Hernandez v. Hill, 1:11-CV-00857 LJO GSA HC
Decision Date | 29 February 2012 |
Docket Number | 1:11-CV-00857 LJO GSA HC |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Parties | JOSE HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. RICK HILL, Warden, Respondent. |
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by jury trial on February 23, 2009, of: second degree murder; gross vehicular manslaughter; driving under the influence causing great bodily injury; driving under the influence with a blood-alcohol content over 0.08 percent causing great bodily injury; engaging in a speed contest causing bodily injury; willful cruelty to a child; and driving on a suspended or revoked license with a prior conviction. (CT1 693-694, 899.) The jury also determined that Petitioner had suffered several prior DUI convictions. (CT 713-714.) On May 12, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to anindeterminate prison term of fifteen years to life on the gross vehicular manslaughter count; sentences on all other counts were stayed. (CT 899.)
Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On July 2, 2010, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District ("Fifth DCA"), affirmed the judgment. (See Lodged Doc. No. 4.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (See Lodged Doc. No. 5.) On September 15, 2010, the petition was summarily denied. (See Lodged Doc. No. 6.)
On March 10, 2011, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition. He presents three (3) grounds for relief: 1) The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Cal. Penal Code § 191.5(d); 2) The trial court erred in failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding prior drunk driving convictions; and 3) The evidence was insufficient to prove causation. On September 16, 2011, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Petitioner did not file a traverse.
(See Lodged Doc. No. 4.)
Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or lawsor treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) ( ). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.
Under the AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is barred unless a petitioner can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct 770, 784, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principlesset forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id. In addition, the Supreme Court decision must "'squarely address [] the issue in th[e] case' or establish a legal principle that 'clearly extend[s]' to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in . . . recent decisions"; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of review under AEDPA. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir.2009), quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008); see Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). If no clearly established Federal law exists, the inquiry is at an end and the Court must defer to the state court's decision. Carey, 549 U.S. 70; Wright, 552 U.S. at 126; Moses, ...
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