Hernandez v. City of Pomona
Decision Date | 06 December 2006 |
Docket Number | No. B182437.,B182437. |
Citation | 145 Cal.App.4th 701,51 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Bonnie HERNANDEZ, as Administrator, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF POMONA et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Moreno, Becerra, Guerrero & Casillas, Danilo J. Becerra, Montebello, and Lizette V. Espinosa for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Alvarez-Glasman & Colvin and Roger A. Colvin, West Covina, and Sean M. Beehler for Defendants and Respondents.
The plaintiffs in this negligence action are the parents, wife, seven minor children and estate of decedent George Hernandez who, while fleeing arrest, was shot 22 times by police officers of the City of Pomona. Defendants are the four officers involved in the shooting and the city.
Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment after the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer to their complaint without leave to amend. The issue is whether, in a civil rights action filed in federal court, the jury's special verdict in favor of the city and three of its police officers and the district court's Rule 50 judgment in favor of a fourth officer preclude the same plaintiffs from bringing a negligence action in state court against the same defendants based on the same facts. Under the circumstances here we conclude police officers cannot escape liability for negligence if they put themselves unnecessarily in harm's way and must then shoot their way out of it.1
Plaintiffs initially sued the police officers and the city in federal district court alleging causes of action for negligence under state law and violation of Hernandez's civil rights under federal law2 —specifically the right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from "unreasonable" seizure.3 The complaint stated: Plaintiffs further alleged Hernandez was unarmed and the shooting was "without reasonable cause."
The district court bifurcated the state and federal claims and only the federal civil rights cause of action went to trial. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the city and three of the officers, Cooper, Devee and Luna, finding these officers did not "violate George Hernandez's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him." The jury could not reach a verdict as to the fourth officer, Sanchez.
Following the trial, defense counsel moved for judgment as a matter of law in favor of Sanchez under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Based on the evidence presented at trial, the district court found Sanchez and the other officers had cause to believe Hernandez was armed, even though it turned out he was not. "Sanchez found himself in a situation that he reasonably believed would threaten his life if he did not act immediately." Therefore, the court concluded, Sanchez's "use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances." The court further found Sanchez was entitled to qualified immunity even if he had violated Hernandez's civil rights because he "reasonably could have believed his conduct was lawful under the circumstances."
Based on the jury's verdict and the Rule 50 judgment in favor of the defendants the district court declined to assume supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law negligence claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court entered a judgment in favor of the city and the four police officers. This judgment is now final.
After a final judgment was entered in the federal court plaintiffs commenced the present action against the same defendants alleging causes of action for assault and battery and negligence. The negligence cause of action was based on two theories. The first theory alleged "[t]he shooting of [Hernandez] occurred as a result of the absence of due care for the safety of others and constituted an unreasonable, unwarranted and excessive use of force, and said shooting manifested an unreasonable risk of injury to [Hernandez]." The second theory alleged that having inflicted a life-threatening injury on Hernandez defendants "intentionally and/or negligently ... failed, delayed and refrained from timely contacting or summoning medical aid [and] after said emergency medical assistance arrived, defendants knowingly and willfully prevented said assistance from being provided to [Hernandez]."
Defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds the federal court judgment and the applicable statute of limitations barred this action. They requested the trial court take judicial notice of the complaint, the judgment and the Rule 50 order in the federal court action as well as plaintiffs' tort claims filed with the city. The trial court granted this request.
As we discuss more fully below, the trial court rejected defendants' statute of limitations argument but concluded the federal court judgment barred plaintiffs' cause of action for negligence with respect to "any and all claims related to use of force and excessive force." (Italics added.) Plaintiffs interpreted this ruling to mean they could proceed on their negligence cause of action only on the theory defendants failed to timely summon medical assistance for Hernandez and interfered with the provision of such assistance once it arrived. Plaintiffs chose not to pursue their negligence cause of action solely on the theory defendants failed to provide timely medical assistance to Hernandez. Instead, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a stipulation in which plaintiffs struck and dismissed that allegation with prejudice in order to expedite plaintiffs' ability to challenge on appeal the court's ruling sustaining defendants' demurrer to the negligence cause of action based on the negligent shooting theory. The trial court approved the stipulation and ordered the complaint dismissed. Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal from the final judgment dismissing their action.5
California appellate courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether a judgment for defendants in a federal court action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (section 1983) alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment precludes a state court action for negligence against the same defendants by the same plaintiffs.6
Based on the procedural circumstances of the case before us we conclude neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel preclude plaintiffs' negligence action against the defendants on the theory defendants' negligent conduct and violation of proper police procedures in effecting Hernandez's arrest was the proximate cause of their use of deadly force against Hernandez.
Under the doctrine of res judicata a valid, final judgment on the merits precludes parties or their privies from relitigating the same "cause of action" in a subsequent suit.7 8
California law defines a "cause of action" for purposes of the res judicata doctrine by analyzing the primary right at stake: 9 10
"" 11 "`... If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged.... The reason for this is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate them in consecutive actions. Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable. [Citations.]' [Citation.]"12
California courts have disagreed over whether an action for violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures implicates the same primary right as an action for violation of the right to be free from negligent personal injury.
In Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa plaintiff filed a section 1983 action against the city and two of its police officers alleging the officers had "knowingly and without provocation or probable cause assaulted [him] and then arrested him[.]"13 The complaint also alleged a cause of action for negligence...
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