Hernandez v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC
| Decision Date | 12 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 4–13–cv–00374. |
| Parties | Lucas HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Brooke C. Timmer, Paige Ellen Fiedler, Whitney C. Judkins, Fiedler Law Firm PLC, Urbandale, IA, for Plaintiff.
Matthew Sean Brick, Erin M. Clanton, Brick Gentry Bowers Swartz & Levis PC, West Des Moines, IA, Robert W. Vyverberg, Holland & Knight LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
The Court has before it cross motions for summary judgment, filed September 15, 2014. Both parties filed resistance materials on October 9, and replies on October 20, 2014. The motions are considered fully submitted.1
Defendant Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC (“BATO”) is a Delaware- based limited liability company that designs, manufactures and sells tires. Plaintiff Lucas Hernandez began working for BATO in early November 2003 as an hourly production worker in its Des Moines, Iowa production facility (“the plant”). In 2004, plaintiff transferred to a tire builder position at the plant, and remained in this position until his termination in August 2012.
All tire builders at the plant work 12–hour shifts, with shifts one and three working daytime hours, and shifts two and four working nights. Plaintiff worked shift two during late 2011 and 2012. Throughout his employment with BATO, plaintiff was a bargaining unit employee and a member of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC (the “Union”). The terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment therefore were governed by the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between BATO and the Union.
BATO develops a schedule for all employees' standard workweeks on an annual basis. Once this master schedule is released in October of each year, it does not change. The parties do not dispute that, under this master schedule, plaintiff's “usual or normal workweek” was 42 hours long.3
In addition to the standard workweek, employees are given the option to sign-up for overtime hours on their off-shifts by writing their names on a sign-up sheet. BATO posts the sheets in the plant's tire room one week in advance, based on the plant's scheduling and production needs. Pursuant to a process outlined in the CBA, BATO then selects individuals to work overtime based on the employee's seniority and total overtime hours worked to-date. Once an individual is selected to work an overtime shift, BATO expects the employee to work the shift, unless he is allowed to leave early due to diminished production.
BATO maintains an attendance program for its hourly production employees, which was negotiated with the Union and is incorporated into the CBA. Under this attendance program, an “incident of absence” is defined as “one scheduled shift of absence.” Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 9.
Under the plant's attendance program, the Company imposes progressive discipline for accumulated incidents of absence: five incidents in a nine-month period result in counseling; an additional incident within nine months of the last incident after counseling results in a “step 2” written reprimand; an additional incident within nine months after the written reprimand results in a “step 3” final written warning; and an additional incident within nine months after the final written warning leads to “step 4” termination.
BATO's computerized “TIPS” attendance system prompts supervisors to schedule meetings with employees who reach steps 1–3 under the attendance program. The plants' human resources department administers any disciplinary action—including termination—from that point forward.
Certain absences are excused under the attendance program and do not result in an “incident,” such as those caused by an employee's accident or sickness (“A & S”), and those that qualify for protection under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”). The plant's human resources department decides whether to excuse an absence, and is in charge of monitoring employees' FMLA usage. Under BATO's A & S plan, which is contained within the negotiated Pension & Insurance (“P & I”) Agreement with the Union, FMLA leave runs concurrently with approved A & S leave.
Between October 31, 2011 and July 15, 2012, plaintiff was absent from his usual and normal work schedule 48 times, and absent from overtime shifts on six occasions.
Many of plaintiff's absences during this period were for FMLA-qualifying reasons. In late 2011 and 2012, plaintiff's son required frequent treatments for his asthma
, which caused plaintiff to need additional time off from work to provide the necessary transportation and care. In late November 2011, plaintiff submitted an FMLA certification form requesting intermittent FMLA leave to care for his son. Based on his this certification, BATO approved plaintiff for 504 hours of FMLA leave beginning November 14, 2011 and ending November 14, 2012. BATO reached this figure by multiplying plaintiff's normal, 42–hour workweek by 12. Bato did not account for plaintiff's overtime shifts in this FMLA allotment.
