Hernandez v. Dart
| Decision Date | 26 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–2493.,15–2493. |
| Parties | Jose HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Thomas J. DART, et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Patrick W. Morrissey, Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Nicholas Cummings, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, Jose Hernandez, a disabled prisoner, sued Defendants-appellees, Sheriff Thomas J. Dart and Cook County (collectively "Defendants"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. These two claims stemmed from his treatment while he was a pre-trial detainee in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC"). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of holding that Hernandez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires. We hold that Hernandez did indeed exhaust his remedies and remand the case so that its merits may be heard.
An April 22, 2012, car accident essentially rendered Hernandez a quadriplegic. He has no use of his legs and limited use of his arms; importantly, he cannot write. The passenger in Hernandez's car died as a result of the crash. Hernandez was driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the accident, and was convicted in May 2014 of aggravated driving under the influence involving an accident causing death. Law enforcement did not take him into custody for his role in the accident until March 9, 2013. On that day, Hernandez was hospitalized at Thorek Memorial Hospital for treatment of pressure wounds
that had developed during his stay at a nursing home.
Under Cook County Sheriff's Office policy, correctional officers must shackle one hand and one foot of a hospitalized pre-trial detainee to his or her hospital bed. Additionally, two armed correctional officers must guard the detainee at all times. When Hernandez came into custody at Thorek on March 9, he was duly shackled and guarded. This continued when the CCDOC briefly transferred Hernandez to Cook County Jail on March 14. He was specifically sent to the facility of Cermak Health Services ("Cermak"), the on-site health care provider at Cook County Jail. That same day, Cermak personnel decided to transfer Hernandez to Stroger Hospital, where he remained from March 14, 2013, to April 18, 2013; the shackling continued. Hernandez claims that the shackling stunted his recovery: the doctors had instructed him to move every two hours to help his sores heal, but he was unable to do so while shackled to the bed. Hernandez orally complained about the shackling to correctional and hospital personnel, but the condition remained.
There is a CCDOC Inmate Information Handbook (the "Handbook") that enumerates the CCDOC's grievance process. CCDOC relief workers visited Hernandez periodically while he was hospitalized, but never gave him the Handbook or told him about the grievance process. He states that he learned about the process from other Cook County Jail inmates after his discharge from Stroger on April 18.
According to CCDOC policy, an inmate must file a written grievance within fifteen days of the alleged incident. Written grievance forms are available in all living units throughout the jail, and an inmate can obtain a form from a CCDOC relief worker or other jail personnel upon request. Once the inmate has received the response to his grievance from the relevant party (for example, the CCDOC or Cermak), the inmate has fourteen days to appeal the decision.
Hernandez never filed a written grievance regarding his shackling at Thorek, Cermak, and Stroger. After discharge from Stroger on April 18, he entered the jail general population. While at the jail, he complained about the medical care that he was receiving. Unable to write, he had fellow inmates assist him in writing and filing various grievances.
One of these written grievances is relevant to this appeal. On August 3, 2013, Hernandez filed a grievance stating that Cermak nursing staff refused to help him move between his geriatric, or "jerry," chair in his room and his bed. His grievance states that the incident in question occurred on August 2, 2013. Inability to move between the chair and the bed would cause pressure sores to worsen, and Hernandez could not move without assistance. The Nurse Manager for Cermak responded to Hernandez's grievance, saying that Cermak staff had assisted Hernandez "in getting ready (washed up, dressed, and transfer [red] [between the jerry chair and the bed] )." Hernandez received this response on September 11, 2013, and appealed on September 17, 2013.
On February 19, 2014, Hernandez filed this suit in federal district court. Hernandez amended his complaint multiple times, and presently asserts two claims: (1) excessive force arising from his shackling while at Thorek, Cermak, and Stroger; (2) deliberate indifference to his medical needs for failing to help him move between his jerry chair and his bed on August 2, 2013.
On December 30, 2014, Defendants moved for summary judgment only on the issue of exhaustion. Pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir.2008)
, the district court ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine if Hernandez had exhausted his administrative remedies. The hearing was on June 18, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court stated that Hernandez's oral complaints about the shackling constituted a proper grievance, but ultimately held that Hernandez had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, orally dismissing the case without prejudice. The corresponding docket entry, dated July 2, 2014, states that Hernandez had "failed to exhaust administrative remedies," that his claim was dismissed without prejudice, and that the case was "terminated."
We disagree with the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants for failure to exhaust, and hold that the district court should hear both of Hernandez's claims on the merits. First, regarding the excessive force claim, the grievance process was unavailable to Hernandez during the relevant period. This lifts the PLRA exhaustion requirement entirely and provides immediate entry into federal court. Second, regarding the deliberate indifference claim, Hernandez followed the CCDOC grievance process, and therefore properly exhausted his administrative remedies under the PLRA. Both claims are properly in federal court.
We review dismissals for failure to exhaust administrative remedies de novo. E.g., Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1098–99 (7th Cir.2013)
(citations omitted). "Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense," and Defendants have the burden of proof. King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir.2015) (). Further, at the summary judgment phase, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Hernandez. Rahn v. Bd. of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir.2015) (citation omitted); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). Here, Defendants have failed to produce evidence that Hernandez did not exhaust his administrative remedies.
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that because the district court dismissed Hernandez's claims without prejudice, its order was not final and we have no jurisdiction over the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(). Defendants are correct in a general sense, because "[n]ormally, a dismissal without prejudice is not a final order for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Kaba, 458 F.3d at 680 (citing Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir.2003) ).
But this general rule does not apply in this case. Instead, we deem the district court's dismissal without prejudice to be final for the purposes of § 1291
jurisdiction. There are two grounds for finality. First, it would be impossible at this point for Hernandez to exhaust his administrative remedies and thereafter amend his complaint. See Hoskins, 320 F.3d at 763 (). The inability to amend is particularly meaningful in dismissals for failure to exhaust, where timeliness under respective agency procedure is so critical. See Kaba, 458 F.3d at 680 (). The incidents of which Hernandez complained in this case occurred in 2013 and required a written grievance within fifteen days. Those respective deadlines have long since passed, such that an amendment would be unavailing and would not resolve the problem.
Second, there are multiple indicia that the district court was finished with the case. See Taylor–Holmes v. Office of Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 503 F.3d 607, 609–10 (7th Cir.2007)
(quoting Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Moore, 446 F.3d 725, 726 (7th Cir.2006) ) (other citations omitted) (where there are indicia that the district court is " ‘finished with the case,’ " a dismissal without prejudice will "end[ ] the suit so far as the district court is concerned"). The true test for determining finality under 28 U.S.C. § 1291"is not the adequacy of the judgment[,] but whether the district court has finished with the case." Moore, 446 F.3d at 726 ; see also...
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