Hernandez v. State

Citation180 So.3d 978
Decision Date17 September 2015
Docket NumberSC13–2330.,Nos. SC13–718,s. SC13–718
Parties Michael A. HERNANDEZ, JR., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Michael A. Hernandez, Jr., Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Curtis Mitchell French, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Michael A. Hernandez, Jr., appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the order denying postconviction relief and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Michael A. Hernandez, Jr., age twenty-three at the time of the crime, was convicted of the November 18, 2004, first-degree murder of Ruth Everett ("Everett") in Milton, Florida. Hernandez and a friend, Christopher Shawn Arnold, went to the home of Everett and her son David Everett, also known as "Snapper," from whom Arnold sometimes obtained drugs. Arnold and Hernandez went there looking for crack cocaine. When Everett answered the door and told them that her son was not home, Hernandez grabbed her and forced her into the house. Once Hernandez and Arnold were inside, Arnold demanded money and then went looking around the house for drugs. He returned, however, with a pillow, which he put over Everett's face in an attempt to smother her while Hernandez held her. During the struggle or thereafter she suffered a broken neck. Arnold left the house with the victim's purse and Hernandez then stabbed her in the neck. Hernandez returned to the car with blood on his clothes, and he and Arnold drove away. They used her ATM card several times to withdraw money which they used to buy crack cocaine.

The evidence presented at trial showed that Hernandez's former stepfather Richard Hartman, Sr., his wife Tammy Hartman, and Arnold's girlfriend Michelle Rose, who is Tammy Hartman's daughter, were told by Arnold about the murder. Richard and Tammy then went to Hernandez's home and confronted him.1 Subsequently, both Arnold and Hernandez turned themselves in to police and gave statements. Hernandez was indicted for one count of first-degree premeditated or felony murder while carrying a knife and one count of robbery with a deadly weapon. He was later also charged with burglary with an assault or battery. Arnold, who was also charged, entered a plea and received a sentence of life in prison and Hernandez proceeded to trial. At trial, the medical examiner testified that Everett died from the combined effects of blunt and sharp force injuries to the neck, and that either the broken neck with laceration of the spinal cord

or the slash through her neck could have been fatal, but also could have been survivable if medical help had been summoned. Hernandez was convicted on February 6, 2007, of all three counts.

At the penalty phase proceeding, the defense called two family members and two mental health experts to present evidence in mitigation, including statutory mental health mitigation. The State presented evidence of statutory aggravation and also presented its own expert, Dr. Harry McClaren, who disagreed that statutory mental health mitigation was present. The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one and a Spencer2 hearing was held before sentencing. On March 22, 2007, the trial court entered an order sentencing Hernandez to death, finding four aggravating circumstances and giving each great weight, as follows: (1) the defendant was convicted of prior violent felonies (§ 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007) ); (2) the murder was committed during a robbery with a deadly weapon and a burglary of an occupied dwelling with an assault or battery while armed with a dangerous weapon (§ 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007) ); (3) the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest (§ 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2007) ); and (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (§ 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2007) ). The trial court rejected the statutory mental health mitigators that the murder was committed while Hernandez was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2007) ), and that Hernandez's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired (section 921.141(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2007) ). The trial court did find the statutory mitigator of lack of significant criminal history and gave it some weight. See § 921.141(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). The trial court also found nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, which were given varying degrees of weight.3 See § 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2007).

On direct appeal, Hernandez raised eight claims,4 and this Court also decided sufficiency of the evidence and proportionality. We affirmed in Hernandez v. State, 4 So.3d 642 (Fla.2009), and in the opinion, we recounted Hernandez's statement given to law enforcement shortly after the murder as follows:

According to Hernandez's statements, the following events occurred on November 18 and 19, 2004. Hernandez left his house at 8:30 a.m. on November 18 to go to work, but he and [Shawn] Arnold instead "went to a crack friend's house and got some crack ... with the gas money and cigarette money [Hernandez] had for the day." Although he had used crack before moving to Florida, Hernandez had not used it since moving to Florida. They were "doing crack," and Arnold suggested going to the house of "Snapper," an individual whom Arnold knew. Arnold had done cocaine with "Snapper" before, but Hernandez did not know him. Arnold told him "he was going to try and get some money." Hernandez and Arnold drove to "Snapper's" house in Arnold's car. They went to the door and spoke with an "old lady" at the house. Arnold told Hernandez to "grab her," and Hernandez grabbed the lady by the mouth and pulled her into the house. Hernandez "got her quiet" and told her, "shh, calm down, calm down. We ain't going to hurt you." The lady sat down in a chair. Arnold told the lady that "Snapper" owed him $300 and that Arnold had a gun put to his head over this money. Arnold had made up this story. Arnold told her that they would try to get the money from her and that they would leave her son alone if they got the money. The lady told them that all she had was $20. Arnold said, "All right," and then asked to use the bathroom and came back with a pillow. Arnold stuck the pillow over the lady's face while she was still in the chair. Arnold told Hernandez to grab the lady's hands, and Hernandez did. Hernandez and Arnold were "suffocating her" and she was "struggling." While Hernandez and Arnold were "choking her," "she stopped moving for a minute." Hernandez said the following then occurred: "And we let her up and tried to drag her over to the couch and lay her down. And she drops, and I go to grab her, and I grab her head. And her head cracked. And Shawn helped me get her on the couch. And I ... got the knife from him and cut her neck.... After she was dead." Hernandez had grabbed Arnold's pocket knife before entering the house and had used it to "chop up a crack block earlier." Hernandez said he did not know why he cut the lady's neck.

Hernandez, 4 So.3d at 649–50. In affirming, the majority of the Court found that the claims were without merit, the evidence was sufficient, and the sentence was proportionate.5 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hernandez v. Florida, 558 U.S. 860, 130 S.Ct. 160, 175 L.Ed.2d 101 (2009).

Postconviction Proceedings

Hernandez filed his initial motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 in September 2010 in the circuit court of Santa Rosa County. The motion alleged ineffective assistance of lead trial counsel Ted Stokes and lead penalty phase counsel Michael Rollo.6 The motion also alleged a Brady /Giglio

claim.7

A case management conference was held on February 25, 2011, and the circuit court entered an order granting an evidentiary hearing on most of the subclaims raised in claim one of the motion and on the Brady claim raised in claim two of the motion. The claims raised in claim one, subclaims A and G, and the Giglio claim raised in claim two were denied by the court without an evidentiary hearing. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing in four different sessions, on January 9–13, 2012; May 25, 2012; July 16, 2012; and July 25, 2012, and denied postconviction relief on all claims in an order entered on March 28, 2013. Thus, the court denied the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Conviction and Sentence in its entirety, although not all of those claims have been appealed here. Because most of the postconviction claims contend that trial counsel was ineffective in representation of Hernandez in either the guilt phase or the penalty phase, the standard of review for those claims is set forth next.

Standard of Review for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), two requirements must be satisfied to establish ineffective assistance of counsel:

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
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