Hernandez v. Coughlin

Decision Date03 March 1994
Docket NumberD,No. 623,623
Citation18 F.3d 133
PartiesJohn HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, Commissioner, New York Department of Corrections; Joseph Pranzenica, Family Service Coordinator; and Dean Riley, Superintendent Fishkill Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 92-2292.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Howard M. Erichson, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, N.Y. (Thomas J. Moloney, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, N.Y., of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Clement J. Colucci, Assistant Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, N.Y., of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: ALTIMARI and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and OWEN, District Judge. *

ALTIMARI, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant John Hernandez appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kram, J.), dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The complaint presents a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. In the complaint, Hernandez alleges that defendants-appellees Thomas A. Coughlin, Commissioner New York Department of Corrections, Joseph Pranzenica, Family Service Coordinator, and Dean Riley, Superintendent Fishkill Correctional Facility, ("the Corrections Officials") denied him conjugal visitation rights, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. On appeal, Hernandez principally contends that the district court erred in dismissing his pro se complaint without considering the Corrections Officials' deprivation of his constitutional right to privacy in marital relations. Hernandez also claims that the district For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's judgment.

court erred in dismissing the complaint without granting leave to amend the complaint to allege that he was denied participation in a prison program in retaliation for his exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

BACKGROUND

Hernandez is an inmate in the New York State Correctional system who was convicted in 1980 in New York state court of robbery in the first degree. He was sentenced to serve eight and one-third to twenty-five years' imprisonment. At sentencing, Hernandez was classified as "Maximum Status," and was assigned to a maximum security facility. Hernandez subsequently served time at Attica, Clinton, Auburn, and Comstock Correctional Facilities, all of which are maximum security prisons. While incarcerated at Attica, Clinton, and Auburn, and while classified as "Maximum Status," Hernandez participated in a program known as the Family Reunion Program ("FRP") established at each of those facilities.

The FRP, which is governed by the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations ("NYCRR"), offers inmates extended private visits with their spouses and families. See N.Y.Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, Secs. 220.1-220.6 (1986). Generally, FRP visits take place overnight or over a weekend in a trailer within the prison facility. Hernandez participated in over thirty FRP visits while incarcerated at Attica, Clinton, and Auburn Correctional Facilities.

Hernandez was reclassified as "Medium Status" in 1986. Two years later, he was transferred to the Fishkill Correctional Facility, a medium security prison. Shortly thereafter, Hernandez applied for admission to Fishkill's FRP, filing all required papers and submitting to a medical examination. In January 1989, Hernandez was told that his application would be placed on hold pending medical clearance. He investigated the matter, and was informed that medical clearance had been granted on December 20, 1988. Hernandez wrote to defendant-appellee Pranzenica, the FRP coordinator, and sent him a copy of his medical clearance. Hernandez was subsequently notified on January 18, 1989 that his application for FRP had been denied based on the "nature of the instant offense."

In November 1990, Hernandez commenced an action pro se and proceeded in forma pauperis in the district court against the Corrections Officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, seeking restoration of FRP visitation, damages, and other relief. The complaint alleged that the Corrections Officials denied him conjugal visitation rights in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

The parties consented, under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c), to conduct all proceedings before Magistrate Judge Kathleen A. Roberts. On December 13, 1991, the Corrections Officials moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Upon Hernandez's request, Magistrate Judge Roberts extended his time to respond to the motion, but Hernandez made no response.

In a Memorandum and Order filed March 4, 1992, Magistrate Judge Roberts granted the Corrections Officials' motion and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Hernandez's claim did not implicate any constitutionally protected interest or any property or liberty interest created by state law. The district court adopted the findings and holdings of Magistrate Judge Roberts, ordered the action discontinued, and entered judgment on March 23, 1992.

Following this decision, on April 23, 1992, Hernandez filed a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The district court treated the motion as a timely notice of appeal. Thereafter, on April 29, 1992, Hernandez submitted to the district court a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, attempting to add an allegation that the Corrections Officials retaliated against him for his initial complaint and for sending the court numerous letters written by him and his family to members of Congress, corrections officials, and other state and city officials. The motion was removed from the docket Hernandez has since been transferred from Fishkill, and as of September 20, 1993, he is confined at the Mid-Orange Correctional Facility, a medium security prison.

because Hernandez was deemed to have already filed a notice of appeal, thereby transferring jurisdiction to this Court. On July 14, 1992, we dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with the scheduling order. Hernandez moved to reinstate the appeal and for appointment of counsel. The Court granted the motion on May 19, 1993.

DISCUSSION

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo. See Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d 455, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993). In reviewing a complaint for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Allen v. Westpoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir.1991). The complaint may be dismissed only where " 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). This standard is applied with even greater force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations or where the complaint is submitted pro se. See Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1015 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1943, 118 L.Ed.2d 548 (1992).

(1) Right to Marital Privacy

On appeal, Hernandez contests the district court's dismissal of his complaint and claims that the district court erred in finding that he had not stated a cognizable constitutional claim. Hernandez contends that the denial of conjugal visits deprived him of a liberty interest without due process of law. He bases this contention on the premise that there exists a fundamental right to marital privacy and conjugal visits while incarcerated. We disagree.

In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, the Supreme Court outlined two steps for the examination of procedural due process claims: "the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (citations omitted).

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Hernandez has a protected liberty interest in the right to marital privacy while imprisoned. Protected liberty interests emanate from either the Due Process Clause or the laws of the States. See id. We therefore must decide whether the alleged right to marital privacy while incarcerated arises from either the Due Process Clause or the laws of New York state.

(A) Due Process Clause

Hernandez claims a constitutionally protected right to conjugal visits in prison. He argues that a guaranteed right to marital intimacy is derived from the fundamental rights of marriage and procreation. Hernandez's understanding of these two rights is misguided.

Prison inmates do not shed all fundamental protections of the Constitution at the prison gates. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2265, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Indeed, many constitutional guarantees survive incarceration, see id., although such protections are restricted by valid penological objectives, see O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (noting deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security limit constitutional rights). Although it is clear that prisoners have a fundamental right to marry, this constitutionally protected guarantee is substantially limited...

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