Hernandez v. Pederio
| Decision Date | 18 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16-cv-00027-DAD-SKO (PC) |
| Parties | ANGEL HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. PEDERIO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE/INABILITY TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM
(Doc. 14)
(Doc. 13)
Plaintiff, Angel Hernandez, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on January 8, 2016. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint was screened and dismissed with leave to amend. (Doc. 10.) When Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within the time provided, an order to show cause issued for Plaintiff to explain why this action should not be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to obey the Court's order and to state a claim. (Doc. 13.) On April 24, 2017, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, which is before the Court for screening. (Doc. 14.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims, despite having previously been given the requisite pleading and legal standards for his claims. Thus, this action should be dismissed with prejudice and further leave to amend need not be extended since futile.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff's allegations in the First Amended Complaint are evaluated as to whether they set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff's factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
While "plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ," Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff's allegations are evaluated by whether alleged facts demonstrate the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant's actions or omissions and a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff's allegations must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
/ / /
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) in Delano, California, but complains of events that occurred while he was held as a pretrial detainee at the Kings County Jail ("KCJ") in Hanford, California. Plaintiff names KCJ Commander, Kimberly Pedreiro; Assistant Sheriff, Robert Jack Thayer; Sergeant S. Henderson; the Kings County Board of Supervisors; and Kings County Superior Court Judge Donna Tarter as Defendants in this action.
Plaintiff alleges that, on April 30, 2014, Sgt. Henderson placed Plaintiff in Administrative Segregation ("Ad-Seg") at KCJ. Plaintiff asked why and Sgt. Henderson told him it was done at CMDR Pedreio's direction. Plaintiff ended up being held in KCJ's Ad-Seg for twenty-eight months, despite filing numerous grievances protesting that he was placed in Ad-Seg without notice and a hearing. Plaintiff alleges that, since he was placed in Ad-Seg without notice and a hearing, his rights to due process, free speech, freedom of association, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment were violated.
Despite having been informed that many of his allegations and claims were not capable of being corrected to state cognizable claims, Plaintiff persists in asserting the same litany of claims. He has made little, if any, changes to his factual allegations, and none of his claims are cognizable. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff is unable to correct the deficiencies in his pleading and the action should be dismissed without extending further leave to amend. Further, Plaintiff's allegations challenging his gang classification at KCJ need not be considered since no such allegations were stated in his original Complaint and including them in the First Amended Complaint exceeds the leave to amend Plaintiff was granted. (See Doc. 10, p. 15 ().)
/ / /
/ / /
/ /
/ /
//
1. Due Process
The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Id. The Due Process Clause does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more adverse conditions of confinement, and under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the condition of confinement at issue. Id. at 221-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir.1986). With respect to placement in administrative segregation, due process requires only that prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons for considering segregation, and allow the prisoner to present his views. Id., 801 F.2d at 1100-01 (quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds, Sandin v. Conne...
To continue reading
Request your trial