Herold v. State
Decision Date | 02 September 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 706,706 |
Citation | 449 A.2d 429,52 Md.App. 295 |
Parties | Ralph Jay HEROLD v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Peter Engel, Baltimore, and Stephen L. Snyder, Pikesville, for appellant.
Stephen B. Caplis, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen. of Md., Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Atty. for Baltimore County, and Scott Smith, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore County, on the brief, for appellee.
Submitted before MOORE, LISS and WEANT, JJ.
This is an appeal from a revocation of probation and reimposition of a suspended two-year sentence. Appellant had been ordered to "attend a mental health program" and did so but was terminated as "unsatisfactory." We shall remand without affirmance or reversal, for such further proceedings as may be deemed appropriate in conformity with this opinion.
Ralph Jay Herold, appellant, was charged in April 1980 with assault and battery and a fourth degree sexual offense. The complainant was the 20-year-old daughter of a woman living with appellant, then 31, divorced, and disabled by the loss of his right leg. On June 30, 1980, at a bench trial on an agreed statement of facts, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found appellant guilty of battery. Disposition was deferred pending a presentence investigation.
The presentence investigation report, completed on August 4, 1980, stated in its "Evaluation and Recommendation":
The report of the court psychiatrist, James E. Smith, II, M.D., was submitted to the sentencing judge on September 8, 1980. The "Summary" was as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
On October 10, 1980, appellant received a two-year suspended sentence and was placed on supervised probation for three years. The special conditions of probation were that (1) he make restitution of $87 to the victim through the Probation Department, and (2) he "must attend a mental health program."
The probation agent's "Evaluation and Recommendation" in the above report was as follows:
The violation cited by Mr. Goldman was:
"By being terminated from a Mental Health Program in an unsatisfactory status."
Judge Hormes signed a warrant on the date of Mr. Goldman's report, and it was served upon appellant on May 12, 1981. Thereafter, it appears, appellant's counsel made arrangements for an evaluation of the appellant by David L. Shapiro, Ph.D., a certified psychologist. After seeing appellant, Dr. Shapiro wrote a letter dated May 22, 1981, to appellant's counsel, expressing his willingness to treat Mr. Herold as an outpatient "for intensive psychotherapy" on the following conditions:
"1. If, in my opinion, his condition deteriorates, or he becomes a danger to himself or to others, I will hospitalize him.
2. If Mr. Herrold [sic] refuses to go along with my recommendation for inpatient treatment under such circumstances, it will be considered a violation of his probation.
3. I will keep the court informed of any changes in Mr. Herrold's treatment status, including any failure to adhere to the treatment plan outlined, or any resistance on his part to a recommendation for inpatient treatment if such becomes necessary."
At a probation revocation hearing on June 1, 1981, appellant waived his right to have his probation officer present. The latter was on vacation and appellant, after almost three weeks of incarceration--never having been incarcerated before--was anxious to obtain an "expeditious hearing." His counsel proffered that appellant was willing to see Dr. Shapiro on his terms, that appellant's mother, who was present in court, would help him to "straighten himself out," and that the real problem was appellant's inability to get along with Dr. Turek. "With all due respect to Dr. Turek," counsel stated, "there are times when a person does not click with that particular therapist for whatever reason."
The court reimposed the suspended two-year sentence, remarking:
(Emphasis added.)
The court thereafter rejected a plea from counsel that it be made a condition of appellant's continued probation that he be hospitalized by Dr. Shapiro if "his condition deteriorates and he becomes a danger." The court stated:
On appeal, Mr. Herold contends that he was denied due process and that the lower court abused its discretion. In the presentation of these claims, he raises essentially two questions:
1. Was appellant denied due process of law because the revocation was based on his mental condition and his failure to achieve mental stability, and not upon a violation of a condition of probation?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in revoking probation because: a) revocation was based on appellant's mental condition or failure to achieve mental stability; b) appellant did not violate any express condition of probation; c) a less stringent and more appropriate alternative was available?
Probation in Maryland is defined as the conditional exemption from imprisonment allowed any prisoner by suspension of sentence. Md.Ann.Code, Art. 41 § 107(f) (1978 Repl.Vol.). The conditions of probation "shall be determined solely" by the judge granting it, id., and any condition may be modified or revoked as the court deems proper. Art. 27 § 641A (1982 Repl.Vol.). Probation is a matter of grace, not entitlement, which permits the wrongdoer to keep his freedom "as long as he conducts himself in a manner consonant with established communal standards and the safety of society." Kaylor v. State, 285 Md. 66, 75, 400 A.2d 419 (1979), quoting Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208 A.2d 575 (1965). The probationer (or parolee) has a right to continuance of his probation absent any violation, and this...
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