Hernandez v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 01 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 11-72286,11-72286
• Citation: 831 F.3d 1127
• Parties: Javier Arellano Hernandez, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

831 F.3d 1127

Javier Arellano Hernandez, Petitioner,

v.Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 11-72286

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2016, San Francisco, California

Filed August 1, 2016

John Gore (argued), Jones Day, Washington, D.C.; Beong-Soo Kim, Jones Day, Los Angeles, California; for Petitioner.

Don Scroggin (argued) and Sarah Maloney, Attorneys; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Mary M. Schroeder, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH

, Circuit Judge:

Javier Arellano Hernandez's conviction for attempted criminal threats, pursuant to California Penal Code sections 422

and 664, constitutes an aggravated felony for which he is removable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). First, attempted criminal threats is categorically a crime of violence as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Second, the California superior court designated the conviction as a felony and imposed a sentence of “at least one year.”

I.

In 1967, Arellano Hernandez entered the United States with his parents as a legal permanent resident. In March 2009, Arellano Hernandez pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to six days' imprisonment. In September 2009, a jury convicted him of three separate crimes: (1) attempted criminal threats, a felony in violation of California Penal Code sections 422

and 664 ; (2) simple assault, a misdemeanor in violation of California Penal Code section 240 ; and (3) false imprisonment, a misdemeanor in violation of California Penal Code section 236. The superior court imposed a suspended sentence for attempted criminal threats and placed Arellano Hernandez on probation for a period of three years with certain terms and conditions, including 365 days in jail. The court stayed sentencing the misdemeanor counts of simple assault and false imprisonment pending Arellano Hernandez's probation.

As a result of these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) began removal proceedings and issued a Notice to Appear. DHS alleged that Arellano Hernandez was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (U)

, because of his March 2009 drug paraphernalia conviction and his September 2009 attempted criminal threats conviction.

At a hearing before the immigration judge (“IJ”), Arellano Hernandez conceded removability based on the drug paraphernalia conviction. However, Arellano Hernandez contested whether his criminal threats conviction constituted an aggravated felony; therefore he requested cancellation of removal.¹ The IJ ultimately concluded that Arellano Hernandez was sentenced to 365 days in jail for the attempted criminal threats conviction. Thus, Arellano Hernandez had been convicted of a crime of violence and an aggravated felony.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ's conclusion that Arellano Hernandez was convicted of a crime of violence and an aggravated felony. Arellano Hernandez was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal.

II.

In its decision, the BIA reviewed the IJ's findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo. Where the BIA conducts de novo review of the IJ's decision, we limit our review to the BIA's decision, except to the extent that the BIA expressly adopted the IJ's decision. Hosseini v. Gonzales , 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)

. However, where the BIA conducts a clear error review, it relies “upon the IJ's opinion as a statement of reasons”; therefore, we can “look to the IJ's oral decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA's conclusion.” Tekle v. Mukasey , 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kozulin v. INS , 218 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) ). “In so doing, we review here the reasons explicitly identified by the BIA, and then examine the reasoning articulated in the IJ's oral decision in support of those reasons.” Id.

We review de novo whether a particular conviction under state law is a removable offense. Coronado – Durazo v. INS , 123 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1997)

. We defer to the BIA's interpretation of its own regulation when that interpretation “is neither clearly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation[ ].” Singh

–

Bhathal v. INS , 170 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 1999). “We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings.” Simeonov v. Ashcroft , 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Zehatye v. Gonzales , 453 F.3d 1182, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2006).

III.

Arellano Hernandez argues that his conviction under California Penal Code sections 422

and 664 is not an aggravated felony or a crime of violence. We disagree. We affirm our prior precedent, which held that a conviction under sections 422 and 664 is categorically a crime of violence. Further, because the superior court designated Arellano Hernandez's conviction as a felony and sentenced him to 365 days in jail, his conviction is also an aggravated felony.

A.

A “crime of violence” includes any “offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)

. California Penal Code section 422(a) (2009) provides:

Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.

In our prior precedent regarding section 422

, we have held that a conviction under this statute is a crime of violence. See, e.g. , United States v. Villavicencio-Burruel , 608 F.3d 556, 563 (9th Cir. 2010) ; Rosales

–

Rosales v. Ashcroft , 347 F.3d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 2003). In Villavicencio

–

Burruel, we concluded that, based on the plain language of the statute, “section 422's elements necessarily include a threatened use of physical force ‘capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.’ ” 608 F.3d at 562 (quoting Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133, 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) ). Arellano Hernandez challenges the validity of this holding in light of (1) other California criminal threat statutes, which are not crimes of violence; (2) Fourth and Fifth Circuit law, concluding section 422 is not a crime of violence; and (3) our recent case Dimaya v. Lynch , 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). None of these arguments provide a basis for us to overturn our prior precedent.

First, neither of the other California criminal threat statutes, California Penal Code sections 69²

or 71,³ are analogous to section 422. As we have previously recognized, neither section 69 nor section 71 include the elements of a threatened use of physical force. See

Flores

–

Lopez v. Holder , 685 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) ; Bautista

–

Magallon v. Holder , 584 Fed.Appx. 300, 301 (9th Cir. 2014).

Second, contrary decisions of our sister circuits have no effect on our jurisprudence. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits reasoned that section 422

does not qualify categorically as a crime of violence under the element test, because one could threaten to poison another, which is not (under their precedent) “force,” and therefore not a crime of violence. See

United States v. Torres

–

Miguel , 701 F.3d 165, 168–69 (4th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Cruz

–

Rodriguez , 625 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 2010). However, this reasoning has been rejected by the Supreme Court. United States v. Castleman , –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1415, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014) (“The ‘use of force’ ... is not the act of ‘sprinkling’ the poison; it is the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm. That the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch), does not matter.” (alteration omitted)); see also

United States v. De La Fuente , 353 F.3d 766, 770–71 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a threat of anthrax poisoning constituted a “threatened use of physical force” because the defendant's “letters clearly threatened death by way of physical contact with anthrax spores”). Further Villavicencio

–

Burruel remains the law of this circuit. Absent intervening higher authority, “a three-judge panel may not overrule a prior decision of the court.” Miller v. Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Finally, Dimaya

does not compel a different conclusion. In Dimaya, we concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)'s definition of “crime of violence” was void for vagueness as it related to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).⁴ 803 F.3d at 1120 (citing Johnson v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2558, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) ); see also

United States v. Hernandez

–

Lara , 817 F.3d 651, 652 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). However, Dimaya did not “cast any doubt on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)

's definition of a crime of violence.” 803 F.3d at 1120 n.17. Arellano Hernandez does not challenge the constitutionality of § 16(a). Thus, applying our precedent, section 422 is categorically a crime of violence.

The “attempt” portion of Arellano Hernandez's conviction does not alter our determination that the conviction is a crime of violence. We have “generally found attempts to commit crimes of violence, enumerated or not, to...