Hernandez v. City of Pomona

Decision Date11 April 2006
Docket NumberNo. B182437.,B182437.
Citation138 Cal.App.4th 506,41 Cal.Rptr.3d 517
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesBonnie HERNANDEZ, as Co-administrator, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF POMONA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Moreno, Becerra, Guerrero & Casillas, Danilo J. Becerra, Montebello, and Lizette V. Espinosa for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Alvarez-Glasman & Colvin and Roger A. Colvin, West Covina, for Defendants and Respondents.

JOHNSON, J.

The plaintiffs in this negligence action are the parents, wife, seven minor children and estate of George Hernandez who, while fleeing arrest, was shot 22 times by police officers of the City of Pomona. Defendants are the four officers involved in the shooting and the city.

Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment after the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer to their complaint. The issue is whether a federal jury's verdict in favor of a city and three of its police officers and the district court's judgment in favor of a fourth officer in a federal civil rights case precludes the same plaintiffs from bringing a negligence action in state court against the same defendants based on the same facts. Under the circumstances here we conclude it does not and reverse the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Federal Civil Rights Action

Plaintiffs initially sued the police officers and the city in federal district court alleging causes of action for negligence under state law and violation of Hernandez's civil rights under federal law1 — specifically the right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from "unreasonable" seizure.2 The complaint stated: "[Hernandez] was being chased on foot by [the officers] and indicated to them that he was unarmed. He turned towards them and raised his empty hands in the air. At that time, [the officers] fired their firearms striking [Hernandez] with fatal gunshots." Plaintiffs further alleged Hernandez was unarmed and the shooting was "without reasonable cause."

The district court bifurcated the state and federal claims and only the federal civil rights cause of action went to trial. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the city and three of the officers, Cooper, Devee and Luna. It could not reach a verdict as to the fourth officer, Sanchez.

Following the trial, defense counsel moved for judgment as a matter of law in favor of Sanchez under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Based on the evidence presented at trial, the district court found Sanchez and the other officers had cause to believe Hernandez was armed, even though it turned out he was not. "Sanchez found himself in a situation that he reasonably believed would threaten his life if he did not act immediately." Therefore, the court concluded, Sanchez's "use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances." The court further found Sanchez was entitled to qualified immunity even if he had violated Hernandez's civil rights because he "reasonably could have believed his conduct was lawful under the circumstances."

Based on the jury's verdict and the Rule 50 judgment in favor of the defendants the district court declined to assume supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law negligence claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the city and the four police officers.

The State Court Action

After a final judgment was entered in the federal court plaintiffs commenced the present action against the same defendants alleging defendants "negligently, violently and without due care, and without provocation, fatally shot and killed plaintiffs' decedent George Hernandez."

Defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds the federal court judgment and the applicable statute of limitations barred this action. They requested the trial court take judicial notice of the complaint, the Rule 50 order and the judgment in the federal court action as well as plaintiffs' tort claims filed with the city.

The trial court rejected defendants' statute of limitations argument but concluded the federal court judgment barred plaintiffs' cause of action for negligence.4 Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal from the final judgment dismissing their action.

DISCUSSION

California appellate courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether a judgment for defendants in a federal court action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment precludes a state court action for negligence against the same defendants by the same plaintiffs.5

Based on the procedural circumstances of the case before us we conclude neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel preclude plaintiffs' negligence action against the defendants in this case.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE OFFICERS.
A. Grounds For Asserting Res Judicata — The Primary Rights Theory

Under the doctrine of res judicata a valid, final judgment on the merits precludes parties or their privies from relitigating the same "cause of action" in a subsequent suit.6 "Under this doctrine, all claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date. `"Res judicata precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief."' [Citation.]"7

California law defines a "cause of action" for purposes of the res judicata doctrine by analyzing the primary right at stake: "[A] `cause of action' is comprised of a `primary right' of the plaintiff, a corresponding `primary duty' of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty. [Citation.] The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. [Citation.] A pleading that states the violation of one primary right in two causes of action contravenes the rule against `splitting' a cause of action. [Citation.]"8 "As far as its content is concerned, the primary right is simply the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered. [Citation.] It must therefore be distinguished from the legal theory on which liability for that injury is premised."9

"`[I]f two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. [Citations.]'"10 "`. . . If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged. . . . The reason for this is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate them in consecutive actions. Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable. [Citations.]' [Citation.]"11

California courts have disagreed over whether an action for violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures implicates the same primary right as an action for violation of the right to be free from negligent personal injury.

In Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa plaintiff filed a section 1983 action against the city and two of its police officers alleging the officers had "knowingly and without provocation or probable cause assaulted [him] and then arrested him[.]"12 The complaint also alleged a cause of action for negligence based on the same facts.13 The federal court declined to take jurisdiction over this supplemental state claim. Following a unanimous verdict for the defendants, plaintiff served the same defendants with a state court action alleging the officers had "`negligently assaulted, battered and arrested plaintiff' and `mishandled his personal property.'"14 The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer on the ground plaintiff's action was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and entered a judgment of dismissal.15

The Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground the doctrine of res judicata barred the second action.16 The court reasoned "the singlemost determinative factor" in deciding whether two suits involve the same primary right "is the substantive right of the plaintiff allegedly violated, the harm suffered."17 Here, the court held, "the right to be free from personal injury, and . . . the right to be free from arrest unless pursuant to a warrant valid on its face or upon reasonable cause and, in either event, without excessive force" constituted the same primary right.18

In Harris v. Grimes a police officer shot and killed Harris's unarmed son during the nighttime execution of a search warrant.19 Harris filed a complaint in federal court against the officer alleging civil rights violations under section 1983 and a cause of action for negligence under state law. A jury rendered a verdict for the officer on the civil rights action and the court dismissed the negligence claim without prejudice.20 Harris refiled her negligence claim in state court. That case was dismissed for reasons not relevant to the issue before us. Harris then filed a malpractice action against one of the attorneys who had handled the state action. The defendant contended Harris could not establish damages for malpractice because she could not have succeeded on her action against the police officer as that action was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court agreed and entered judgment for the defendant.21

The Court of Appeal reversed. It held the federal jury's general verdict for the police officer...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT