Herndon v. UAW Local No. 3

• Decision Date: 07 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 1,Docket No. 18425,1
• Citation: 56 Mich.App. 435,224 N.W.2d 334
• Parties: , 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2563, 76 Lab.Cas. P 53,595 George HERNDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UAW LOCAL NO. 3 et al., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 334

224 N.W.2d 334

56 Mich.App. 435, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2563,

76 Lab.Cas. P 53,595

George HERNDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UAW LOCAL NO. 3 et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 18425.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

Nov. 7, 1974.

Released for Publication Dec. 30, 1974.

Leave to Appeal Denied Feb. 12, 1975.

Lawrence S. Katkowsky, Schurgin, Katkowsky & Rosenberg, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph M. Rubin, Royal Oak, for UAW Local 3.

William M. Mazey, Detroit, for Hopkins.

John J. Lynch, Vandeveer, Garzia, Tonkin, Kerr & Heaphy, P.C., Detroit, for Int. Union.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and J. H. GILLIS and VanVALKENBURG,* JJ.

VanVALKENBURG, Judge.

It is undisputed that plaintiff was assaulted by defendant Calvin Hopkins, chief union steward at the Huber Avenue foundry of the Chrysler Corporation. The assault took place in Hopkins' office at said plant while plaintiff was in the office for the purpose of filing a grievance. Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action for assault against Hopkins personally and against both defendant plant UAW local and the international UAW on the theory of Respondeat superior. All three defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The trial court granted each defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff now appeals as of right.

As to defendant Hopkins, the trial court held that Hopkins and plaintiff were both employees of Chrysler Corporation and thus the sole avenue of recovery with respect to Hopkins personal liability was the exclusive remedy provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. ¹ The sole question on appeal with respect to Hopkins is thus whether a union steward, while performing his duty of processing grievances, is a 'natural person in the same employ' within the meaning of M.C.L.A. § 418.827(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(827)(1).

The labor-management agreement between Chrysler and the UAW provides that the employees in each district shall be represented by a chief steward 'who shall be a regular employee having seniority and working in the district'. The agreement further provides that the chief steward shall be paid by Chrysler, shall be provided with an office by Chrysler and shall be subject to the supervision of the foreman of any department he enters.

It is well settled that M.C.L.A. § 418.827(1), Supra, exempts from liability all fellow employees carrying on the activities of the employer, regardless of what those activities may be. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. DeShone, 384 Mich. 686, 187 N.W.2d 215 (1971). Plaintiff however argues that since Hopkins' function was to process grievances, Hopkins was not carrying on the activities of Chrysler and thus was not a natural person in the same employ within the meaning of M.C.L.A. § 418.827(1), Supra.

We feel that plaintiff has placed an unnecessarily restrictive definition upon what is meant by the concept of carrying on the activities of the employer. While in the narrow sense the processing of grievances can be viewed as being contrary to the carrying on of the activities of the employer, the better rationale would be to view the processing of grievances as being an integral part of the labor-management process. Clearly, viewed in this light, the processing of grievances by a chief union steward is an activity which is in the interest of the employer in that it provides a method by which labor-management disputes can be resolved in an orderly fashion. Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that Hopkins' activities in processing grievances were activities carried on on behalf of Chrysler. It follows that plaintiff and Hopkins were natural persons in the same employ; and thus, plaintiff is precluded from bringing this action against Hopkins personally.

As to defendant local union and defendant international union, it should be noted that plaintiff's claim against them is premised upon the assertion that Hopkins was at the time of the assault acting as an agent of both the local and international union and that he was acting within the scope of his duties. Both unions argue that the assault, as a matter of law, was beyond the scope of Hopkins' agency and thus they are not liable under the doctrine of Respondeat superior.

Both unions cite ample...