Hernandez-Mendez v. Rivera

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 15–1147 (GAG).
• Parties: Jannette HERNANDEZ–MENDEZ, Plaintiffs v. Benjamin RIVERA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

137 F.Supp.3d 142

Jannette HERNANDEZ–MENDEZ, Plaintiffs

v.Benjamin RIVERA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 15–1147 (GAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Sept. 30, 2015.

Israel Roldan–Gonzalez, Aguadilla, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ

, District Judge.

Jannette Hernández–Méndez ("Plaintiff") filed this action against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Family Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (collectively "Commonwealth Defendants"), Benjamin Rivera ("Rivera") and Marisel Rodríguez ("Rodríguez") in their personal and official capacities, as supervisor-employees of the Family Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (hereinafter "Individual Defendants") (collectively "Defendants"), seeking redress for alleged violations of anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes during her employment with the Family Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, specifically, Plaintiff brings claims of sexual discrimination, hostile work environment, sexual harassment and retaliation. (Docket No. 1). This action was brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

("Title VII") and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1983 and 1988. Id. Plaintiff also invokes this court's supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate parallel claims pursuant to laws of Puerto Rico: Law 17 of April 1988, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 155 –155m (sexual harassment) ("Law 17"); Law 69 of July 6, 1985, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 1321

–1341 (gender discrimination) ("Law 69"); Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 194a et seq. (retaliation) ("Law 115"). (Docket No. 1). Pending before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 11.

For the following reasons, after reviewing the pleadings and pertinent law, the court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion to dismiss at Docket No. 11.

I. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

, the court analyzes the complaint in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by the Supreme Court. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) which discusses Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). First, the court must "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Id. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, the court must then "take the complaint's well-[pleaded] (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Plausible, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). This "simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937

(quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2) ). If, however, the "factual content, so taken, ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility." Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

II. Relevant Facts and Procedural Background

Jannette Hernández–Méndez, of legal age and resident of Moca, began working for the Family Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on February 1, 1994. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 7, 13). On April 1, 2013, she was transferred to the Family Department's Aguadilla I Office where she was designated secretary and auxiliary collector. Id. ¶ 13. Her immediate supervisor was Rivera, director of the Aguadilla I Office where Plaintiff worked at the time of the incidents alleged in her complaint. Id. ¶ 15. In turn, Rivera's immediate supervisor was Rodríguez, regional director overseeing the Aguadilla I Office. Id. ¶¶ 16; 21. According to Plaintiff, she always performed her work and duties in a satisfactory manner. Id. ¶ 14.

Sometime on or around March/April 2013, Rivera allegedly began to sexually harass Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 17. The first incident occurred when Rivera asked Plaintiff about her marital status, to which she responded that she was, at the time, separated from her husband. Id. ¶ 18. Rivera then asked if she had a boyfriend, and the Plaintiff answered in a "firm and upset" manner that she did not and left the area of Rivera's office. Id. ¶ 18.

A few days later, Rivera approached the Plaintiff while she was at her desk and asked her about her age. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff responded that she was forty years old and Rivera got closer to her and whispered in her ear "you look hot for your age." Id. ¶ 19. This prompted the Plaintiff to feel uncomfortable and move to another desk, abandon her post as Rivera's secretary and focus on her other job as auxiliary collector. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 20). In addition, when Plaintiff was fetching documents Rivera had requested, Rivera intentionally approached the Plaintiff from behind and she felt him rub against her back and gluteus. Id. ¶ 21. This latter incident caused Plaintiff to feel sufficiently shocked and humiliated that she began to cry. Id. ¶ 21. Upon the suggestion of a co-worker, and after conferring with a local union representative, she decided to discuss Rivera's harassment with Rodríguez, the Family Department's Regional Director and Rivera's immediate supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Rodríguez asked the Plaintiff if she wished to file a complaint against Rivera and Plaintiff answered in the affirmative. Id. ¶ 23.

After her meeting with Rodríguez, Plaintiff alleges returned to her desk and discovered that everyone in her office had already been told by Rivera that she had filed a complaint against him and that Rodríguez was the one who told him. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff avers that was also informed by a co-worker that she was going to be transferred, which appeared to be a clear indication that Rodríguez had not believed her and was siding with Rivera. Id. ¶ 25. According to Plaintiff, no action was taken against Rivera and Plaintiff was not called in for an interview after filing her complaint, her complaint was not investigated in violation on proper procedural guidelines and this amounted to Rodríguez's "condo[ning]" Rivera's behavior and forcing Plaintiff to work under a hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 25–27. Plaintiff's complaint to Rodríguez was, allegedly, not confidently kept and, instead, Rivera was immediately informed about it and, in turn, he told Plaintiff's co-workers. Id. ¶ 27. Defendants allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff's actions and complaint to the regional supervisor by transferring her to another office location, instead of letting her remain in her current office. Id. ¶ 29. Because of the incidents just described, Plaintiff sustains that she suffered emotional harm and had to seek psychological treatment. Id. ¶ 30.

Prior to this action, Plaintiff filed an administrative proceeding before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on November 11, 2013 where she alleged she suffered sexual harassment and retaliation. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 4). The EEOC mailed the Plaintiff a Notice of her Right to Sue on November 24, 2014, received by the Plaintiff on November 28, 2014. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff filed this action within 90 days of receiving said Notice on February 19, 2015. Id. ¶ 6. A certified translation of the Plaintiff's complaint to the EEOC, submitted to the record by Defendants as Exhibit 1, was filed with this court. (See Docket No. 16–1).

To be sure, the substance and structure of the Plaintiff's complaint leaves this court with want of a better structure and clearer arguments on her part. Nevertheless, this court was able to identify five substantive causes of action after carefully parsing through the complaint. First, Plaintiff alleges she was sexually harassed by Rivera, and Rodríguez's and the Commonwealth Defendant's failure to subsequently act on her complaints was tantamount to forcing Plaintiff to endure a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 32–34). Second, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are strictly liable for the alleged sexual harassment she endured from Rivera and the subsequent acts and omissions of Rodríguez, his supervisor, in violation of Puerto Rico Law 17. Id. at ¶¶ 35–39. Third, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for gender discrimination and retaliatory acts in violation of Puerto Rico Law 69. Id. at ¶¶ 40–42. Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that on account of her seeking administrative redress regarding the alleged sexual harassment from Rodríguez, Rivera's regional supervisor, Defendants retaliated by transferring Plaintiff to another office in violation of Title VII. Id. at ¶¶ 43–45. Fifth, as with the fourth substantive cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for retaliatory acts in violation of Puerto Rico Law 17, Law 69 and Law...