainable under the burden-shifting framework applicable in Title VII cases; and (2) Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies against Defendant GE. Docket Document Nos. 78, 97. On December 29, 2004 Plaintiff opposed the motion. Docket Document No. 89.

On April 6, 2005, this court referred Defendants' summary judgment motion to Magistrate Judge Aida M. Delgado-Colón for a Report and Recommendation. Docket Document No. 107. On August 18, 2005, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, granting Defendants' motion with regards to the exhaustion of administrative remedies against Defendant GE and denying Defendants' motion with regards to the underlying discrimination claims. Docket Document No. 111.

On September 16, 2005, Defendant Caribe filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation, requesting that we decline to adopt the Magistrate Judge's disposition with regards to the discrimination claims. Docket Document No. 115.

II. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, we ADOPT the Magistrate Judge's factual synopsis and also her recommendation regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies against Defendant GE. Docket Document No. 111. All claims against Defendant GE are DISMISSED. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.¹

We will first consider the two arguments raised in Defendant's objection regarding Plaintiff's discrimination allegations: (1) Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; and (2) Plaintiff failed to reveal Defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for termination as pretextual. Docket Document No. 115. Additionally, we will consider whether the present case may survive summary judgment as a disparate impact claim, an issue only indirectly addressed in the pleadings and Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Docket Document Nos. 1, 78, 89, 111.

We proceed according to the analytical roadmap articulated in the Magistrate Judge's opinion, Docket Document No. 111, which relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the case that established the burden-shifting framework commonly used for analyzing Title VII discrimination cases. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 1996).

A. Prima Facie Claim

The McDonnell Douglas framework first requires that a plaintiff establish a prima-facie case by demonstrating that: (1) she was pregnant or had indicated an intention to become pregnant; (2) she met the employer's legitimate performance expectations; (3) she experienced an adverse employment decision by her employer; and (4) the employer had a continuing need for the services that plaintiff had been rendering. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421. Defendant contends that contrary to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, Plaintiff has established neither that she experienced an adverse employment action nor that Defendant had a continuing need for her services, and so fails to put forward a prima facie discrimination claim. Docket Document No. 115.

1. Adverse Employment Action

Plaintiff's final employment contract with Defendant expired on April 20, 2001. Docket Document No. 89, Exh. 11. Plaintiff left work on disability leave prior to the expiration date, on March 10, 2001, due to pregnancy-related complications. Docket Document No. 89. Plaintiff alleges that when she returned to work on June 12, 2001, she was not offered a position. Indisputably, her employment contract was not renewed. Docket Document No. 78. Defendant claims the failure to renew Plaintiff's contract was not an adverse employment action. Id.

For support, Defendant relies upon Gourdine v. Cabrini Medical Center, 307 F.Supp.2d 587, 595 (S.D.N.Y.2004), in which the court found that an employer-defendant's failure to renew an employee-plaintiff contract does not constitute an adverse employment action if the contract makes no guarantee of further employment. As Defendant notes, the Second Circuit affirmed this finding, while vacating other portions of the district court's decision. 128 Fed.Appx. 780, 782 (2d Cir. 2005). However, the appellate decision is not to be cited as precedential authority, id., and, therefore, we place no weight on its holding.

Other courts, meanwhile, have treated-and sometimes explicitly found the failure to renew an employment contract as an adverse employment action cognizable under Title. VII. See, e.g., Kassaye v. Bryant College, 999 F.2d 603, 607 (1st Cir.1993) (noting that refusal to renew employment contract may provide grounds for Title VII complaint); Mateu-Anderegg v. Sch. Dist. Of Whitefish Bay, 304 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir.2002), (finding, in contract-renewal Title VII case, "it is undisputed that [plaintiff] ... suffered an adverse employment action"); Walker v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 300 F.Supp.2d 836, 851-52 (W.D.Wis.2004) (Title VII applies "equally to both termination decisions and the refusal to re-hire."); Flores-Suarez v. Turabo Med. Ctr. P'ship, 165 F.Supp.2d 79, 91 (D.P.R.2001); Meadows v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Oswego, 160 F.R.D. 8, 12 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (considering decision not to renew contract as adverse employment action); Castro v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 252, 258 (D.P.R.1984) (dismissing failure-to-renew-contract claim on other grounds).

As even at-will employees and job applicants are entitled to Title VII protection, see Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir.2000); Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1982), we agree with the overwhelming majority of courts that nonrenewal of an employment contract constitutes an adverse employment action.

2. Continuing Need for Services

Establishing a prima facie case under Title VII and the PDA requires Plaintiff to show that Defendant continued to have Plaintiffs duties performed by a comparably-qualified person after Plaintiffs discharge. Smith, 76 F.3d at 421.

The present case does not fit neatly into this element of the burden-shifting framework because Plaintiffs discharge was caused by her contract's termination and the subsequent lapse in time before she requested a renewal. Docket Document No. 111. Nevertheless, entirely relevant to this inquiry is whether Defendant needed Plaintiffs services at the time that it allegedly declined to extend her a position in June 2001. See Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir.2002) (noting that "the McDonnell Douglas framework is a flexible evidentiary standard...