Heron v. Medrite Testing, LLC

Decision Date25 April 2022
Docket Number21 Civ 09471 (CM)
PartiesMALIKA HERON, Plaintiff, v. MEDRITE TESTING, LLC, CHRISTOPHER SCHRIER, and JANE DOE, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

McMahon, J.

In this action, Plaintiff Malika Heron sues her former employer Medrite Testing, LLC, and Christopher Schrier (together Defendants), alleging that she was fired in retaliation for exercising her rights as guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (the “NYSHRL”); and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. (the “NYCHRL”). Plaintiff seeks an award of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. See First Amended Complaint Dkt. No. 16, filed January 10, 2022.

Defendants move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim up which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND
A. Parties

Plaintiff Malika Heron is a twenty-year-old individual who lives in New York City, New York. She was at one time employed by Defendant Medrite Testing, LLC. FAC ¶¶ 4, 8.

Defendant Medrite Testing, LLC is a New York limited liability company in the business of providing in-home medical testing services. FAC ¶¶ 5-6. Its central facility is located at 344 W 51st St. in Manhattan. FAC ¶ 7.

B. Facts

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Medrite Testing to work as a medical assistant out of Medrite's central facility on March 15, 2021. Her employment commenced on March 16, 2021. Her job was to drive a Medrite vehicle from the central facility to patients' homes, to administer medical tests by collecting body fluid samples, and to return the samples to the central facility. Plaintiff alleges that, up until the days before her termination, she performed her duties with her co-workers without incident. FAC ¶ 10.

On March 29, 2021 (two weeks after she started work), Plaintiff was assigned to work with Mr. Samuel Rodriguez. FAC ¶ 11. According to the FAC, Mr. Rodriguez is roughly thirty years old. FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that, throughout the course of the day on the job, Mr. Rodriguez repeatedly asked her probing questions about her love life. FAC ¶ 13. Plaintiff did not call Mr. Rodriguez out directly on his inappropriate line of questioning; instead, she attempted to change the subject. Id.

Plaintiff did not report Mr. Hernandez to anyone at Medrite Testing. FAC ¶ 14.

The next day, on March 30, 2021, Plaintiff was again assigned to work with Mr. Rodriguez for that day. FAC ¶ 15. He drove the Medrite vehicle while she rode next to him in the passenger seat. Id. Mr. Rodriquez again asked Plaintiff questions about her love life and purportedly referred to Plaintiff and to women in general as “bitches.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that, when Mr. Rodriguez parked the Medrite car at a client's home, Plaintiff did not immediately get out of the vehicle and hoped “that he would exit the vehicle to provide physical distance between them.” FAC ¶ 16. Instead of getting out of the car, Mr. Rodriguez “physically pushed [Plaintiff] and called her a bitch.” Id. In response, Plaintiff alleges that she “push[ed] back against him in his collar area, ” and “insisted that he stop touching her and berating her as a woman.” FAC ¶ 17. Plaintiff states that only then did it become clear to Rodriguez that his behavior was not acceptable to Plaintiff, and that he “sheepishly exited the car.” FAC ¶ 18. Rodriguez performed the testing service for that client while Plaintiff waited in the parked car outside the client's home. Id.

At the end of the workday, Plaintiff returned to the central facility where she filled out paperwork and logged the patient samples collected that day while Rodriguez stayed outside with the Medrite vehicle. FAC ¶ 21. While inside the facility, Plaintiff asserts (vaguely) that she asked “Manager David” whether a fellow employee would be fired if she were to complain about them, to which he replied, “No.” Id. Plaintiff provides no further information about her conversation with Manager David, nor does she specify whether Manager David was her direct manager. She asserts that Manager David went outside to speak with Rodriguez in the course of conducting certain “day-end check-out procedure of [Medrite] Testing's vehicle.” FAC ¶ 22. Plaintiff suspects that it was then that Rodriguez complained to Manager David that Plaintiff had “choked” him. FAC ¶ 23.

Plaintiff alleges that, when she left the Medrite central facility for the day, she “continued to contemplate to whom and how she would allay the hostile situation.” FAC ¶ 24. But she does not allege that she spoke to anyone at Medrite (or otherwise) about the incidents with Rodriguez.

When Plaintiff arrived at the central facility for work the following day (March 31), that she was immediately informed that she would not be assigned to a work detail for the day, and that she was asked to sit outside the human resources office to await for further instruction. FAC ¶ 26. Plaintiff does not specify who gave her these instructions. After waiting nearly two hours, she was summoned into the human resources office by Defendant Christopher Schrier to meet with another unnamed “supervisor.” FAC ¶ 27. Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Schrier was “a supervisor, ” but it is not clear whether he was her supervisor at Medrite Testing; her complaint does not identify Defendant Schrier's title or job function.

Inside the human resources office, the unnamed supervisor presented Plaintiff with a typed statement and instructed her to read it. FAC ¶ 28. By reading the statement as she was asked to do, Plaintiff alleges that she “learned that [Rodriguez] had complained about her, ” to Medrite and had painted her as the “aggressor” in the situation. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the statement reflected that Rodriguez had admitted to using the term “bitch” in his communications with Plaintiff. She provides no further information about the contents of the typed statement that was given to her. Plaintiff pleads that she responded by exclaiming, “I did not ‘choke' him while driving. Do you want to hear my side of the story and what really happened?” Id. The unnamed supervisor responded, “No, our company has a strict policy against touching other employees, so you are fired.” FAC ¶ 29. The unnamed supervisor then demanded that Plaintiff surrender her company identification badge and leave the central facility immediately. FAC ¶ 30.

Plaintiff alleges that she responded, He was touching her [I assume this means ”my”] face, and I asked if they would fire him.” FAC ¶ 31. The supervisor stated that he would talk to Mr. Rodriguez but told Plaintiff to leave the building because her employment was terminated. FAC ¶ 32.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Medrite's “retaliatory choice to fire Ms. Heron for her complaint about unlawful workplace activity, ” caused her emotional distress and economic damages from the loss of her job. FAC ¶¶ 34-36. She does not specify what “complaint” she is referring to; Plaintiff does not allege that she complained to anyone about Mr. Rodriguez before she was terminated.

C. Procedural Posture

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against Defendants on November 16, 2021. Dkt. No. 1. In her original complaint, Plaintiff asserted nine claims against Defendants under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, for sex discrimination and for retaliation. On January 7, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint. Dkt. No. 12. On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”). Dkt. No. 16. In the FAC, Plaintiff has dropped any claim for sex discrimination. Instead, she brings retaliation and aiding and abetting claims against Defendants under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL; and a vicarious liability claim against Medrite under the NYCHRL.

Presently before the court is Defendants' joint motion to dismiss the FAC. See Dkt. No. 20. Defendants move to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Furthermore, Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff's only federal claim (Count I for retaliation in violation of Title VII) fails, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state and city law claims.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

LEGAL STANDARD

In order to “survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To achieve “facial plausibility, ” a claim must contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that “nudge[] [plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations omitted).

“In determining the adequacy of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) consideration is limited to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated into the complaint by reference, and to matters of...

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