Hernandez v. Colegio Y Noviciado Santa Maria Del Camino, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 12-2052 (PAD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | ELAINE HERNANDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COLEGIO Y NOVICIADO SANTA MARIA DEL CAMINO, INC.; et al. Defendants. |
Elaine Hernández claims her daughter, minor I.C.H., was sexually molested by another minor (E.S.L.), in the school where they were both enrolled (Docket No. 59 at ¶¶ 8-49). She sued the school (Colegio Santa María del Camino) and the school's insurer (Mapfre/PRAICO Insurance Company), alleging that the Colegio is liable for her own and for I.C.H.'s damages. Defendants have denied liability. Before the Court is Mapfre's "Motion for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 154), joined by the Colegio (Docket Nos. 158 and 159), which plaintiffs opposed (Docket Nos. 171 and 211). Defendants replied and plaintiffs sur-replied (Docket Nos. 204, 205, 229, and 242). Having considered the arguments raised in light of the record, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Hernández was a Kindergarten assistant in the Colegio. Her daughter - I.C.H. - was a pre-kinder student in the same school. Due to an ongoing construction, the pre-kinder classroom was moved to the second floor of another building that had no bathroom inside its facilities. The bathroom used by pre-kinder students was located outside the classroom facilities. Hernándezwent to that bathroom looking for her daughter, and upon entering, alleged to have seen minor E.S.L. sexually molesting her daughter (Docket No. 59 at ¶ 33). Enraged and extremely upset, she "fiercely repealed" E.S.L.'s sexual assault. Id. at ¶ 37. Employees of the Colegio intervened. Id. at ¶ 38. Minor I.C.H. was taken to the Emergency Room, Id. at ¶ 40, and days later, Hernández' employment with the Colegio was terminated. Id. at ¶ 41.
Hernández initiated this action on her own and her minor daughter's behalf, asserting that the Colegio was negligent, breached contractual obligations, and defamed her. Defendants contend the case should be summarily dismissed because (1) there is no evidence that a sexual molestation incident occurred; (2) Hernández' negligence claims are time-barred; (3) the Colegio breached no contract; and (4) there are no defamatory statements sustaining liability.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is need for trial. Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F. 2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). It is "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case in light of applicable law. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). As to issues on which the nonmovant has the burden of proof, the movant need to no morethan aver absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325; Mottolo v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, 43 F.3d 723, 725 (1st Cir. 1995). All reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d. 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2013). Careful record review reflects absence of genuine dispute as to the facts identified in the section that follows.
In 2010, Hernández was hired as a "teaching assistant" in the Colegio for the academic year running from August 2010 to June 2011. See, Docket No. 154, Exh. 1, Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion Requesting Summary Judgment ("SUMF") at ¶¶ 2 and 3. She enrolled her daughter, minor I.C.H, as a pre-kinder student at the Colegio for the same academic year. SUMF at ¶ 1.
On January 24, 2011, around 9:00 a.m., Hernández requested permission from the Kindergarten teacher to take the classroom's attendance sheet to the registrar's office. SUMF at ¶ 9. After she did so, she went to her daughter's classroom to give her a blanket. SUMF at ¶ 12. At the classroom, she was told her daughter had gone to the bathroom. SUMF at ¶ 13.
The bathroom assigned for pre-kinder students was located next to the registrar's office, and had a sign posted outside the door stating it was for the exclusive use of pre-kinder students. SUMF at ¶ 14-15, 17. Its interior was divided by three partitions. The first two were showers with curtains and the third was a toilet. The toilet stall had its own door. SUMF at ¶ 18. At the end, there was another area to the left where the sink was located. SUMF at ¶ 19. Its outside door (main door) was closed, but unlocked, when Hernández arrived and opened it. SUMF at ¶¶ 20-21.
As Hernández opened the door, she saw minor E.S.L, a 9th grade student, standing at the doorframe in front of the toilet stall. SUMF at ¶ 22. She asked him whether he was alone, to which he responded in the affirmative. See, Docket No. 211, Exh. 1, Plaintiff's "Amended Opposing Statement of Material Facts" ("OSMF") ¶ 25.1 She then saw her daughter inside the toilet stall, standing on top of the toilet, wearing a robe that covered up to her knees. Under the robe, her daughter had pants with an elastic band, but was fully clothed with a portion of the robe tucked in her pants. SUMF at ¶¶ 23, 25, 26.
Hernández saw minor E.S.L. grab the left side of his pants upward, from the hip to the waist, but could not see his underwear. SUMF at ¶¶ 28-29. She asked him "[w]hat did you do to my daughter?," he answered "I haven't done anything," Hernández "lost her mind" and, without asking her daughter if anything had happened, assaulted minor E.S.L., fiercely hitting him. SUMF at ¶¶ 33-35. At that, she grabbed E.S.L. by the neck with her right hand, smacking his head against the wall various times while punching him with the left hand. SUMF at ¶ 36. Then, she started shouting out "Viyi" (the registrar), because her office was the closest to the bathroom. SUMF at ¶ 40. Both Viyi and another employee (Carmen Zayas) entered the area, separated Hernández from minor E.S.L., and took minor I.C.H. out of the bathroom. SUMF at ¶ 41.
After regaining her composure, Hernández went to look for her daughter, found her at the social worker's office, and interrogated her. SUMF at ¶¶ 42-43. I.C.H. told her mother that nothing had happened. SUMF at ¶ 45. Hernández went out to the hallway, where her cousin and anotherteacher (Daribel) were. SUMF at ¶¶ 49 and 52. As she stepped into the hallway she saw Dinah Martínez (a Colegio employee), who looked at her and said: SUMF at ¶¶ 50 and 55; OSMF ¶ 50. Dinah also told Hernández that she had called the police because she had hit a minor and committed a crime. OSMF ¶ 50.
Hernández stayed in the Colegio's pastoral office until she was taken to talk to the police officers. SUMF ¶ 60. She has no personal knowledge of what minor I.C.H. told the police, if anything, because she was not present during the interview. SUMF ¶ 66. A police report was filed and Hernández was sent to the hospital. SUMF ¶ 67. On January 28, 2011, the Colegio informed Hernández she could not come to work until it was determined that she could return, but she was never recalled (Docket No. 164, Exh. 7).
Under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, "a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." P.R. Law Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. Plaintiffs claim the Colegio was negligent in providing reasonable care, safety, and supervision for them (Docket No. 171 at p. 17). In their view, but for that negligence, I.C.H. would not have been sexually molested by E.S.L. For that reason, plaintiffs hold the Colegio liable for their damages. Id.
Defendants counter that liability cannot be established because there is no evidence that any such molestation occurred. They point out Hernández admitted that she never saw any sexual molestation, and that I.C.H. testified that she did not recall anything happening to her. SUMF ¶¶ 30-32, 73. Plaintiffs challenge defendants argument with two documents: (1) a Resolution issuedby the Puerto Rico Juvenile Court; and (2) a "Report of Investigation on Abuse or Institutional Negligence Referrals at a School or Academy" prepared by the Puerto Rico Department of the Family (Docket Nos. 171 and 200, Exhs. 6A, 6B and 7).
The Resolution states that E.S.L. admitted to have committed lewd/lascivious acts on minor I.C.H, in that he "passed his tongue over the vagina of the injured party," who at the time was a five (5) year old. The Report concludes that the Colegio was negligent, that I.C.H. went to the bathroom unaccompanied, and that she was sexually molested by E.S.L. It includes an ad verbatim description of the incident provided by I.C.H., who according to the Report, said she was molested by minor E.S.L. Defendants object to these documents as inadmissible hearsay, and therefore, insufficient to defeat summary judgment (Docket No. 204 at pp. 5-9).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)((2) requires that the material relied on to support or dispute a fact in connection with a motion for summary judgment be admissible in evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 802 prohibits the admission of hearsay, except when otherwise made admissible by a federal statute, another rule of...
To continue reading
Request your trial