Each time plaintiff missed work due to an accident or sickness, or for an FMLA-qualifying purpose, BATO deducted 12 hours from the 504–hour allotment, whether plaintiff missed one of his standard shifts, or an overtime shift for which he had been selected.
Meanwhile, throughout 2011 and 2012, plaintiff was disciplined for unexcused absences pursuant to the plant's attendance program. These absences resulted in a counseling session, which occurred on February 1, 2012.
Plaintiff had received another unexcused absence on January 13, 2012, placing him on step 1 under the attendance program. BATO issued a written warning on February 1, 2012. It is undisputed that plaintiff would have been removed from BATO's attendance program if he did not have any additional incidents of absence through October 13, 2012, however.
Plaintiff was absent from scheduled overtime shifts for FMLA-qualifying reasons on May 7, and 13, and June 4, and 8, 2012. BATO deducted 12 hours from plaintiff's annual leave allotment balance for each of these four shifts.
Plaintiff was absent again for an FMLA-qualifying reason between July 9–15, 2012. Plaintiff did not miss another scheduled shift between July 16, and August 6, 2012.
At some point during or prior to his July 9–15, 2012 absence, plaintiff called Samantha Peterson, BATO's human resources coordinator, to alert her of the reason for his absence. Peterson then accessed his TIPS file and determined that, pursuant to BATO's policy for deducting FMLA hours due to missed overtime shifts, plaintiff had exhausted his 504–hour leave entitlement on July 10, 2012.4 Peterson sent plaintiff a letter dated July 17, 2012, confirming that, under current BATO policy, plaintiff's FMLA leave was exhausted as of July 10, 2012.5
Based on its policy for calculating and accounting for FMLA leave, BATO concluded that plaintiff's absences on July 11, and 12, 2012 caused him to advance to steps 2 and 3 under the attendance program. BATO issued plaintiff a written reprimand and a final written warning on July 24, and August 2, 2012, respectively.
The shifts plaintiff missed on July 11, and 12, 2012 were overtime shifts for which plaintiff had signed-up and been selected. Plaintiff contends that since his absences on these dates were for FMLA-qualifying purposes, no deductions should have been made from his 504–hour annual allotment.6
Plaintiff remained off-work on July 13, 14, and 15, 2012. Believing plaintiff had exhausted his leave as of July 10, 2012, BATO considered these absences to be unexcused, and advanced plaintiff to Step 4 under the attendance program.
On August 2, 2012, a meeting was held between plaintiff, his Union steward and the plants's labor relations manager, Jeff Higgens. During this meeting, plaintiff provided BATO personnel with a note from his physician indicating he was absent from July 9, through July 15, 2012 for an FMLA-qualifying purpose.
Pursuant to the CBA, plaintiff was placed on an Article 12 cooling off period during the August 2, 2012 meeting, and was instructed to return to the plant on August 6, 2012. During the cooling off period, Jim Funcheon, BATO's division human resources manager, and Higgens reviewed plaintiff's absences, and confirmed that, pursuant to BATO's policy for calculating and allocating FMLA leave, plaintiff had exhausted his FMLA leave allotment as of July 10, 2012. Based on this conclusion, on August 6, 2012, Funcheon made the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment.
Plaintiff believes his repeated use of FMLA leave caused him to be selected for fewer overtime shifts. When he asked his supervisors about the discrepancy, no explanation was given. Plaintiff admits that he does not fully understand the process for assigning overtime, but is aware of employees with less seniority than him who were selected when he was not.
On at least three occasions, plaintiff was moved to a less-productive machine after he took FMLA leave. He reported his accusation to Peterson on at least one occasion, and she responded: Deposition of Lucas Hernandez (“Hernandez Dep.”) at 151, Plaintiff's Supp.App. at 134.
Plaintiff also complained to Area Business Manager Andy Minor, who responded: “Oh, are you going to start this shit again?” Hernandez Dep. at 172, Defendant's App. at 39. Plaintiff lost up to $200.00 per day in earnings on the less-productive machines.
Plaintiff also believes he was denied certain “out-of-class work” as a result of taking FMLA leave.7 When plaintiff later complained that BATO was forcing plaintiff to sit idle and not giving him “out-of class work,” one of his supervisors,...
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