Hernandez v. City of Austin
| Decision Date | 17 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | A-14-CV-492 LY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
| Parties | PETE HERNANDEZ v. THE CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS, et al |
Before the Court are Defendants Alfonso Anderson, Jason Castillo, Peter Dennis, Daniel Doyle, Robert Escamilla, Steven Harris, Jesus Sanchez and John Sikoski's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 41), Plaintiff Pete Hernandez's Response (Dkt. No. 48), and the Defendants' Reply (Dkt. No. 51); and Defendant the City of Austin, Texas's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 42), Hernandez's Responses (Dkt. Nos. 49, 50), and the City's Reply (Dkt. No. 52). A hearing was held on the motions on August 5, 2015, at which the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs. Dkt. No. 55 (Minute Entry). Those supplements are also before the Court (Dkt. Nos. 68, 70). The undersigned submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1(h) of Appendix C ofthe Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
This action arises out of the detention of the Plaintiff, Pete Hernandez, by City of Austin police officers who were investigating a report of a stolen vehicle. Hernandez alleges that the Defendants used excessive force causing him injury, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. He alleges that the City is liable for the officers' actions, as its policies and customs regarding the use of force caused his injuries. In his responses to the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Hernandez argues that the City may also be held liable because it later ratified the officers' use of force, which Hernandez argues was "manifestly indefensible," and that it did so after an inadequate investigation.
There are two motions for summary judgment before the Court: the officers have filed one motion for all of them collectively, and the City has filed its own motion. The officers assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity, and that Hernandez's claims against them are therefore barred. They argue that any force used was objectively reasonable—that is, not excessive—and in any case not forbidden by clearly established law. For its part, the City argues that it cannot be held liable as Hernandez has failed to produce evidence that the City's policies were inadequate, it was deliberately indifferent, or that any decision or lack of training or policy was the moving force behind his injuries. Regarding Hernandez's ratification argument, the City argues that this case does not constitute an extreme factual situation where the officer's conduct was "manifestly indefensible." The City's investigation, it contends, was sufficient.
Since the motions were filed, Hernandez has filed with the Court a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of all claims against Defendants Daniel Doyle, Steven Harris, Jason Castillo and Peter Dennis, which the Court has granted. Dkt. Nos. 56, 57. The undersigned therefore will only consider the remaining claims against the City and Defendants Jesus Sanchez, John Sikoski, Alfonso Anderson, and Robert Escamilla, in its evaluation of the motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Washburn, 504 F.3d at 508. Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. Id. The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006).Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
After a careful review of the record, and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Hernandez, the basic facts of the case are as follows. On June 7, 2012, Pete Hernandez left a Walmart store through the main entrance, and walked across the "roadway" portion of the parking lot immediately adjacent to the front door. Dkt. No. 48-3 at 1. Parked in the closest parking spot across from the entrance, on the opposite side of the drive in front of the store, was an SUV. Hernandez's path took him across the drive, immediately past the front end of the SUV, where he then turned to his right and proceeded along the passenger side before turning to his left, away from the vehicle. Dkt. No. 41-1 (Attached Video from Dashboard Camera of Sgt. Sikoski) at 13:25:24 et seq. and Dkt. No. 41-4 (Attached Video from Dashboard Camera of Officer Escamilla) at 13:25:22 et seq. As he made his turn away from the vehicle, police officers standing behind and to the right of the SUV began to yell at him to "get on the ground." Dkt. No. 48-3 at 2. Hernandez then either stopped moving entirely or took a step to the side. Dkt. No. 48-1 at 5. As this happened, Officer Jesus Sanchez ran to Hernandez, left his feet, and tackled Hernandez "heads up"—that is, chest tochest. Dkt. No. 41-4 (Escamilla Video) at 13:25:30 et seq. Once Hernandez was on the ground, Officer Sanchez began to place him in handcuffs. Id. As he did so, Hernandez's left hand was laying flat on the ground out above his head. Dkt. No. 41-1 (Sikoski Video) at 13:25:44 et seq. Officer Robert Escamilla put his foot on Hernandez's hand. Id. Once Hernandez was fully handcuffed, he was loaded into the back of Officer Escamilla's police cruiser. Dkt. No. 41-4 (Escamilla Video) at 13:25:58 et seq. No one put a seatbelt on Hernandez, and he was not secured in any way. Id. With Hernandez in the back, Officer Escamilla drove his police cruiser at up to 37 miles per hour around to the other side of the Walmart. Id. After speaking with other officers there, Officer Escamilla checked in on Hernandez, who stated that he was in pain and that he was having a panic attack. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 6. Officer Escamilla then drove Hernandez back to the front of the Walmart where, after conferring with other officers, he released Hernandez from custody. Id. Officer Escamilla told Hernandez that he could speak with a supervisor if he had any complaints. Dkt. No. 41-4 (Escamilla Video) at 13:36:40 et seq. Hernandez did so, talking with an unknown supervising officer. Id. The officers then called an ambulance and Hernandez was taken to a hospital. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 6.
Hernandez, it turns out, had walked right into the middle of a crime scene. Austin Police Department Officers were investigating a report of a stolen vehicle. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 5. When Hernandez arrived, several police cruisers had converged on the vehicle, a black GMC Yukon, which was parked near the front of the Walmart. A woman was in the driver's seat, and the passenger seat was empty. Id. Officer Escamilla, who had parked his police cruiser behind the Yukon, was about to approach the vehicle to detain or arrest the occupant. Id. Sgt. Sikoski then arrived in the front of the parking lot and stopped on the curb near the Walmart entrance. Surveying the scene, Sgt.Sikoski surmised that the woman was waiting for someone to return from the store. Dkt. No. 41-1 at 5. Sgt. Sikoski saw Hernandez exit the Walmart and walk toward the Yukon. Id. As Hernandez got closer to the Yukon, Sgt. Sikoski formed the belief that Hernandez was a second suspect, and said into his radio, "grab that dude," "grab that dude," and "grab him," with increasing levels of urgency in his tone. Dkt. No. 41-1 (Sikoski Video) at 13:25:34 et. seq. Officers Escamilla and Sanchez...
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