Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 71303,71303
• Citation: 172 Ill.Dec. 200,149 Ill.2d 190,595 N.E.2d 561
• Parties: , 172 Ill.Dec. 200 Gerard HERNON, Appellee, v. E.W. CORRIGAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 561

595 N.E.2d 561 149 Ill.2d 190, 172 Ill.Dec. 200 Gerard HERNON, Appellee,
v.
E.W. CORRIGAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant. No. 71303. Supreme Court of Illinois.
June 9, 1992.

[149 Ill.2d 191] Schaffenegger, Watson & Peterson, Ltd., Laughlin, Cunningham, Hare & Fanone, Chicago [149 Ill.2d 192] (Donald G. Peterson, John J. Piegore, and Anthony V. Fanone, of counsel), for appellant.

Hilfman & Fogel, P.C., Chicago (Louis Hilfman and John M. Kovac, of counsel), for appellee.

Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:

This interlocutory appeal involves the following certified question:

"If an action is based upon tort for an act or omission in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, is the cause of action for bodily injury which is pled either under common law negligence or the Structural Work Act but not filed within two years after the cause of action accrued barred by [section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure]?"

On April 21, 1989, the plaintiff, Gerard Hernon, filed his two-count, first-amended complaint in the circuit court of Du Page County adding E.W. Corrigan Construction Company as a party defendant. Plaintiff, a construction worker, sought to recover damages for personal injuries he suffered on July 29, 1986, when he fell while attempting to descend from a roof at a construction site. Count I of his amended complaint alleged a violation of the Illinois Structural Work Act, whereas count II alleged negligence on the part of defendant Corrigan. Initially, on March 8, 1990, the circuit court dismissed defendant Corrigan because the first-amended complaint adding Corrigan was not filed within the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 13-202.) Plaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of Corrigan, arguing that the four-year statute of limitations for acts or omissions relating to construction applied. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 13-214(a).

[149 Ill.2d 193] On June 19, 1990, the circuit court vacated its March 8 order dismissing Corrigan from the action, and held that the four-year statute of limitations as set out in section 13-214(a) applied rather than the two-year statute of limitations set out in section 13-[172 Ill.Dec. 201] 202.

Page 562

Subsequently, defendant Corrigan moved the circuit court to certify a question of law under Supreme Court Rule 308 for interlocutory appeal to the appellate court. The circuit court agreed, certifying the above question. The appellate court denied defendant Corrigan's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 308 (134 Ill.2d R. 308). We, however, granted Corrigan's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315).

As the question certified by the circuit court indicates, the central issue in this case is whether the two-year personal injury statute of limitations or the four-year building construction statute of limitations applies to plaintiff's cause of action. We hold, as the circuit court did, that the four-year building construction statute of limitations governs plaintiff's cause.

Section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

"Personal Injury--Penalty. Actions for damages for an injury to the person, or for false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, * * * shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of action accrued * * *." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 13-202.

Section 13-214 of the Code reads, in part:

"Construction--Design management and supervision. As used in this Section 'person' means any individual, any business or legal entity, or any body politic.

(a) Actions based upon tort, contract or otherwise against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property shall be commenced within 4 years from the time the person bringing an action, or his or her [149 Ill.2d 194] privity, knew or should reasonably have known of such act or omission. * * *

(b) No action based upon tort, contract or otherwise may be brought against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property after 10 years have elapsed from the time of such act or omission." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, pars. 13-214(a), (b).)

Subsection (a) of 13-214 is the limitations portion of the statute, whereas subsection (b) of 13-214 is commonly known as the repose portion of the statute.

After a cursory review of the limitations statutes involved in this appeal, it is apparent that a persuasive argument...